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ABSTRACT 
The politicization of the civil service in Mali in the context of democratization had a catastrophic 
effect on the democratization and development process in Mali. In the first decade of 
democratization, the “dominant” party permeated and used the civil service to control and take 
advantage of state resources. In addition, the civil service has been also transformed into a 
funding agency for the “dominant” party as well as coercion and exclusion machinery.  In the 
second decade the rules of the games were changed while the goal and outcome remained the 
same.  “Dominant” party rule has been replaced with a diffused party system under the name of 
“consensus” politics. 
This dissertation examines the phenomenon of the politicization of the Malian civil 
service in the context of democratization as a hindrance for its development into the institution 
needed to support and deliver democracy to citizens.  Such an examination is important to 
uncover a new type of politicization whose objective is not to control the civil service for policy 
purposes, but rather the élite’s organized abuse of the state.  
By using the ethnographic method of studying the concept of politicization of the civil 
service in the context of democratization, this dissertation argues that the phenomenon of 
politicization of the civil service in the context of democratization has been a hindrance for the 
civil service development into the institution needed to support and deliver democracy to 
citizens. This phenomenon of politicization has also destroyed all state institutions and has 
endangered the democratization and development processes.  
The findings of the dissertation show how state leadership has engaged in grand 
corruption and clientelist practices to reinforce its power. The rupture of the state and its civil 
 v 
service from society, the Malian élite’s abuse of the state and its citizens, the joint conspiracy of 
the administrative and political leaders against the people, and the insidious and organized grand 
corruption under implementation have caused a crisis in both state authority and state legitimacy 
as well as the failure of democratization and the development process.  
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
The researcher’s interest in this research began during a conversation with a friend while 
vacationing in Mali in the summer of 1998. This friend asked the researcher for her political 
affiliation and was surprised with the response of having no party affiliation.  Then he 
immediately advised the researcher to join one to give herself a chance to get reappointed as a 
civil servant upon graduation. He explained that the civil service has been captured by political 
leaders and transformed into an instrument at their service.  
The Malian civil service has a long history of politicization. In the colonial era, a 
Governor administered the territory of Mali, called French Sudan. The territory was divided into 
administrative units called “cercles” headed by French “Commandants”. “Cercles” were divided 
into subunits called “cantons” headed by local traditional African leaders and nonmembers of the 
traditional chieftaincy who knew how to read and write French and who were loyal to the 
colonial government (Imperato, 1989).    
At independence, Modibo Keïta became Mali’s first president in 1960.  Keïta was both 
president of the republic and secretary general of the single political party “Union Soudanaise-
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain, (US-RDA).” A charismatic leader, Keïta forged a highly 
centralized form of government following the logic of the command economy and Marxism 
became the guiding political philosophy for his administration. He moved quickly to Africanize 
the civil service, and loyalty to US-RDA became the key criterion for hiring and promotion in 
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the civil service. Keïta was overthrown in the coup d’état of November 19, 1968 (Imperato, 
1989).  
Moussa Traoré led the second Republic of Mali, put all political activity on hold and 
suspended the political institutions.  In 1974, a new constitution was adopted in a referendum, 
leading to the creation of Mali’s single political party, “Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien 
(UDPM)” in 1978. The military continued to dominate the regime; as they controlled the 
economy and strengthened their political power through the distribution of rents. Membership of 
the party and loyalty to the President’s family were the main criteria for obtaining administrative 
appointments at the senior level (Diarrah, 2000).  A popular protest of pro-democratic movement 
ended the Traoré regime in March 1991 (Danté et al, 2001). 
A transitional government called “Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple : CTSP” 
was appointed to launch the process of political pluralism and democratization. The Fundamental 
Act N° 1 specified its term limit and stated that its mandate was to assess the state of the nation 
and to draft a new constitution, a new electoral code, and a new charter of political parties. A 
sovereign National Conference was held from July 29 to August 12, 1991.  
The Malian National Conference was called to formalize and launch the democratization 
process. Its main goal was to delegitimize the single party regime and lay the foundations of a 
new constitutional order consistent with democratic principles.  Since all these drafts were 
written in French, the researcher served as a resource person to explain the content of the various 
drafts to the participants at the National Conference who were not literate in French).  
The National Conference marked the transition from military rule towards the 
rehabilitation of the State.  Pro-change forces succeeded in introducing multiparty politics and 
asserting the rights of ordinary citizens to speak out and organize independently of the state, and 
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demanding accountability from the governing elite. As a result, the élite pledged to rigorously, 
honestly and loyally work toward the building of a democratic society and to bring social and 
economic well-being to the Malian people. After a fourteen-month transition, Mr. Alpha Oumar 
Konaré became the third president of Mali, succeeding to President Moussa Traoré in June 1992.  
After nearly two decades of democratization, the Malian leaders failed to rid the civil 
service of its historical patrimonial legacy. Instead, there has been a persistence of 
patrimonialism, exclusion politics, rampant corruption and the looting of the state within the 
context of multiparty politics.  The “Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali (ADEMA)” the 
dominant political party in power from 1992 to 2002 has used the civil service as an instrument 
of coercion and fundraising for its own benefit. With its exclusionary politics, ADEMA was the 
only party in the game. As such the then highest authorities had captured the civil service and 
turned it into the party’s fundraising instrument on the one hand and in an instrument of 
repression of opposition parties on the other hand.  
President Touré succeeded President Konaré in 2002 and devised an inclusionary 
governance style of “consensus politics”. Then, the practice became a system of placing 
members of political organizations supportive of the executive branch’s agenda in key civil 
service positions to “help them”. Given the spate of political repression and violence under 
ADEMA rule, only few parties claimed to be in the political opposition. In view of Malian 
governmental rejection of political opposition, the state’s highest authorities have used various 
techniques to smother the opposition including exclusion and violence to ensure their compliance 
to the machinations of the “help network”.  In Mali, senior civil servants have colluded with the 
political leadership to engage in grand corruption detrimental to the state, its civil service and the 
democratization process.  
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According to a 2007 World’s enterprise survey, it takes 40.95 days to obtain an operating 
license compared to an average of 23.85 days in countries in the region and 27.63 days in all 
countries.  It takes 133.63 days to obtain a construction-related permit compared to an average of 
52.63 days in countries in the region and 64.80 days in all countries. The survey also found that 
80.35% of the firms expected to give gifts to secure a Government contract compared to an 
average of 38.35% in countries in the region and 28.55% in all countries. According to the 
survey data, 53.95% of firms identified tax rate as a major constraint compared to an average of 
37.99% in countries in the region and 35.70% in all countries. With regard to the infrastructure, 
it was found that it required 42.64 days to obtain water connection compared to an average of 
28.60 days in countries in the region and 34.78 days in all countries. As of telephone connection, 
it takes 43.37 days to obtain a mainline telephone connection compared to an average of 32.73 
days in countries in the region and 25.34 days in all countries.     
The purpose of this dissertation is to bring to light state highest authorities’ sponsored 
grand political corruption and financial delinquency of senior civil placed at key positions and 
”instructed” to rob the state treasury and use the money to service political parties and 
organization under the blanket of democracy. This poses a major challenge to democratization in 
Mali. 
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The consideration of this problem prompts a number of research questions. It is the researcher’s 
contention that politicization weakens the civil service as it hinders its independence, its 
integrity, its autonomy, its responsiveness and the morale of career civil servants. It is the 
researcher’s contention that both democracy and economic development require a strong, 
technically competent, effective, efficient and responsive civil service.  
The main argument of this study is that politicization remains the major hindrance to 
democracy and to development.  
The central questions to be addressed here are as follows: 
1) To what extent are the structural and normative features of the Malian civil service 
in the context of democratization consistent with the Weberian model?  
2) Are relationships between politics and administration alike in Mali and in liberal 
democracies? 
3) How well is the Malian civil service grounded in core democratic values and 
principles to support liberal democracy in the making and to foster development?  
1.3 RATIONALE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study is timely because after nearly two decades of democracy, one of the major problems 
facing Mali today is the politicization of its civil service. Following the overthrow of President 
Moussa Traoré, a transitional committee was appointed to launch a democratization process.  
The first general elections took place in June 1992 and ADEMA came out victorious. Alpha 
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Oumar Konaré, the newly elected ADEMA presidential candidate in coalition with other 
political parties signed the “Pacte Republicain”. The ruling party was expected to devise the 
institutions of a democratic society.  
The second election was organized in 1997 by an independent electoral commission. 
However, many opposition parties decided to boycott the elections as an expression of their 
discontent about the behavior of the civil service, accusing President Konaré of heavily 
politicizing it to serve ADEMA’s interests. They filed lawsuits to request the nullifying of the 
elections, arguing that the Konaré’s administration and the civil service conspired through 
various maneuvers to ensure ADEMA’s victory. The constitutional court invalidated the 
elections on the grounds of various irregularities.  
First, there was too much wavering in the setting of the electoral calendar. With regard to 
the parliamentary elections, March 9, 1997 and March 23, 1997 were the dates set for the first 
and second rounds respectively. However, the promulgation of the electoral law as the basis of  
the whole process was delayed until January 14, 1997 because of disagreements between the 
ruling party and the “Collectif des Partis Politiques de l’Opposition (COPPO)”, or the coalition 
of opposition political parties. In addition, the “Commission Electorale Nationale et 
Indépendente ( CENI)”, the national independent electoral commission, the key player in 
elections was established only on January 24, 1997.  These two delays and the amount of work 
that lay ahead made it impossible to meet elections deadlines. Because the term of deputies 
would end on April 17, 1997 the President of the Republic resorted to the dissolution of the 
National assembly on March 3 to be able to set new election dates of April 13, 1997 and April 
27, 1997 respectively for the first and second rounds (Sow, 2008). 
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Despite the postponement, CENI was faced with numerous problems. Accordingly, the 
president of the organization acknowledged the impossibility to plan and hold free and fair 
elections under such conditions and suggested delaying the elections to the Prime minister. CENI 
president announced on national television and radio that the prime minister rejected his 
suggestion to postpone the elections and firmly instructed that elections be planned and held 
regardless of the conditions. In reaction to the Prime minister’s instructions, COPPO accused the 
ruling power of trying by all means to cling to power and threatened to boycott the upcoming 
elections.   
Despite these reactions, ADEMA found a way to strengthen its position within the civil 
service. The party instructed the Ministry of Territorial Administration and the Directorate of 
Elections, the two administrative entities involved in the electoral process along with the CENI 
to proceed to the planning and administration of the elections without the CENI.  
  The study is significant because since the fall of authoritarian regimes and the 
emergence of competitive politics in Africa, numerous studies have been conducted on various 
subjects. These subjects range from the cultural aspects of democracy (Nzouankeu J-M. 1991; 
Jung W. and Krieger S. 1994), to national conferences (Adamo, A. D., 1995; Eboussi, B.1993) to 
constitutional debates (Jung W. and Krieger S. 1994), to the legitimating of elections and the 
electoral process, to developmental aspects of democracy (Sandbrook, 2000), to the assessment 
of democratic experiments (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997), to consolidating democracy 
(Vengroff and Magala, 2001), to prospects of democracy (Wiseman, J. 1990) and so on.  Two 
articles have been published on the politicization of the civil service.  The first was authored by 
A. K. Gitonga, who argued that the politicization of the public service is one of the biggest 
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controversial issues in the post-colonial African public service. The second was published in the 
1994 book of “African Perspectives on Development: Controversies, Dilemmas and Openings.”  
In the case of Mali, there have been a number of studies conducted since the re-
emergence of competitive politics in the 1990s.  These include Kester and al’s 1997 book on the 
role of unions in building a sustainable democracy; Diarrah’s 1996 book on democratic 
challenge in Mali; Sidibé and  Kester’s 1994 book on the national dialogue on democracy; 
Vengroff’s 1993 and 1994 work on political parties, party system and electoral system in Mali; 
Diarra’s 1995 and Molinier’s 1994 articles on the constitutional debate in Mali, Nzouankeu’s 
1993 and Pimont’s 1993 publications on the role of national conferences; Nzouankeu’s article on 
the transition to democracy in Benin and Mali.  
A survey of the literature on Mali has revealed that there is no study on the phenomenon 
of politicization and that little attention has been given to the civil service within the new context 
of democratization and competitive politics in Mali.  Therefore, this research is a pioneer work 
on the subject.  Knowing the key role that the civil service plays in the state, it is this public 
administration that this study attempts to address. The objective is to examine the process of 
building a civil service institution based on the legal-rational model capable of responding to the 
demands of citizens.  The ultimate goal is to examine the phenomenon of politicization of the 
civil service as one aspect of the problem of institutionalization of the state, deeply rooted in its 
political-institutional heritage, in the context of pluralistic politics in Mali. It is intended to shed 
light on the phenomenon of politicization of the civil service in Mali and its impact on the 
building of a professional civil service capable of mediating between the governors and the 
governed. By investigating the politicization of the civil service system, it may be possible to 
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transform the existing civil service into a new system capable of mediating between the state and 
citizens through the delivery of democracy and development. 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
This dissertation is comprised of seven chapters. Chapter one has introduced the problem under 
investigation; provided the background of the problem; stated the research questions and outlined 
the rationale and significance of the study. Chapter two provides the review of the literature on 
the problem. Chapter three explains the conceptual framework and the research methodology. 
The contextual analysis is given in Chapter four. Chapter five presents respondents’ perspective. 
Chapter six explains the politicization of the Malian civil service. Chapter seven concludes the 
dissertation. 
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2.0  A LITERATURE REVIEW: POLITICIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN A 
DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT 
2.1 THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY  
Theorists of democracy have yet to reach a consensus on the meaning of democracy.  There is a 
vast array of democracies throughout the world. Theorists of democracy have tried to classify 
democracies into few broad types to facilitate the study of democracy.  In the views presented 
here, Mali is closest to a pseudo-democracy given the quality of its governance and state 
institutions. It was a “hegemonic party system” under President Konaré in which ADEMA 
leadership engaged in severe repression, patronage, and held the civil service captive to weaken 
opposition parties.  This new party system became encompassing, preferential with a nonviolent 
clever refusal of the political opposition.  
2.1.1 Democratic Theory  
Collier and Levitsky (1997) identify a host of subtypes of democracies considering the range and 
extent of their political features. In this line of thinking, Diamond (1999) suggests four broad 
types of democracy namely electoral democracy, liberal democracy, midrange democracy and 
pseudo democracy.  
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2.1.1.1 Electoral Democracy 
 
According to Diamond (1999), electoral democracy was first defined by Schumpeter (1947) as a 
system “for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”  Huntington (1993), Lipset, (1981, 1994), 
Linz (1978), Przeworski (1991) among others have endorsed, clarified and refined Schumpeter’s 
(1947) definition with regard to its content and meaning. Collier and Levitsky (1997) have called 
this exercise a periodic “precising”. Schumpeter’s (1947) emphasis on elections is somewhat 
misleading because multiparty elections do not necessarily guarantee either the participation of 
all the citizens to the democratic process or the advancement of all citizens’ interests (Schmitter 
and Karl, 1993). Second paragraph. 
 
2.1.2 Liberal  Democracy 
Dahl (1971), in his “procedural theory” or “polyarchy has suggested a number of conditions of 
democracy. First and foremost, elected officials must be vested with constitutional powers to run 
government.  Second, state officials must be chosen in periodic, fair and free elections.  Third, all 
adult citizens must have the right to vote and to run for office.  Forth, citizens’ freedom to access 
information,  freedom of expression, freedom of publication of information, freedom of 
assembly and freedom of association must be protected (Dahl, 1971).  
Diamond (1999) identifies three dimensions to Dahl’s conception of “polyarchy” namely 
opposition, participation and civil liberties. Opposition refers to competition to access public 
office through regular, free, and fair elections. Participation is about the right for all adults to 
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vote and compete for office.  Civil liberties entail the right of expression, the right to form or 
adhere to organizations, the right to assembly, the right to access information and the right to 
inform.  
Diamond (1999) also finds some key components of democracy, namely the checks and 
balances through the separation of powers, the recognition and protection of minority rights, and 
the protection of individual freedom of belief and opinion. All these rights, freedoms and 
pluralism, the author argued, can exist only within the framework of the “rule of law”.    
Schmitter and Karl (1993) define democracy as “a system of governance in which rulers 
are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the 
competition and cooperation of their elected representatives”. According to the authors, “a 
system of governance is an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the 
principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such 
access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the 
making of publicly binding decisions”. This “ensemble” must be written in the form of a 
constitution and its subsequent laws (Schmitter and Karl, 1993).   
Schmitter and Karl (1993) add two more conditions although they agreed with Dahl’ 
definition. The first addition is that popularly elected officials should be able to freely exercise 
the constitutional powers vested in them. The second addition is that there should be no outside 
interference to influence state power.  By making these two additions, the authors sought to 
protect the sovereignty of nation-states by preserving their autonomy.  
Turpin (1992) defines democracy as “a freedom, one of these words that ‘sing more that 
they speak’ and in the name of which a lot of crimes have been committed”. Gonidec (1977) 
asserts that “according to the new constitutionalism, liberal democracy rests on four foundations 
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or four pillars: the rule of law, the recognition and the protection of human rights, pluralism, a 
representative regime; these pillars are the building blocks of the democratic edifice”. 
2.1.3 Midrange Democracies 
The Midrange Democracies are subtypes of democracies which are somewhere between electoral 
democracy and liberal democracy. They include basic freedoms of expression and association, 
but restrict citizens’ rights and have a flawed rule of law in which legal rules are applied unfairly 
and inconsistently. Linz (1996) defines midrange democracies as a political system which 
guaranties basic political freedoms, and regular, free and fair competitions for all public offices. 
This definition is an expansion of the Schumpeterian conception of democracy which 
undermines the reserved domains of power and suggests that electoral competition be based 
solely on basic political freedoms with no concerns about the protection of civil liberties and 
minorities’ rights.   
O’Donnell (1996) defines midrange democracies as a system that includes all the 
attributes of Dahl’s “polyarchy” to which he added two more features.  The first addition is that 
elected officials should not be arbitrarily removed from office before the end if their terms. The 
second addition is that elected officials should not be subject to severe constraints, vetoes or 
exclusion from certain policy domains. The reason for these additions is to secure a meaningful 
power for elected officials. The basic argument of O’Donnell (1996) is that many third-wave 
democracies are polyarchies with rampant clientelism and particularism with little concern about 
accountability to citizens and respect of formal rules.  
Schmitter and Karl (1993) do not believe that democracies are necessarily better than 
autocratic regimes in solving citizens’ problems. But by guaranteeing freedom, pluralism and the 
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possibility of choosing state officials through frequent, fair and free elections, liberal democracy 
appears to be the only form of governance likely to reduce poverty and social injustice, redirect 
ill-designed policies and curb corruption.  In that regard, democracy should be considered to be a 
developmental undertaking (Diamond 1999).  
Bruszt and Stark, (1997) argue that no democracy is capable of solving all the problems 
that society face. But giving more space to civil society groups, empowering historically 
powerless groups, encouraging citizens’ participation in the political process, ensuring 
government responsiveness and accountability may increase elected officials legitimacy. 
Putnam, (1995) asserts that citizens’ participation in the political process builds trust, reciprocity 
and cooperation; it reduces cynicism, encourages political participation, economic development, 
democratic stability and the resolution of social problems.  
From a developmental perspective, Sklar (1987) affirms that democracy is likely to move in any 
direction.  There is no single way of emergence of elements of liberal democracy. Once 
democracy emerges, Diamond (1999) calls our attention to the need for nurturing it to prevent 
the breakdown of its formal institutions leading to its decay.    
2.1.4 Pseudo-Democracies and Non-Democracies 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1995) include what they call “pseudo democracies” as a fourth 
category of democratic regimes. According to the authors these are authoritarian regimes in 
disguise with some democratic features such as multiparty elections.  Pseudo democracies 
include semi democracies which are closest to electoral democracies in their pluralism and 
competiveness, as well as what Sartori (1976) called “hegemonic party system” in which a 
relatively institutionalized ruling party engages in a variety of actions to deny formally legal 
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opposition parties a chance to compete for power.  In the latter systems, the ruling party regularly 
wins massively all the elections and maintains itself in power.  Pseudo democracies also include 
multiparty electoral systems in which the undemocratic dominance of the ruling party may be 
weak and contested, highly personalistic and poorly institutionalized or in the process of turning 
into a more competitive system.  
Pseudo-democracies tolerate legal opposition parties and give more space for 
organizational pluralism and dissent activity in civil society than non-democracies. Pseudo-
democracies vary in their repressiveness and in their readiness to transform into electoral 
democracy.  Thus, pseudo-democracies tend to have somewhat higher levels of freedom than 
other authoritarian regimes. Diamond (1999) argues that pseudo-democracies who tolerate 
opposition parties in the electoral process and who provides civil society with more space are 
likely to develop into true democracies.  He is optimistic that many African countries have 
democratic features; therefore, they are likely to transform their regimes into full democracy.      
2.1.5 African Vision of Democracy 
 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, liberal democracy has become the universal model of 
governance regardless of the diversity of cultures. In the 1990s, democracy appeared to be the 
top priority in Africa and particularly in Mali where the fall of single party dictatorship occurred 
in bloodshed. There is a consensus among African scholars that some form of democracy has 
always existed in the African culture and society even prior to colonization.  
Buchmann (1962) asserts that “Africa also had its true mystic of democracy”. Through 
his extensive work on pre-colonial black Africa, Diop, (cited in Sow, 2008), argued that black 
Africans have experienced democracy before colonization outside the framework of republics 
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when he stated that “Africans have never lived a republic experience, although the regimes have 
been democratic almost everywhere, with balanced powers… The king had no power; but power 
belonged to society. The manifestation of this was that the king could be put to death as he was 
also chosen by a council of wise men; which implied democracy not in the sense of pluralism but 
in the sense of control over leaders”.   
Building on Diop’s (cited in Sow, 2008) work, N’Guema, (1992) supports the idea that 
some form of democracy has existed in pre-colonial Africa when he said: “According to 
proponents of the positivist thesis, democracy exists and is documented in traditional African 
societies where notions of people, human, nation, State, right, justice, freedom, equality, God, 
have a true meaning…It is only that these notions are conceived, perceived, organized and 
structured according to another vision, or if we prefers, according to another logic”.  
In the same line of thinking, Randrianja, (1995) declares that a democratic popular 
culture has existed in pre-colonial times. Africa.  Ba (2001) explains that “customary authorities’ 
power was neither arbitrary nor absolute…Of course the traditional chiefs also detained an 
enormous power, but most often, this power was strictly regulated by tradition, therefore, could 
not become either absolute or arbitrary. Traditional chiefs were being considered receivers of a 
divine power, they had to abide by strict behavior rules and there were multiple ways and means 
of controlling them”. 
However, scholars of African development find some key features that distinguish the 
African society from the western society. According to Guéma (1992), it is the law of the state 
that applies to all citizens and assures social cohesion in Western societies while in African 
societies, social cohesion is the result of people’s desire and willingness to live together and 
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cooperate with one another. Ardant, (1995) underlined the centrality of the individual in Western 
democratic societies. 
The above cited authors believe that the success of liberal democracy in Africa is 
contingent to a number of conditions. Gonidec (1977) firmly believes that individual freedom in 
Africa is severely restricted by the dynamics of groups that derive from the social life. Mbaye 
(1992) argues from human rights standpoint. According to the author, in the West, human rights 
are instruments that protect the individual against society, while in Africa their goal is to assure 
harmony and social cohesion by reinforcing the individual’s acceptance in the community.  
Human rights in Africa do not have the conflict character rather they bond the individual with the 
community (Mbaye, 1992).  
There is a widely held belief that democracy evolved from a culture generated by a 
society.  As a result, Alliot (1993) deplores the attitude of westerners toward the African public 
decision making culture. The author explains that if in the West it is the state that makes the 
society, in Africa it is the common decision making which takes a unanimous form called 
consensual. He finds it very unfortunate that western scholars do not consider this process of 
decision making to be democratic, despite its representative feature, because groups are more 
often represented by elders. 
For Elliot’s (1993) various citizens groups’ struggle to seek recognition and to influence 
public decision-making through mass demonstrations in western democracies has exposed the 
limits of state officials’ decision making power. If this has allowed the author to infer that 
western “organized democracy” may be evolving into “African natural democracy”, it has also 
given some insights into how to transform “African natural democracy” into “organized 
democracy”.  Obviously, these various statements call upon the African élite to either reflect on 
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the concept of liberal democracy and its viability in Africa or to consider African “natural 
democracy” as one type of democracy.  
Alliot (1994) goes further to pose the problematic of democratization in Africa and 
therefore the problematic of the nature of the African State. This has become a persistent 
problem since the emergence of democracy in the 1990s. That is why Leroy (cited in Sow) called 
upon the élites for an invention of an “authentic African democracy” built upon the adaptation of 
colonial legacy, shared governance consistently with African values, the respect of the challenger 
and the rule of law. 
 Finally, the French interference in its former colonies is also an impediment to the 
progress of the democratization process in these countries. Sow (2008) cites the editorial of the 
1981 issue of the journal “Politique Africaine: African Politics which discussed the problematic 
character of France’s double standards on African policy.  Indeed, the French government which 
took office in 1981 dealt selectively with the issue of human rights on the African continent to 
accommodate French interests in Africa.   
Sow (2008) believes that the task of African societies seems particularly difficult because 
of their dual traditional and colonial past.  In this endeavor, many concepts have been considered 
by both eminent scholars of African development in their efforts to construct a true democratic 
postcolonial state. However, nearly two decades after the fall of single party and military 
dictatorships, democratization is far from finding its way especially with regard to the inclusion 
of the African culture in the states systems of governance. In this regard, Badié (1990) 
acknowledges hesitant non-western societies between adaptation and innovation. This author 
finds the latter more viable in the long-run and the former more realistic and rational in the short 
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run. Other scholars offer the perspective adaptation and argue that colonialism or post-
colonialism are not points in time.  It is an evolving process that synthesizes elements of both.   
The above contributions to the debate show how difficult it is for a given culture, to 
integrate elements coming from a different society.  Meny (1993) underlines the failure of the 
new African constitutionalism through discrepancies between the affirmed big principles and 
their implementation. Unfortunately, most francophone African states, after independence and 
even after the democratic revolution of the1990s, engaged more in imitation than innovation, not 
to mention invention (Sow, 2008).  As a result, institutional and political practices often deviate 
from the adopted rules.  Rules and principles are either abandoned or are bent to the interests of  
high authorities. (Sow, 2008). Therefore, the civil service has failed to deliver democracy in the 
African democratic context.  
2.1.6 Malian Version of Liberal Democracy  
The Malian Constitution of 1992 featured both popular and national sovereignty, unlimited 
multiparty system, electoral competition and separation of powers.  
2.1.6.1 Popular sovereignty vs. national sovereignty  
Bangoura (2003) notes the urgency to affirm the foundation of democracy in most Africans 
States.  In their quest to restitute to the people its most fundamental power which has been 
confiscated by authoritative and autocratic regimes, most African States proclaimed principles of 
both  popular and national sovereignty their corollaries, namely multiparty system, electoral 
competition, separation of power and respect of rights and liberties.  
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These democratic features are affirmed in articles 25, 26, 27, 29, and 118 of the Malian 
Constitution of 1992.   
Article 25:  “Mali is an independent, sovereign, indivisible, democratic, secular and 
social Republic. Its principle is government of the people, by the people, for the people. 
National sovereignty belongs to all the people who exercise it through its representatives 
 or through referenda. 
Article 26: “No fraction of the people, no individual can claim to usurp its exercise”. 
Article 27: “The suffrage is universal, equal and discreet”. 
Article 28: “Political parties participate to the expression of the suffrage. They form and 
exercise  
freely their activities in the conditions determined by the law. They must respect  
principles of national sovereignty, democracy, territorial integrity, national unity and the  
secularism of the State.  
Article 118: “The republican form of the State and its secularism as well as multiparty 
system shall not be changed”. 
So the Malian Constitution included both direct democracy (popular sovereignty) drawn 
from the theory of Rousseau and indirect democracy (national sovereignty) drawn from the 
theory of representative democracy. The principle of representative democracy requires the 
selection of people’s representatives through multiparty electoral competition. Unfortunately, 
80% of the Malian population is excluded from the democratic process because of its illiteracy in 
French the official language in which the official documents are written.  Consequently, only the 
20% who know how to read and write, the élite truly participate in the democratic process. This 
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situation has a negative effect on the state system of governance and the particularly on the 
principles of sovereignty, the foundation of democracy and development (Sow, 2008).  
All this political arrangement is meant to operate on the principle of separation of 
powers. Indeed, “national and popular sovereignty” entails the separation of powers, secularism, 
multiparty system, electoral competition and recognition and protection of human rights and civil 
liberties (Constitution, 1992).  
2.1.6.2 Unbounded Multiparty System  
Mali’s national liberation struggle was led by multiple parties which merged to form two 
coalitions: “Parti Progressiste Soudanais (PSP)” and “Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement 
Démocratique Africain (US-RDA)”, a territorial section of the larger “Rassemblement 
Démocratique Africain” created in Bamako in October 1946.  
The multiparty system also included union pluralism, affiliated with unions in the 
metropolis. In 1991, multiparty system, as a radical demand of the Democratic Movement has 
been translated into an ideology at the National Conference.  Although political actors and 
international development partners made African people believe that multiparty system is a 
panacea in the early 1990s, many scholars were not convinced that multiparty system would be 
the solution to the crisis of the State in Africa. They suggested that multiparty system being a 
western institution may need some adjustment to function in the African context (Sow, 2008).  
The challenges to democracy in Africa was that multiparty system is likely to produce a 
“dominant party” which can exercise power alone, paralyzing the legislative system, crushing the 
opposition and putting democracy in jeopardy.  As Ki-Zerbo (1998), pointed it out, power 
alternation requires a viable opposition.   
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The Malian Charter of political parties includes a preamble and sixty one articles.  The 
Charter addresses the followings issues: 1) citizens equal participation to the political life; 2)  
preservation and consolidation of independence, territorial integrity and national unity; 3) 
Free, pacific and fair participation of political parties in electoral competition; 4) adherence to 
the universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 10, 1948 and subsequent instruments.  
The Charter affirmed political parties’ duties of civic education.  It defines the conditions 
for the creation, functioning and financing of political parties and provides for a moral and legal 
framework for political parties.  Finally, although the National Conference did not accept the 
financing of political parties with public money, pressure from the political community forced 
President Konaré to institute the public financing of political parties under certain conditions 
clearly stated (Sow, 2008).  
The unintended effects of this public financing were political opportunism, political 
clientelism and the fragmentation of the political community. In addition, the Malian multiparty 
system turns out to be disruptive to democracy with its rejection of political opposition. In this 
regard, Sow’s (2008) claimed that the Malian system of governance is a “democracy without the 
people”. The Charter of the opposition parties was passed to strengthen political opposition.   
2.1.6.3 Electoral Competition  
International development partners have largely favored and supported electoral democracy in 
Africa. The Malian Electoral Law touches upon every aspect of the elections. Despite the 
existence of this law, Malian political parties have not been capable of holding a single election 
without numerous allegations of fraud, cheating and other practices that adversely affected 
election outcomes. As a result, it has caused court litigations and brought political actors and 
civil society organizations to request a revision of the law.  
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The tampering of the electoral outcome is an old and recurrent practice performed by the 
civil service to grant victory to the “party of notables” or canton chiefs, the colonial masters’ 
favorite parties. Parties have a key role in the organization and the regulation of modern 
democratic systems. But politics in Africa has always been characterized by violence, disorder, 
personalization of power and weakness of constitutional rules and principles. Parties as western 
imports seem to have difficulty adapting to the African political life, just like liberal 
constitutionalism or representative government.  
Multiparty system and electoral competition are two pillars of liberal democracy.  The 
failure of the democratic era constitutions coupled with the failure of multiparty system and the 
electoral competition could be signaling that majoritarian democracy is not suitable for Africa; 
rather, consensual democracy might be more likely to cater to Africa’s development needs.   
From 1992 to 2002 turnout of presidential and legislative elections were low as they 
never reached 50%.  For the constitutional referendum of January 1992, the turnout rate was 
43%. For the presidential of 1992 to 2002, the mean is 28, 41% while for the presidential 
elections 2007 the rate of involvement was 36, 24%. 
As of court litigations, there were 197 requests for annulment of the 2002 presidential 
elections and 250 requests for annulment of the 2007presidential elections. For the legislative, 
there were 505 requests for annulment in 2002 and 250 requests for annulment of 2007elections 
(Sow, 2008). These demonstrates the fluctuating character of an organization that is constantly 
struggling and desperately trying to find a better formula, after almost twenty years of 
democratization and multiparty experiment. As far as rates are concerned, political party 
representation and the number of the court cases are proofs of the maladjustment of liberal 
democracy in Mali.  
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2.1.6.4 Separation of Powers  
The principle of the separation of power derived from Montesquieu’s works in France, later 
elaborated by Locke. It was based on the assumption that “any man who has the power is likely 
to abuse it”, that is why it is important that “power stops power”. For Turpin (1992), the need for 
power limitation “has two objectives, the protection of the liberty and the efficiency of the 
government…”  
The principle of the separation of power is affirmed in the 1992 Malian Constitution.  
Unfortunately, there is a discrepancy between the principles and the political practice. The 
dominant party ADMA neutralized the principle and ended up assuring its control on all the 
State institutions including the legislative power. With 76 seats out of 116 in 1992 and 128 
deputies plus 13 seats from allied parties out of a total of 147, ADEMA secured more than the 
absolute majority, while turning the National Assembly into a registration room. The same 
situation continued with the third legislature built on the “consensus”.  
These are the features and the functioning of the separation of powers in the Malian 
democratic system. The African culture is based on dialogue and conciliation. The electoral 
system of the “winner takes all” which excludes a large segment of the population is not 
consistent with the African culture and cannot support democracy in Africa.  Instead, it 
encourages the emergence of a dominant party which later transforms the system into a single 
party system under the cover of a democracy: a pseudo democracy.   
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2.2 CIVIL SERVICE  
2.2.1 Theories of Civil Servants’ Behavior 
Various theories have been proposed to explain bureaucratic behavior. The view of bureaucrats 
as generous social guardians maximizing general welfare considered to be the objectives of the 
state dominated the public administration literature of the 1960s and 1970s. From the 1980s, 
public choice theorists criticized the perspective and introduced the concept of civil servants as 
people who pursue their self-interest, rather than the common good. Though, public choice 
theories have been criticized for their emphasis on economic aspects only. 
2.2.1.1 Public Servants as Social Welfare Maximizers  
The development literature of the 1960s and 1970s viewed civil servants as being motivated by 
maximizing public welfare. Proponents of civil servants as public welfare maximizers such as 
Bentham (1834), Von Mises (1944) Weber (1946), Bardhan (1988), Das (1998), portrayed civil 
servants as people who place public interest before their personal interests before. These authors’ 
assumption is that people selected for public office, protected from political and economic 
pressure, and given knowledge and power to do what they think is in public interest are likely to 
act in public interest. Particularly, Weber’s (1946) concept of bureaucratic “impersonality”, 
argued that civil servants’ behavior is governed by rules, which require them to be deprived from 
their private interests. Such deprivation is what Weber called “publicness” and the rules 
governing and defining the behavior of civil servants are meant to ensure the advancement of 
public interest. For Weber the rules governing selection, appointment, advancement and other 
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bureaucratic discretion are also intended to curb civil servants’ self interested behavior and 
encourage accountability.  
According to Bardhan (1988), after independence, the civil servants behaved as guardians 
of public interest in the context of command economy system of governance operating in the 
state being viewed as a welfare–maximizer. Grindle (1991) added it was believed that 
government would make appropriate policies with the necessary technical advice about how to 
achieve citizens’ well being.  If a policy fails to achieve welfare, it was because of the poor 
quality of the information or the wrong analysis.  
It should be noted that these theories have been developed in the era of single party 
regimes and the command economic planning in which the state was seen as the engine of 
development. As a result, the civil service of the newly independent states could only have a 
social welfare maximizing behavior. As these regimes evolved into authoritarian regimes, the 
civil service was transformed into an instrument at the service of the ruling powers. That was 
why the civil service in these countries was permeated by rampant corruption, clientelism and 
widespread patronage in its functioning. The rules governing the selection, appointment and 
promotion of civil servants have contributed to curbing patronage. However, the rules which 
defined the behavior of civil servants and governed their discretionary power in decision making 
did not generate structures of accountability. Instead, such rules have been distorted and turned 
into rent-seeking practices. Therefore one can say that the Weberian prescriptions for the civil 
service do not seem to be very effective in curbing civil servants’ self-interested behavior. 
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2.2.1.2 Civil Servants as Self-Interest Seekers: Public Choice Theory 
Opponents of the perspective of civil servants as welfare maximizers such as Tullock (1965), 
Downs (1966), Niskanen (1971), Bates (1981), have engaged in bureaucratic bashing to argue 
for their self-interested behavior. Bates (1981) conducted a study of civil servants in tropical 
Sub-Saharan African states and his findings supported the thesis of self-interested behavior of 
civil servants.  He explains how civil servants have used the process of industrialization to take 
bribes in exchange for access to public services as their reluctance to pursue failing policies.  
 Tullock (1965), Niskanen (1971) and Krueger (1993) use evidence from their studies of 
the civil service to argue that civil servants are rational individuals primarily concerned with 
maximizing their self-interest in the form of economic gains such as: "salary, prerequisites of the 
office, public reputation, power, patronage...and the ease of managing the bureau."  Downs 
(1966) sees civil servants as “utility maximizers” because they are largely motivated by their 
self-interests in the decision making process. Public choice theory attempts to explain the 
behavior of civil servants under authoritarian regimes in less developed countries from the 
economic perspective.  But economics alone cannot explain complex administrative issues.  
2.2.1.3 Critiques of Public Choice Theory 
Detractors of public choice theory like Beetham (1987) and Dunleavy (1991) argue that the 
theory has failed miserably. Beetham (1987) contended that the assumption about the self-
interested character of human nature is very narrow and that if economics can be applied to the 
private sector, it has a very little relevance for explaining complex situations within the public 
sector administrative matters. Public administration is different from the private sector, because 
it is subject to a whole range of scrutiny and its purpose is to provide public services in 
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accordance with both political and legal criteria of performance.  In addition, the philosophy of 
public service is a very important aspect of public administration.   
Dunleavy (1991) used what he calls a "collective action problem” to criticize public 
choice model particularly both Niskanen and Downs’s models to support the notion of failure of 
public choice models of bureaucratic behavior as well as the disparate nature of the components 
of public choice theory. Bureaus are obviously made up of large numbers of staff, each of which 
will have its own unique utility functions.  Consequently, collective-action is more likely to work 
in the civil service (Dunleavy, 1991). Findlay (1991) examines the conflict between the self-
interest behavior of civil servants and the interest of citizens. For the author, if civil servants are 
individualistic self-interest seekers, mainly concerned with maximizing their own well being, to 
what extent this behavior conflicts with the interests of the citizens they are supposed to serve? 
If public administration is subjected to multiple types and levels of scrutiny in western 
nations, this has not always been the case in Less Developed countries. The motivation of civil 
servants is to provide for citizens’ needs in accordance with both political and criteria of 
performance. However, the civil service in less developed countries did so poorly in public 
service provision because the ruling powers have turned captured it and turned it into an 
instrument at their service. As a result, civil servants abandoned the “public service” philosophy 
a major aspect of bureaucratic action, and espoused the values of the ruling power.  
This literature was built on the corporatist behavior of civil servants. The social welfare 
maximizing argument was based on the assumption that civil servants’ behavior was shaped by 
patriotism and the socialist ideology.  The public choice theory was developed on the hypothesis 
that civil servants were more concerned about the protection of their “corporatist” interests. 
Since the launching of the democratization process, neither of these theories has been able to 
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explain Malian civil servants’ behavior.  The so called “democratic governance system” has 
forced the Malian civil servant to develop a behavior of “pragmatism” to accommodate political 
officials’ in their pursuit of both personal and party economic interests with little concern for the 
citizens.  This research argues that such association of the civil service with the political 
community does not serve democracy; rather, it contributes to its crumble.  
2.2.1.4 Civil Service and Democratic Values and Principles  
The “raison d’être” of the civil service operating in the context of democratic governance is to 
deliver democracy and development.  Civil servants have the “obligation” of upholding 
democracy and the Constitution and to make sure that public policies are consistent with 
citizens’ true wills.  They must create conditions which allow for citizens’ access to their 
constitutional rights in the framework of the rule of law (Waldo, 1980; Frederickson and Hart, 
1997; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003; Berkley and Rouse, 2004; Shafritz and Russel, 2005; 
Rosenbloom, and Kravchuk, 2005). To do so, civil servants need a broad knowledge base, 
technical skills and expertise sustained by high moral qualities and mental attitudes, the passion 
for public service and the quest for efficiency. They must use their expertise and their 
professionalism to encourage citizens’ involvement in the policy making process (Mosher, 1982; 
King and Stivers, 1998)  
2.2.2 Roles and Responsibilities of Public Servants in Democracy  
Hamilton (2007) argues that for democracy to function and thrive, it needs to have a strong and 
professional civil service.  Mosher (1982), Frederickson (1997) and Gawthrop (1998) embrace 
Hamilton’s argument of a strong civil service to uphold democratic values and principles, with a 
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special emphasis on training and professionalism. Hamilton (2007) identifies a number of roles 
and responsibilities of public servants. They are 1) “delivery of democracy” and promotion of 
the public interest, 2) management and administration of public agencies and implementation of 
public policy and 3) development of professionalism, accountability and reliability, grounded in 
moral qualities and ethical values. 
2.2.3 “Delivery of Democracy” and Promotion of Public Interests    
This responsibility that falls in the shoulders of civil servants requires them to be fair, just and 
equitable in their decisions and actions in order to help citizen enjoy liberty, justice, freedom 
equality and equity. They owe to their commitment to excellence in public service to serve 
citizens with respect and devotion (Gawthrop, 1998; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003).  Frontline 
civil servants’ successful mediation between the state and citizens is the evidence of “public 
administration’s contribution to an ongoing renewal and reaffirmation of the social contract” 
(Frederickson and Chandler, 1997).  
2.2.3.1 Management and Administration of Public Agencies and  Implementation of Public 
Policy 
Hamilton (2007) insists on the role of public servants as managers and administrators of public 
agencies because administrative procedures are crucial in upholding democratic principles and 
values.  That is why Gawthrop (1998) prescribes the need for frequently reviews of 
administrative procedures to ensure they truly support democratic viability.  
Box (1998) sheds the light on civil servants’ role in public policy-making process and its 
implementation. The author distinguishes three types of public servants in the public policy 
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making process. The first type is composed of “implementers”, those so called “neutral” 
practitioners who limit themselves solely to a policy implementation role. The second type he 
calls “controller” are practitioners who attempt to influence “their supervisors, politicians or 
citizens” in the policy making process.   The last type is made up with “helpers” who take the 
role of mediators between politicians and citizens in the policy making process.  
2.2.3.2 Development of Professionalism, Accountability, Reliability,  
Moral and Ethical Values  
Public servants must possess a large knowledge base, be well-educated and well trained 
professionals with moral and ethical character to be apt to solving complex and pressing social 
problems (Hamilton (2007; Gawthrop, 1998; Mosher, 1892; Lipset, 1995). These are the roles 
that civil servants are expected to play in western democracies.     
2.2.4 African Civil Service System and the African Environment 
At independence, most of African governments have not been successful in adapting their 
inherited civil service systems to their contextual conditions. Although these colonial civil 
service systems were built according to the principles of the Weberian bureaucracy with regard 
to their structures, their underlying ideas and visions were different (Darbon, 1991; Adamolekun, 
2002; Balogun, 2002; Sow, 2008).  Some scholars believed that the imported civil service 
systems from metropolitan countries to colonies have been corrupted by local cultural values in 
their adaptation process. These changes have adversely affected African civil service systems 
(Darbon, 1991; Ndi Zambo, 1997; Kamto, 1997; Adamolekun, 2002).   
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2.2.4.1 African Civil Services as Transferred Institutions 
The post-colonial African system of government and administration did not undergo the process 
of adaptation despite Riggs’s (1963) warning about the transferability of western forms of 
government and administration to developing countries. At independence, the majority of these 
countries inherited systems of government and civil services that have evolved in the history, 
culture and traditions of the metropolis.  The inherited political and administrative systems have 
common features (Balogun, 2002). The newly independent secular States were to be guided in 
their actions by Constitutions, replicas of the Constitutions of the former colonial master, as well 
as a body of laws regulating their day-to-day life (Balogun, 2002; Sow, 2008). These 
Constitutions provided that the new States were founded on the will of the people and shall be 
run according to liberal democratic principles (Balogun, 2002). 
The new States were also to sit on the principles of separation of powers between the 
legislative, the executive and the judiciary.  The legislative branch, a popularly elected body, was 
to pass laws and perform budget analysis and general control functions following the procedures 
that have evolved over centuries in the metropolis (Balogun, 2002; Sow, 2008).   
The second body was the executive branch, headed by a president or prime minister, 
responsible for law enforcement and the implementation of policies and programs.  This branch 
was created to implement the laws appropriately enacted by the legislature and in case of legal 
dispute, to seek clarifications and interpretations from the judicial branch (Balogun, 2002; Sow, 
2008).   The third branch, an independent judiciary, was to arbitrate on constitutional and legal 
disputes. It was to be staffed by professionals and highly respected jurists.  Members of the 
bench were to be respected and recognized by their robes and wigs, their dignity, manner and 
behavior, their scholarship in law and jurisprudence, as well as their integrity.  Most importantly, 
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they were to be fully independent from the two remaining branches of government (Balogun, 
2002; Sow, 2008).  
As of the post-colonial civil public agencies’ organizational design, it was highly 
centralized, with field officers under the authority of officers in central agencies.  Although 
provinces or regions and districts were divided into smaller units to bring government “closer” to 
the people, the post-colonial administrative apparatus kept its highly centralized feature, its 
pyramidal rigidity and its clear and precise chain of command, with orders flowing down from 
the central agencies to the field officers.  In a nutshell, newly independent states retained the 
bureaucratic organization governed by precise rules and regulations despite Eisenstadt’s (1964) 
call for “de-bureaucratization (Thompson, 1964; Chambers, 1969; Mukandala, 1992; Olowu, 
1998).  Such organizational design, however, was based on the assumption that there would be a 
continuous and timely flow of information, resources, orders and instructions between central 
agencies and field offices.    
2.2.4.2  African Civil Service and its Adaptation   
In terms of values, Mukandala, (1992),  Kamto (1997) and Olowu, (1998)  affirm that African 
post-colonial civil services have kept certain negative values of the colonial civil services such as 
social categorization, loyalty to and cooperation with the colonial authority, paternalism, 
patrimonialism and discriminatory practices in the colonial era. These negative values in their 
adaptation process have produced other type of civil service systems with a totally different 
bureaucratic culture and rationality. The transplants in their adaptation process in the African 
social, economic and cultural context have undergone a value system change. The new value 
system that developed appears to be among the contributing factors to the crisis of the African 
civil service systems (Mukandala, 1992; Kamto (1997).   
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In addition to this negative influence of the colonial value system, Ndi Zambo (1997) 
contends that in their adaptation process to the African environment, local cultural values also 
have “corrupted” some components of the value systems of colonial civil service systems.  
Therefore, respect for traditional authorities of the chief, replaced the legal-rational 
feature of the colonial civil services systems. The African people’s culture of distribution of gifts 
to their guests or elders as a manifestation of their sense of honor and their hospitality or 
appreciation was twisted to become corruption in civil service transactions.  Colonial social 
categorization became favoritism and colonial civil servants’ loyalty to colonial order 
degenerated into their politicization (Ndi Zambo, 1997).     
As a result of this adaptation, African civil servants found themselves caught between 
western bureaucratic values and indigenous values as explained by Riggs (1964) through his 
theory of “prismatic society”. They were somewhere in the middle between indigenous values 
and bureaucratic rationality, caught in a complex web of loyalty and devotion forcing them to 
discard professional rules and to use their positions to enhance their family and social status 
(Kamto, 1997).  This situation is believed to be the blunt manifestation of the crisis of identity of 
the African civil service systems (Haque, 1996; Ndi Zambo, 1997). 
It should be noted that the literature on the African civil service does not fully explain the 
shift in the Malian civil service system values from patriotism to “pragmatism” it is experiencing 
today. This situation is likely to be explained by greed and self-interest behavior of the élite 
combined with the total loss or absence of the philosophy of public service forged through years 
of military rule and reinforced by poverty.  
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2.3 POLITICIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE  
The relevant literature on the politicization of the civil service can be placed into two categories. 
The first category includes studies that present various types of politicization that occur in civil 
service systems.  The second category of studies deals with theories of loyalty of subordinate 
civil servants to their superiors.   
2.3.1 Types of Politicization of the Civil Service  
2.3.1.1 Definitions of the concept of “politicization” 
Peters and Pierre (2004) define the politicization of the civil service as “the substitution of 
political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and 
disciplining of members of the public service.” According to the authors, the term politicization 
has a general negative connotation in democratic societies and there is no single way of 
politicization. Politicization in industrialized countries means attempt to control policy and its 
implementation as opposed to supplying jobs to party members or members of a family or clique.  
This definition is more oriented toward political influence on the behavior of career civil 
servants for policy purposes. One way of doing that is to use ideology and leadership skills to 
mobilize the civil service.  Another way is to use political strategy to change the attitudes and 
culture of the civil service. A third way is to duplicate or supplement career civil servants with 
more political appointees. Finally, politicians may make few key appointments to change civil 
servants way of doing things. These ways of politicization are less likely to cause a political 
controversy (Peters and Pierre, 2004).   
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Ståhlberg (1987) identifies five types of politicization.  The first type, which is more 
general, includes an economic and a functionalistic definition spearheaded by Ronge (1974) and 
Derlien (1985) who argue that politicization happens when the public sector grows along with an 
increase of it regulation of private matters. Koch’s functionalistic definition implies that 
politicization occurs when the public sector reacts positively to political signals (Koch, 1985). 
The second type of definition deals more with the relationship between the political and 
administrative power. From the normative conception of the civil service as a neutral and 
knowledgeable arm of the political power, Rylander (1969) sees politicization as the degree of 
the public sector’s autonomy from the political power on the one hand.  On the other hand, in the 
absence of the normative conception of bureaucracy, the author defines politicization as an 
inappropriate political interference within bureaucracy.  
The third type of definition considers the relationship between bureaucracy and its 
environment outside government. Kingsley (1944) and Krislov and Rosenbloom (1983) argue 
that politicization refers to the extent to which civil servants are representative of the population 
they are expected to serve.  This definition somewhat challenges the Weberian concept of 
bureaucracy, which defines bureaucracy as unrepresentative of people in general. 
The fourth type of politicization has to do with the attitudes and behavior of bureaucrats.  
Aberbach et al. (1981) and Moulin (1975 define politicization as the extent to which bureaucrats 
participate in political parties or supply parties with information and partisan advice. This 
definition is in accordance with the Weberian. The last type of politicization is recruitment-
related and regarded as patronage. In this case, politicization is defined as the extent to which 
party preferences are considered more important in recruitment decisions over merit principles 
(Rylander, 1969; Ståhlberg, 1987).  
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2.3.1.2 Debate on Politicization of the Civil Service 
There are two conflicting views on the issues of civil servants’ relationships with political parties 
and politicians and political neutrality. Opponents of political neutrality of the civil servants 
support the argument that civil servants should be politically partisan while proponents of 
political neutrality contend that they should be politically neutral. Political partisanship means 
allowing civil servants to express and publicly display their political preferences as freely as any 
other citizen.  This allows them to join political parties, to participate fully in their activities and 
to promote their causes like ordinary citizens. Political neutrality means excluding civil servants 
from or severely limiting their involvement in political activities including asking preventing 
them from engaging in political activities, expressing partisan opinions and so on (Gitonga, 
1994).  
These authors also believe that it does not make sense to ask political leaders to act 
through non-political agents.  The major argument here is that only public officials who are loyal 
to and share the political philosophy of the elected officials can implement the policies and 
programs of the latter faithfully and diligently (Gitonga, 1994).      
Proponents of politically neutral civil service oppose politicization to prevent state power 
from being used to advance the interests of some political organizations or few parties at the 
expense of another or other parties.  They believe that it enables recruitment to be done on the 
basis of merit while in politicized civil service appointments are made on the basis of political 
affiliation and loyalties, which may lead to appointments of mediocrities and incompetents, 
discouraging the civil service’s objective capacity for effective and efficient performance in 
delivering democracy. In addition they argue, it may results in lowering the ethical standards of 
the civil service and in contributing to increase “administrative immorality” (Carney, 1975).  
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The solution adopted in most multiparty states is to attempt to strike a balance between 
politicization and neutrality. Top echelons are politicized and are often referred to as “political 
appointees”, while middle and the lower echelons are expected to be politically neutral.  In one-
party states, the civil service is always politicized to a more or less degree (Gitonga, 1994).  
Despite dramatic changes in the conditions of public administration, politicians still complain 
about the difficulties they encounter in trying to control their administrative systems.  
In his contribution to the debate on politicization, Hojnacki (1996) brings back the old 
politics-administration debate. The author believes that the civil service is a constitutional 
symbol system as it uses its expertise and know-how to bring between governments closer to 
citizens.  According to the author, civil service systems operate as channels of institutionalized 
values and norms which govern behavior, beliefs and missions. In his view, civil servants 
behavior has been molded by the constitution in industrialized countries while this is not very 
clear in developing countries (Hojnacki, 1996).  
It is not easy to build upon the definition of politicization in terms of attitudes and 
behavior of bureaucrats with regard to western administrative systems. Because it is not 
necessarily true that a bureaucrat who has pluralistic views could not respect rules and principles 
of bureaucratic neutrality, given the extent to which bureaucrats adhere to principles of 
bureaucratic neutrality depends on administrative arrangements and the historical tradition in 
which they operate.  
At first, one may argue that it is possible to combine most political attitudes with a non-
political bureaucracy.  But a closer look at the political recruitment shows that it entails the 
return of favor to the political party, which did the recruitment. Therefore, politicization goes 
against bureaucratic practices, as it increases compliance. In most western political systems, 
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there is a distinction between political and administrative power. The former makes decisions 
and the latter implement those decisions.  However, it is noteworthy that over the years, many 
changes have altered the administration’s position.  
It is believed that politicians’ permanent concern is how to control public bureaucracy 
because they believe that political power must be felt very strongly in public agencies and that 
the civil service should be politicized.  As government organizations and administrative systems 
become more and more complex, politicians find it harder and harder to control public 
bureaucracy. In today democratic governance systems, civil servants are increasingly expected to 
be loyal to both politicians and the public, while organization representatives are granted direct 
access to public bureaucracy and civil servants through various corporatist arrangements.  
One argument is for a total separation of politics and administration (Wilson, 1887; 
Goodnow, 1900). Another argument is that a representative bureaucracy could be the solution 
(Kingsley, 1944; Krislov, 1974; Agbessi, 1995). The third and fourth arguments are to maintain 
and reinforce civil servants accountability to citizens for their actions as suggested in the 
Friedrich-Finer debate (Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941).  Finally, there are those who make the 
distinction between facts and values. These thinkers see public administrators as representing 
facts and politicians as representing values (Simon, 1957; Aberbach et al., 1981).  
It is hard to find governmental arrangements built on one single model.  Moreover, the 
concept of politicization of the civil service has different meanings in different traditions of 
thought. Of course it is very difficult to determine the degree to which party political criteria 
prevail over merit principles in recruitment.  There are several reasons for preferring the 
recruitment-related definition of politicization. Merit recruitment emerged in most western 
administrative systems in reaction to a persistent patronage and after a long and sustained 
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struggle against it.  Also, administrative systems are expected to follow the rule of law and to be 
loyal to the legitimate political power.   
2.3.2 Theories of Loyalty in the Civil Service   
There is an ongoing debate on loyalty at the workplace. Advocates of loyalty argue that 
employees owe loyalty only to the ideals of public service, while detractors of loyalty contend 
that it does enormous damage to the organization. 
2.3.2.1 Proponent of Personal Loyalty 
Denhardt (1987) as a vigorous defender of loyalty deals with personal loyalty from a managerial 
angle. He believes personal loyalty contributes to advancing an organization’s interests because 
what is good for the organization is also good for the worker. He uses his concept of 
“organizational citizenship” to emphasize the unifying factor of personal loyalty which definitely 
benefits an organization. He believes that moral employees should strongly commit themselves 
to protecting their organization in all aspects ranging from its structure to its authority patterns, 
to its managerial norms and culture (Denhardt, 1987).  
Denhardt’s view is in accordance with the Weberian concept of bureaucracy, which 
preached that subordinates develop relationships of fidelity with their superiors. This view was 
intended to encourage hierarchical submission through establishing reliable ties (Denhardt, 
1987).  Fletcher (1991), a big supporter of loyalty, also argues in favor of employees’ obligation 
to support the organization’s mission and to abide by the rules and regulations that govern that 
organization. However, the author warns that we must be able to avoid biases caused by our 
membership in a group. 
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2.3.2.2 Opponent of Personal Loyalty 
Opponents of personal loyalty view it as absurd and harmful to society. These authors strongly 
believe that loyalty does a number of harms to society.  First, it is slowly replacing workplace 
loyalty by making employees choose administrative convenience over commitments to the ideals 
of public service.  Second, personal loyalty undermines employees’ accountability to the 
organization’s rules and regulations. It promotes subordinates’ actions geared at covering up 
their boss’s misconducts by ignoring commitments to the ideals of public service.  Third, 
personal loyalty opens the door to organizational hypocrisy.  Employees are incapable of 
differentiating between what should be done from what their bosses want to be done (Blamires, 
1963; Souryal and McKay; 1996; Wilson, 1993; Hummel, 1994)  
Ouchi (1981) brings the cultural factor of personal loyalty in the debate. Instead, he 
contends that civil servants have the obligation to be personally loyal to their superiors in some 
political systems.  While in some others, children carry on their parents’ institutional loyalty by 
working for organizations their parents once worked for. Kleinig’s (1994) contribution to the 
debate is his attempt to combine the two views. On the one hand, he considers loyalty to be “an 
important virtue” which is not well understood because of some of its features. He calls for 
removing that “important virtue” from the hands of superiors who use it as an informal tool of 
manipulation and control of their subordinates. 
Until the issue of loyalty is resolved, government ethics will continue to suffer.  It is 
meaningless to believe that public servants would willfully uphold a faithful good conduct and 
cater to organizations’ goals and objectives. Public servants are not sure if this behavior and 
attitude would protect their careers which leaves them defenseless.  The fact is that personal 
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loyalty in public service will not die off so long as superiors continue to believe that the 
protection of their subordinates is crucial to their survival.  
Meanwhile moral and dutiful public servants will continue to suffer from the clash of 
loyalties. Operating in a politicized environment and an adverse subculture, most public servants 
might end up in institutional desperation. There is also a fear that demands for personal loyalty to 
superiors in public service may irremediably inhibit the building of a good governance system.  
Such demands are likely to weaken public servants’ sense of accountability and turn their moral 
sense into indifference and cynicism. 
2.3.3 Configurations of Civil Service Systems 
Miller and Friesen (1984) and Miller and Mintzberg (1983) have developed the concept of 
configurations of civil service systems.  According to Miller and Friesen (1984), configurations 
may be defined in two ways: conceptually and empirically.  Conceptual configurations are 
defined from the theoretical synthesis of the literature available, while empirical configurations 
are devised from quantitative data collection and analysis.   
2.3.3.1 Conceptual Approach 
Heady (1996) chooses the conceptual approach to develop configurations of world civil service 
systems, using five dimensions to describe variations in civil service systems, namely 1) relation 
to the political regime; 2) socio-economic context; 3) focus for personnel management functions; 
4) qualification requirements; and 5) sense of mission.  From these dimensions, the author 
identifies four general configurations of civil service systems.  
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 The first configuration includes “ruler trustworthy” civil service systems.  He argues that 
systems which fall in this category conform to rulers’ expectations, enjoy a high status, possess a 
corporate identity, and have a sense of mission as key policy makers.  The second configuration 
comprises of “party controlled” civil service systems.  In his view, systems in this category make 
allegiance to a political party, do not value professional qualification, and do not have a clear 
sense of mission (Heady, 1996).  
 The third configuration is made up with “policy receptive” civil service systems.  The 
author considers these systems to operate in pluralistic and competitive environments and require 
appropriate credentials for membership, and adhere to the constitution and laws.  
The fourth configuration comprises of “collaborative” civil service systems.  According 
to him, systems in this category have a sense of mission aiming at avoiding manipulation from 
the political leadership and maintaining their support, value competencies for good 
administrative performance and respect authority (Heady, 1996).   
2.3.3.2 Empirical Approach 
Unlike Heady, Morgan (1996) takes a different approach in the same exercise of developing 
configurations of civil service systems in poor countries, including the emerging democracies of 
Eastern Europe. The author uses the empirical approach to develop his model based on four 
parameters: 1) level of institutionalization of the state; 2) public attitudes toward the state; 3) 
degree of professionalism/politicization; and 4) tension between process and outcome.   
He distinguishes three types of state. The first type is “the integral state”, a state that is 
the pillar of national social and economic development. These types of state developed a civil 
service that was expected to be a rational policy instrument at the service of development.   
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The second type is the “patrimonial state”, a state that is permeated by clientelism, while 
it develops a strong central government to control the economy. This type is mostly seen in 
Africa. The civil service that developed in these countries is more concerned with “servicing 
patronage networks.”   
The third type is the “custodial state”, in which the civil service is the most 
institutionalized agent of the state to overcome endemic instability.  This type is mostly seen in 
Latin America (Morgan, 1996). Each of these configurations has a different influence on the 
functioning of the civil service systems. 
2.4 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, THE AFRICAN CIVIL SERVICE AND 
POLITICIZATION  
One of the major debates with regard to the post-independence African civil service has been 
about the issue of the political role of civil servants.  The State was seen as the engine of social 
and economic development therefore, post-colonial civil services were expected to adapt to the 
developmental State and to assist political leaders to achieve the development objectives of the 
State. The Africanized civil servants were seen as servants of the African people, appointed to 
permanent career positions to tackle underdevelopment in all its aspects. Thus, the civil service 
was expanded to meet the new challenges of development (Mukandala, 1992; Adamolekun, 
2002).  
It was in the Cold War era that development was equated with ideology.  Some viewed it 
as transplanting Western model of economic, political and social models into underdeveloped or 
developing societies. While others considered development as the export of command economic 
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planning model sustained with a single-party rule called the “people’s democracy” (Balogun, 
2002).  It was also the era of the rise of modernization theory which involved the transfer of 
technology and technical assistance from developed countries to newly independent states with a 
special emphasis on professionalization and decentralization in development management and 
development economics.  Stronger civil service systems were believed to be the engines of 
development (Mukandala, 1992; Balogun, 2002).  
From its features namely specialization, merit-based recruitment, orderly organizational 
arrangements, the civil service appeared to be the appropriate institution for assisting the newly 
independent States in their developmental role.  As time goes by and with the multiplicity and 
complexity of developmental challenges, the limits of the civil service became apparent. As an 
institution built according to the legal-rational model, the civil service is supposed to hold 
individual civil servants and public agencies accountable for the realization of specific objectives 
and the law enforcement.   
Unfortunately, the characteristics of the traditional society have facilitated many civil 
servants’ avoidance of accountability for their actions.  As we all know, the sovereign power of 
the state, executive responsibility and bureaucratic authority with accountability are the key 
ingredients for “good” governance. As a result, the civil service had a limited contribution to 
advancing democratic values and principles in Africa because of the dynamics of politics and 
administration in the newly independent States.  From the 1960s to the early 1990s, the 
governance of many Africa countries fell into the hands of a political and/or military élite that 
was not truly dedicated to democracy.  Their attitude coupled with the post independent 
environment contributed to the fragility of the inherited governance institutions and impeded the 
modernization process of post-independent societies (Balogun, 2002).  
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Indeed, from the 1960s to the era of democratization, the civil service was highly 
supportive of dictatorial rules as many countries were under either one-party or military rule. The 
single-party rule entailed the abandonment of values and principles underlying the Weberian 
model and their replacement with a command economy and the supremacy of the single party 
over state institutions (Mukandala, 1992).  
As a result, the practice of single-party regimes was to politicize the civil service and 
require senior officials to be members of the “ruling party”, transforming the career civil service 
into an instrument of control and repression.  In this role, the civil service was expected to serve 
only the interests of the ruling class, not the interests of citizens.  As politicization and 
partisanship became common features of single party systems, party militancy replaced the merit 
system as the key criterion for recruitment, appointment and promotion.  The political neutrality 
principle of senior civil servants was abandoned for fear of excluding the well educated from 
politics (Haque, 1996; Adamolekun, 2002; Balogun, 2002).   
In the military regimes, preference was given to association with the military to the 
detriment of political neutrality and security of tenure for fear of military reprisal (Haque, 1996; 
Adamolekun, 1987; 2002).  At the beginning, the tendency was for the military to rely on the 
civil service to conduct state business; but over time, the military turned it into a terrible 
instrument of military supremacy with no respect for civil servants and no accountability to 
citizens (Balogun, 1997.) 
The police or the “gendarmerie” was used to enforce those new policies even at the 
expense of citizens.  Public utilities were managed by civil servants directly accountable to the 
military. Political decisions were made by the military, shaped by civil servants with no 
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consultation with the citizens. Corruption and rent-seeking became rampant both among the 
military and the civil servants who were very cooperative with the rulers (Balogun, 2002).   
Civil service systems in those new states who embraced the free market economy 
displayed the same behavior. Despite their choice of economic liberalism, recruitments, 
appointments and promotions were contingent to political patronage (Haque, 1996; Adamolekun, 
2002).  By the 1980s, the failure of the African State as well as its civil service system became 
apparent (Mukandala, 1992; Haque, 1996; Adamolekun, 2002; Balogun, 2002).  African people 
lost faith in the State and its civil service system and bureaucrat bashing became common 
practice (Ndi Zambo, 1997).  
By the mid-1980s, many African countries were under structural adjustment programs 
with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These programs prescribed a 
reduction in the size of civil service and its wage bill, a roll back of state expenditures, a freeze 
on new recruitments and a reengineering of government. African civil services have been called 
upon to implement these remedies (Mukandala, 1992; Adamolekun, 2002).  
In the early 1990s, structural adjustment programs showed their limits and African people 
began to be more vocal about the harm these programs have done to them and to press for a 
change. They blamed structural adjustment programs for worsening their living conditions 
because of the cutback management principle, especially because of deep cuts in social 
programs. With the fall of the Berlin wall in1989, social movements formed everywhere in 
Africa and popular protests against structural adjustment programs and poverty took center stage. 
Change occurred in many countries at varying degrees, marking the abandonment of State-led 
development for the market-led economy and democratization (Mukandala, 1992; Adamolekun, 
2002). 
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2.5 RELEVANCE OF THE LITERATURE 
This literature revealed three key features which distinguish Western societies from African 
societies. The first feature is about the individual versus community. In Western societies, the 
individual is at the centre of society while in Africa, the individual is defined as a member of a 
community. The second feature is about the protection of the individual versus ensuring social 
cohesion. In Western societies human rights protect the individual against society whereas in 
Africa, human rights ensure social cohesion (M’Baye, 1992).  The third feature refers to Western 
“organized democracy” versus African “natural or communitarian democracy”.  It is believed 
that the contact with Western “organized democracy” has destroyed the African “natural 
democracy” and posed the problematic of democratization in Africa, therefore, the nature of the 
African State (Elliot, 1994).  
The re-engineering of the African democracy in the form of adapting liberal democracy 
to the African cultural context became an obligation of the African élite.  It was hoped that this 
would be done through a new constitutionalism. But the new constitutionalism has failed to 
devise new constitutions based on African realities, to reproduce the constitutions of the 
metropolis. The implementation of these new constitutions has resulted in discrepancies 
between the rules and the practice.  The Malian Constitution of 1992 was no exception to the 
imitation of the French Constitution of 1958 granting the executive branch with extensive 
powers.     
However, democratic theory has not been very helpful in categorizing the nature of the 
Malian democracy.  In the first decade, it resembled Sartori’s (1976) “hegemonic party 
system”.  Though, it evolved in a “consensus” democracy with extensive powers in the hands 
of the President of the Republic, a malfunctioning of fragile democratic institutions, a rampant 
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grand political and administrative corruption resulting in a popular disaffection with politics 
and politicians.  
The evolution of the Malian democratic experiment has not yet adapted to the African 
context to become a “communitarian democracy” as African scholars have suggested. 
“Communitarian democracy” involves a governance style based on power-sharing that caters to 
the well-being of the community, and the people at the national level.  This is not the case in 
Mali.  It has neither evolved into a true democracy nor turned in a dictatorship as Linz, Lipset 
and Diamond (1995) have predicted about pseudo-democracies. Instead, it was transformed 
into a soft regime that tried to bring as many parties as possible along with the civil service 
around a president with no party membership in an association based on the spoliation of the 
already bankrupt state of its meager resources to benefits only members of the clan.   
This is a whole new tendency that is unique in Africa and in the developing world which 
no theory has foreseen. “Consensus” governance has been forged initially to appease the social 
tension created by the dominance of ADEMA, the bitter war its leaders have waged against the 
leaders of other political parties to push those aside and gain the full control of states resources 
causing frustrations, tensions and division in the political community.   
The civil service as one of the state institutions has been suffering and continues to suffer 
this political capture.  It has been observed that civil servants have displayed a pragmatist, 
opportunistic behavior to secure their positions and avoid public humiliation with their 
acceptance to comply with the rules of the informal grand political corruption erected into a 
system of governance. Instead of delivering democracy to the people, the Malian civil service 
has become hostage of the political community it has tacitly agreed to serve the interests to the 
detriment of the citizens.  No theory has explained this situation in a democratic context.  
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In liberal democracies, there is a distinction between the strictly administrative sphere 
and the political sphere however complementary they might be. But in the midst of the 
implementation of the ongoing democratic experiment in Mali, the confusion of the political 
and administrative sphere is a phenomenon yet to be well documented.   
African scholars have argued that African cultural values have “corrupted” the Western 
values of the civil service in its adaptation process to the African environment.  The authors 
discussed corruption in the form of a bribe, but the fact that civil servants service political 
parties teaming up to steal and share state money in a democratic context without the people’s 
consent has not been discussed as a corrupt practice. That is the reason why the researcher has 
chosen to engage in the endeavor of documenting this pernicious type of democratic 
governance system.  
The politicization literature focuses mainly on the attempt of politicians to control the 
civil service from public policy making and implementation perspective (Kingsley, 1944; 
Ronge, 1974; Rosenbloom, 1083; Peters and Pierre, 2004). Hence, in Mali, the politicization of 
the civil service has taken the form of civil servants “helping theirs parties to live” on public 
money.  So far, no theory of politicization has explained the fact that the democratic state and 
its resources have become the booty the winners share after each election and that the civil 
service as an outgrowth of the political power has abandoned its role of supporting democracy 
to associate itself with the winners of the elections in these corrupt practices.   
The goal of this dissertation is to examine this type of politicization of the civil service in 
Mali in order to bring an understanding of and document the phenomenon with regard to its 
process and outcomes. 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
The review of the literature has revealed that liberal democratic system of government 
transplanted in the African context has produced different types of government systems that have 
done anything but to encourage the expansion of democratic rules and practices in Africa. 
Liberal systems of government have evolved in historical, economical and cultural contexts that 
were completely different from the African context. The transplanted systems have been 
corrupted by African cultural values as they were going through the transition and adaptation 
process.  This apparently has opened the door to all sorts of abuses of the state, endangering the 
Malian young democracy. Above all, the literature reviewed here does not fully explain the 
current Malian situation. It does not grasp the document the subtle “pragmatism” of Malian 
governance system under the cover of democratization.      
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3.0  CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH 
The reader may recall what prompted this study of the politicization of the Malian civil service. 
The politicization of the Malian civil service can be traced back to the colonial era.  The colonial 
administration leaned on local traditional African leaders and nonmembers of the traditional 
chieftaincy who knew how to read and write French and who were loyal to the colonial 
government (Imperato, 1989). At independence, Mali’s first president Modibo Keïta continued 
the colonial legacy of politicization of the civil service through his de facto single party rule 
within the logic of the command economy and the political philosophy of Marxism(Imperato, 
1989).  
After Keïta’s overthrow on November 19, 1968 in a coup d’état led by  Lieutenant 
Moussa Traoré, the military also continued the politicization of the civil service  through “Union 
Démocratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM)” established in 1978 (Diarrah, 2000).  A popular 
protest of pro-democratic movement ended the Traoré regime in March 1991 (Danté et al, 2001) 
and a transitional government called “Comité de Transition pour le Salut du Peuple : CTSP” was 
appointed to launch the process of political pluralism and democratization. A sovereign National 
Conference was held from July 29 to August 12, 1991 to delegitimize the single party regime, to 
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rehabilitate the state and to lay the foundations of a new constitutional order consistent with 
democratic principles.  
Despite pro-change forces’ success in introducing multiparty politics and asserting the 
political and civil rights of Malians and the élite’s pledge to rigorously, honestly and loyally 
work toward the building of a democratic society and to bring social and economic well-being to 
the Malian people, they failed to de-politicize the Malian civil service. After a fourteen-month 
transition, Mr. Alpha Oumar Konaré became the third president of Mali, succeeding to President 
Moussa Traoré in June 1992.  
After nearly two decades of democratization, the Malian leaders failed to rid the civil 
service of its Instead, there has been a persistence of the historical politicization legacy in the 
form of patrimonialism, exclusion politics, coercion rampant corruption and the looting of the 
state within the context of multiparty politics.  In Mali, senior civil servants have associated 
themselves with the political leadership to engage in grand corruption erected in a system of 
governance fatal to the state, its civil service and the democratization process.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to shed a light on state highest authorities’ sponsored 
grand political corruption and financial delinquency of senior civil placed at key positions and 
”instructed” to rob the state treasury and use the money to service political parties and 
organization under the blanket of democracy.  
The consideration of this problem prompts a number of research questions. The main 
argument of this study is that politicization remains the major hindrance to democracy and to 
development. The central questions to be addressed here are as follows: 
1) To what extent are the structural and normative features of the Malian civil service in 
the context of democratization consistent with the Weberian model?  
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2) Are relationships between politics and administration alike in Mali and in liberal 
democracies? 
3) How well is the Malian civil service grounded in core democratic values and 
principles to support liberal democracy in the making and to foster development?  
This study has been built around the self-interested behavior of both civil servants and the 
political leaders, within “the patrimonial state”, and subject to politicization defined as the 
recruitment and promotion of agents according to political party loyalty. Elected officials are 
supposed to represent people’s interest and civil servants are accountable to elected officials in 
channeling these interests. As politicians are more interested in remaining in office, they appoint 
civil servants loyal to them to make and implement policies that may not necessarily be in the 
interest of the citizens to reach this goal.  Because recruitments and promotion within the civil 
service are not based on merit and the absence of career security leave civil servants at the mercy 
of politicians.  
After the elections, the winner party or party coalition proceeds to the replacement of 
incumbent senior civil servants with those loyal to their parties; the new comers in turn, replace 
those under their authority and so on.  The result looks more like politicians’ and civil servants’ 
joint conspiracy against the people to serve their self-interests. This conspiracy is more 
observable within “the patrimonial state”, a state that is permeated by clientelism, and develops a 
strong central government to control the economy. In this case, the civil service is more 
concerned with “servicing patronage networks.”  
In Mali, the President is the most powerful authority. As extensive powers are vested in 
him by the Constitution, he became the lord of the political game in practice. In this capacity, the 
Presidents of the democratization era have developed political networks within the civil service 
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to access state resources and use them for political ends. The difference is that President Konaré 
has displayed an exclusion leadership behavior in keeping all the resources to his party ADEMA 
and its members while President Touré has shown an inclusion leadership behavior by allowing 
his supporter parties and associations to access and use state resources to their benefit. Thus, it is 
the evidence of the failure of Malian constitutionalism.  
The purpose of this research is to examine how a politicized civil service functions in 
Mali and whether it impacts the building of a professional civil capable of mediating between the 
governors and the governed. This dissertation argues that democratization has encouraged a 
specific type of politicization which is destroying the foundation of the civil service. Instead of 
serving the people, politicization has encouraged civil servants to abandon citizens and team up 
with political officials to loot the state treasury.  
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN 
To address the issue of politicization of the civil service in Mali, this dissertation uses the case 
study method based on the qualitative method of generating data. Because, this study is more 
concerned with understanding a process, the quantitative method of generating data will not be 
able to describe contexts, activities, perception and beliefs surrounding the phenomenon.  Of 
course the limit of a case study is that it does not lend itself to generalization. But its strength is 
that it allows for a detailed and thorough investigation of the problem of politicization of the civil 
service in Mali. This study is interpretative in nature, and uses the ethnographic approach in 
order to provide a descriptive account of the politicization of the civil service and its impact on 
the process of building a distinct identity for the civil service system in Mali. Applied to the 
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study of the politicization phenomenon as it occurs inside the civil service, ethnography provides 
rich, descriptive data about contexts, activities, perception and beliefs of the participants 
involved (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984). 
 The hallmark of the ethnographic approach is fieldwork with informants. 
Fieldwork involves participant observation along with in-depth interviewing, with the researcher 
adopting the posture of detachment. This requires a high degree of sensitivity, adaptability, and 
insight on the part of the researcher (Babbie, 1995).  
 This study uses “triangulation,” a strategy, which consists in using multiple sources of 
data in order to develop multiple perspective accounts of a societal situation or social process 
(Denzin, 1978). Cohen and Manion (1994) suggest that triangulation is most appropriate when 
the phenomenon under investigation is fairly complex or controversial, or when one single 
approach is likely to produce a limited and distorted image.  
3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
The primary qualitative method selected for this research is in-depth interviewing, which 
involves repeated face-to-face encounters between the researcher and informants.  In this study, 
data collection has been based on face-to-face interviews and official document analysis. 
During fieldwork, the researcher worked closely and maintained a regular contact with 
participants.  As an active civil servant, the researcher closely followed appointments and 
promotion to civil servant positions at all levels. This helped the researcher take an insider’s 
view of the institution, learn from participants, and map as many perspectives as possible of the 
problems, concerns of civil servants, and proposed or perceived solutions to existing problems.  
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A closed attention was paid to stories, jokes, ceremonies, and special language used to describe 
or characterize the condition or status of civil servants. 
The researcher relied on informational and semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions for data collection and prepared a letter of consent for participants to sign before the 
interview sessions. For practical purposes, an interview guide was developed, which was then 
translated into French because Mali is a French-speaking country.  
Interviews were conducted orally in French and interview sessions lasted between forty 
five (45) to sixty (60) minutes in a setting of informants’ choice, mostly their homes and their 
offices on weekends. All interviews were audio taped. Tape recording allows the researcher to 
capture everything that the informants say and how they say it. Few people were not very 
comfortable with the tape recorder at first; but as they spoke, they became comfortable and 
talked freely. The researcher conducted the interviews, transcribed all of them verbatim and 
translated the transcriptions in English.   
Immediately after each interview, additional notes and comments that informants may 
have said off recorder were written as well as notes of emerging themes and interpretations, and 
non verbal communication language. At the end of each interview, the researcher explained to 
the participant that there may be a need for a follow-up interview at a later time.  They all 
showed their willingness to help so long as there are informed earlier.  Interviews were thorough 
and there was very little need for follow-up interviews. Information was also gathered from 
official documents. These included official reports, appointment and promotion documents, 
newspaper articles, policy guidelines, regulations, and national databases.   
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3.4 SAMPLING 
Ethnographic designs rarely use probabilistic sampling procedures. Ethnographers view selection 
processes as dynamic and sequential rather than static. The goal of sample selection in 
ethnographic research is to expand the scope of the study, refine the questions or constructs 
under investigation, or generate new lines of research (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984). Instead of 
making statistically based inferences at the end of the study, ethnographers use inductive 
reasoning and sequential logical inferences based on accumulation of as many corroborative 
sources of evidence as possible.  
A commonly used sampling method in ethnographic research is known as “criterion-
based selection” (Goetz and LeCompte, 1984).  This procedure is used not only to choose the 
group or site to be studied, but also to establish new sets of phenomena to be investigated.  
 “Criterion-based selection” was the sampling method used in this research. The basic 
“criterion” of sampling in this research was the civil service. This study focused on the national 
government only, because decentralization was at its infancy in Mali. The sample size is 33 
senior civil servants with 15 years experience.  
The executive branch was composed of thirty (30) ministries, the Office of the Prime 
minister and the President’s staff. The participant selection consisted of one (1) senior civil 
servant at each ministry, two (2) at the Office of the Prime minister and one (1) at the President’s 
Office. Before starting data collection within these various groups, the researcher has sought 
authorization to carry out the study from the Centre for Scientific and Technical Research 
(CNRST), the state agency in charge of approving research projects in Mali. Permission was 
been granted through “Autorisation de Recherche Nº0369654/08/MESSRS/CNRST du 03 
Octobre 2008”.  
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The researcher used the national civil service database to draw the sample. To do so, the 
researcher identified the names and addresses of people in each ministry, in the Prime minister’s 
office and in the President’s office. The researcher then contacted people at the ministries she 
knew to be introduced to her potential participants. The researcher met the five potential 
participants, one person at a time in each ministry to explain the purpose the research and asked 
for their participation. In accordance with the Malian culture, this was the introductory visit that 
gave the researcher the chance to show respect and talk about the importance of the participation 
of potential respondents to the research. During this visit, the researcher explained the purpose of 
the study and sought their assistance and cooperation. The first person who accepted to 
participate among the five was selected as participant in that ministry.  
The researcher explained to each of her informants that their participation will be in the 
form of an audio taped interview which may last between 45 to 60 minutes. She assured each of 
them that they had the choice of the date, the time and the place of the interview.  She also 
guaranteed the protection of their privacy and the confidentiality of the information they will 
provide. She asked them not to give out any personal information during the interview. Finally, 
she emphasized the voluntary nature of their participation. A week later, she contacted the 
participants to make interview appointments at their convenience. Before interviews began, the 
researcher made each of the informants sign the informed consent form.  
The major questions asked during the interviews are listed below. 
1) How do you perceive the role of the civil service in general? 
2) What is the meaning of a professional civil service for you? 
3) What do you think about civil servants’ behavior toward citizens? 
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4) To what extent are you satisfied with civil servants performance in producing goods and 
providing services to citizens? 
5) Do you have any knowledge of any formal and informal criteria of appointment and 
promotion within the civil service? 
6) What do you think about civil servants’ behavior toward political parties and party 
leaders? 
7) How would you describe the relationships between the party in power and the civil 
service? 
8) Could you give me your point of view about civil servants involvement in partisan 
politics? 
9) What do you think about the appointment and promotion of individuals in the civil 
service? 
10) Could you tell me the advantages and disadvantages of this type of appointment  
and promotion you just described? 
11) Do you see a difference in civil service appointment and promotion practices between the 
Konare regime and Touré’s rule?  
12) What do you make of various criticisms civil servants suffer from the public and 
opposition parties in terms of service delivery and handling elections? 
13) How would you describe the type of civil service you would like to see develop in Mali?  
Why? 
14)  Is it possible to put such a civil service in place? How? 
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3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Within the qualitative research tradition, data collection and data analysis are described as 
inseparable aspects of the same process (Marshall and Rossman, 1999; Strauss, 1995). 
According to Spradley (1980) and Bogdan and Biklen, (1982), qualitative data analysis involves 
organizing data, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, 
discovering what is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell other 
people.   
In this study, the researcher relied on a strategy of data analysis suggested by Strauss 
(1995) and Spradley (1980). Audiotapes of in-depth interviews in this research have been 
transcribed to provide a written record of each interview for data analysis. Data analysis itself is 
a process, in which the researcher constantly tries to make sense of the data.  In this process, 
ideas that developed in reading through and thinking about the interview transcripts, field notes 
and written document contents are added to notes as they occur. 
The overall goal of data analysis in qualitative research is to arrive at a good fit between 
the data and explanations of social phenomena (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998).  With regard to this 
research, the goal is to fit civil servants’ assessment of the politicization phenomenon and its 
explanations. A fundamental aspect of qualitative data analysis is data coding, which is the way 
of developing and refining interpretations of data (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998).  Data coding 
involves bringing together and analyzing all the data bearing on particular themes, ideas and 
concepts by assigning each piece of written evidence a symbol or number to reflect the category 
or categories in which it belongs.   
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Spradley (1980) defines data analysis as a search for patterns or regularities among data. 
The initial step in the ethnographic analysis is domain analysis, which involves the search for 
domains under which smaller categories that give meaning to members’ perceptions and 
assumptions are subsumed. The next step, taxonomic analysis, consists in the systematic search 
for attributes both components and meaning that are associated with each domain or cultural 
category. These attributes may be regarded as dimensions of contrast among the members who 
share the same set of meanings and assumptions in that particular domain. The final stage in data 
analysis is thematic analysis, which consists in the discovery of recurrent themes that tacitly or 
explicitly cut across several domains of the phenomenon under investigation.  
 Strauss (1995), describes the procedure of data analysis in terms of stages of coding.  
According to the author, the initial type of coding is called open coding, which consists of 
reading very carefully the data word by word. Axial coding follows open coding, which consists 
of a serious analysis of each category in terms of the paradigms such as conditions and 
consequences. The third stage of coding is the selective coding. This is the stage of grouping the 
axial codes together into categories that are relevant to the research. Finally, the categories that 
emerged from the selective coding are grouped into core categories, which account for almost all 
the variation in a pattern of behavior. The number of coding categories used depends on the 
amount of data and the complexity of the analysis. 
Coding tasks and data analysis were facilitated by the use of the Non-numerical, 
Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching, and Theorizing (NUDIST) qualitative data analysis 
software program.  NUDIST does indexing in the form of nodes that allow for hierarchical 
organization of concepts into categories.  NUDIST helps the researcher to identify emergent 
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themes and the construction of coding categories.  Codes were merged by hand to get core 
categories or relevant themes.  
The core categories that emerged from data analysis are:  
Core category # 1: Degree of politicization of the civil service. Three indicators were used to 
measure the degree of the politicization of the Malian civil service.  They are: 
-  Political appointments and promotion of civil servants determined in terms of the 
existence of legislation, de facto criteria that applied, politics of exclusion with 
politicization outcome and the advantages and disadvantages of political 
appointments and promotions.  
-  Degree of civil servants’ involvement in partisan politics determined in terms of the 
absence of loyalty to the state and the existence of loyalty to theirs parties.  
- Party interests versus public interests determined in terms of fundraising for parties 
through state contracts, fundraising for parties through cash money and securing 
election victories to parties.  
Core category # 2: Characterization of civil servants-political party leaders’ relations. 
Five indicators were used to measure relationships between civil servants and party 
leaders. They are:  
- Civil servants as political party leaders determined in terms of party leaders 
being also civil servants, few private sector party officials and parties’ 
presence in the civil service.  
- Civil servants as “pragmatic” self-interest seekers determined in terms of 
“juicy” position hunters, the courting of parties and the seducing of party 
leaders.  
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- Party leaders as clientele seekers determined in terms of clientele formation 
exercise and non civil servants’ hiring. 
- Party officials’ alluring behavior determined in terms of competent cadres and 
moral obligation to join the minister’s party. 
- State clerks resistance to political involvement determined in terms of 
professionalism opposed to party, left on the sidelines, punishment for 
disobedience and decision of clerks to leave. 
Core category # 3: Politicization as a threat to the building of a professional civil 
service. Seven indicators were used to measure how politicization poses is an impediment 
to the professionalization of the civil service.  They are:  
- Civil servants and policy and decision making determined in terms of policy 
making and implementation and the blind support for party choices.  
- Degree of openness of policy and decision making determined in terms of less 
involvement of civil society organizations and civil society organizations’ 
ambiguous position.  
- Public service delivery and users’ satisfaction determined in terms of users’ 
dissatisfaction, bad image of civil servants, bad behavior toward users and 
users’ lack of objectivity. 
- Transparency and accountability determined in terms of lack of transparency, 
absence of accountability and widespread clientelism.  
- Independence, autonomy and neutrality determined in terms of bad judgment 
on civil servants, lack of neutrality, lack of independence and lack of 
autonomy.    
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-  Honesty and integrity determined in terms of lack of honesty and lack of 
integrity. 
- Civil service values and state officials’ moral values determined in terms of 
state officials’ involvement in grand corruption and the struggle to get a slice 
of the national cake.  
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4.0  CHAPTER FOUR: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICIZATION OF 
THE MALIAN CIVIL SERVICE  
In Mali, the democratization experiment has been quite challenging for both state institutions and 
between the state and citizens. It has been characterized by a continuing crisis of the state and a 
continuation of single party regime practices. State institutions have failed to function according 
to the constitution. Under both ADEMA and the “consensus” regimes, the dominance of the 
executive branch was apparent. In both regimes, the executive branch has managed to become 
the master of the democratic game and has paralyzed the legislative and the executive branches. 
The politicization of the civil service is a case in point. Both regimes have captured the civil 
service, a key democratic institution, politicized and manipulated it by totally destroying its 
philosophy and its public service spirit and have turned it into an instrument at their service. The 
state-society relations have not fared well either, with continuous human rights violations, 
repressions, torture and jailing.  
This chapter explains the contextual conditions in which the politicization of the civil 
service under study has occurred. It shall do so by considering a number of points.  First, the 
Malian economic and social context will be presented.  Next, the political context of the 
Politicization of the Civil Service will be discussed under both ADEMA and the “consensus” 
regime. Finally, the profile of the Malian Civil service will be provided.   
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4.1 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Gonidec (1977) said that “The prevalence of democracy is nothing but the answer to the crisis of 
the state and the crisis of economic development”. In Mali as in any other less developed 
country, people believed that democracy would be the answer to the economic crisis.  So much 
was expected from democracy in Mali as the regime that will bring a solution to all the social 
and economic problems. 
With regard to economic and social development, much has not been achieved. In 1994, 
after the devaluation of CFA franc, the Malian economy was relatively healthy with a sound 
macro-economic framework.   From 1994 to 1998, the GDP grew at an average annual growth 
rate of 5%. However more challenges remained: 70% of the population was classified as poor 
and economic disparities between regions as well as within various localities of regions also 
grew significantly. School enrollment rate was around 50%; 30% of the population was 
classified as suffering from malnutrition and adult illiteracy rate was higher than 20%.  The 6% 
annual growth rate of the GDP triggered by structural adjustment programs and a healthy 
macroeconomic framework has not contributed to the improvement of the living conditions of 
the large majority of the Malians.  From 2000 the economic growth rate fell to 2% (Camara, 
2007).  
In the 1999 World Report on human development, Mali ranked16 out of 17. In 2002, 
Mali ranked 172 out of 175 countries and in the 2005 World Report on human development, 
Mali anked174 out of 177 countries, with a human development indicator of 0.333; the highest 
indicator being 0.963 for Norway and the weakest being 0.281 for Niger (Moulaye Z. 2005). The 
Malian government has angrily disputed this ranking and published its own report on the 
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country’s economic performances from 2002. Table # 8 below summarizes Mali’s key indicators 
of development. 
Table 1. Mali key indicators of development 
Indicators Years Value 
Current GDP (billions of CFA franc 2004 255.0 
Real GDP growth rate  (in %) 2004 2.2 
GDP per capita (in thousands of F CFA) per annum  2004 233.0 
Population (in million inhabitants) 2004 11.3 
Population growth rate of the (in %)  2004 2.2 
Life expectancy to the birth  1998 60.5 
Nominal stock foreign debt/GDP (in %)  2004 65.9 
Poverty ratio on households (in%) 2001 63.8 
Adults prevalence of VIH/AIDS in the (in %) 2001 1.7 
Rural population access to drinking water in (in %) 2003 62.0 
Malnutrition rate for 0 to 5 years (in %) 2001 33.0 
Infant mortality rate (for 1.000 live births 2001 113.0 
Youthful death rate (for 1.000 live births)  2001 229.0 
Maternal death rate (for 1.00000 live births) 2001 582.0 
School enrollment rate in primary education (in %) 2004 70.5 
Parity index (girls boys) in primary education (in %) 2004 76.9 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finances, August 2005. See also Moulaye Zeini, 2005.  See 
also Camara, 2007.  
 
“Democratic Governance of safety in Mali-a challenge of sustainable development”, Frederich Ebert Foundation, 
Bamako, p. 37. 
 
From these World Reports on human development, we can infer that poverty has been 
increasing among the Malian population since the launching of the democratic experiment.  
Malian officials argued that the figures in the table above are the outcomes of the 
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implementation of the first generation of the Strategic Poverty Alleviation Program (2002-2006).  
According to the implementation report of the Program, Mali had 4.3% growth rate in 2002, 
7.6% in 2003, 2.3% in 2004, 6.1% in 2005 and 5.0% in 2006. The average growth rate was 5.1% 
versus 3% in other West African Monetary Union member countries in the 2002-2006 period.  
This good economic performance was due to good harvests combined with the rise in the price of 
gold as well as a good productivity in gold mining in 2005 and 2006 (Camara, 2007; Essor 8.8, 
2007).  
In the same period, inflation rate fell from 5.1% in 2002, to -1.3% in 2003, to even -3.1% 
in 2004 to climb at a significantly high 6.4% in 2005 because of a bad harvest in 2004 and 2005 
and an average 2% inflation rate.  As a result of this macro-economic performance, monetary 
poverty was said to have decreased.  Poverty rate dropped from 68.3% in 2001 to 59.2% in 2005 
on the basis of an update on poverty line from 420 CFA francs in 2005 to 397 CFA francs in 
2001.  Investment rate rose from 16.0% of the GDP in 2002 to 22.0% of the GDP in 2006 with 
an average 10.0% rate for private investment and 7.3% for public investment (Camara, 2007; 
Essor 8.8, 2007).  
However, experts are divided on the issue of the correlation between the economic 
performance and the living conditions of the Malian population. The vast majority believe that 
the economy is healthy and that Mali has neither a backlog in its debt service, nor in the payment 
of its wages bills. While a small number contended that the good health of the economy did not 
translate into any noticeable improvement of the living conditions of the population; rather, they 
find that poverty has increased dramatically (General Report of the Prospective National Study 
“Mali 2025”, 1999).      
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From the results of the first generation of the Strategic Poverty Alleviation Program and 
its second generation, it can be said that much needed  to be done not only to alleviate, but more 
ambitiously to eradicate poverty because more than 60% of the Malian population still live on 
less than one dollar a day. This was why the first five years of “consensus politics” were centered 
on “the social demand” that aggregated people's desires and aspirations.   
A second Strategic Growth and Poverty Alleviation Program (2007-2011) was developed 
without Malian officials’ true autonomy in the decisions that were made and is been 
implemented. It is less likely that the program will be able to solve Mali’s pressing social and 
economic problems, given the country almost rock bottom in UNDP ranking on the indicators of 
human development.  For the next five years of “consensus” politics, a social and economic 
development program was extracted from the Strategic Growth and Poverty Alleviation Program 
because Mali public officials have pledged to achieve a 7% accelerated growth before 2012.  The 
implementation of the first generation of the Poverty alleviation program has brought little 
improvement on the cost of living, especially food prices.  The Malian economy may be 
growing, but the impact of this growth is not visible on the life the Malian people.  
4.2 POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE POLITICIZATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE  
Ardant’s (1995) statement that no democratic regime functions to perfection is a universal truth.  
Transferring liberal democracy from western societies where it developed to the African context 
was not foreseen to be easy. This is particularly the case in Mali where democracy has so far not 
been able to take roots. The Malian regime has gone from a dominant party regime under 
ADEMA rule to a politically diffused regime under “consensus” politics with severe 
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consequences for state institutions and particularly for the civil service which underwent a heavy 
politicization. The politicization of the civil service in the context of democratization began with 
the  ADEMA  regime  and continued in the “consensus” era in another form.  
4.2.1 ADEMA Regime: from “concerted exercise of power” to a “dominant” party rule 
The fall of the military regime in March 1991 following a popular protest was the consequences 
of poverty and rejection of the World Bank-International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment 
policies. Malians were demanding for a radical change and the restoration of democracy. The 
goal of this insurrection was to rebuild the state on the basis of principles of liberal democracy 
known or believed to foster economic, social and cultural development and to restore civil 
liberties and political right.  
Indeed, at the time of the national Conference convened in August 1991, the people's 
representatives insisted on the necessity of building a democratic State.  A new constitution was 
discussed, approved, adopted by referendum on January 12, 1992 and signed into law on 
February 25 1992. This constitution guarantees the republican nature of the state and establishes 
a democratic regime again with its attributes namely the principle of separation of powers, 
multiparty party competition, and the protection of political rights and civil liberties. It marked 
the rupture with the de-facto one-party dictatorial regime of the first republic and de jure one-
party authoritarian military regime.  
But the fact remains that Malian institutions and Mali institutional mechanisms came out 
of the National Conference with deficiencies and incoherence. The quest for the rule of law and 
for democracy caused insufficiencies. There was a debate on two conflicting views at the 
National Conference: the balance of power and power sharing versus a strong state. The younger 
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generation was highly supportive of the balance of power and power sharing was while the older 
generation favored a strong State. With regard to a new mechanism, new constitutional 
arrangements, the younger generation was told that: “we need a strong state”. And the younger 
generation responded to this statement by saying: “if we choose a strong state with strong powers 
vested in the president, he/she will not be able to exercise them; and because nobody will 
exercise them, our democracy will be disrupted”.  With the insistence of supporters of a strong 
state, the Constitution granted the president of the Republic extensive powers.  Even the Judicial 
branch seemed to be placed under the President’s authority because he/she has the power to 
appoint magistrates and to preside over the Superior Council of the Judiciary.     
After a 14 short months transition, the Malian people democratically elected their first 
president of the third republic in April 1992.The president elect was inaugurated on June 08 of 
the same year. In March 1992, parliamentary elections were held and ADEMA came out 
victorious with 76 seats over 129 seats in the National Assembly. The younger generation’s 
argument at the National Conference happened to be true. That no matter who wins the elections 
he/she will end up with a consensus government.  
There was also a heated debate at the National Conference about the public financing of 
political parties. But, at the end, the idea of financing political parties with public money was 
rejected.  When the president took office, he ignored this decision and modified the electoral 
code to include that the State will devote 0.25% of its budget to fund political parties.   
4.2.1.1 “Concerted Exercise of Power” 
After the general elections of 1992, the ruling party signed “the Republican Pact” with a number 
of parties that have been called “Participant Parties to the Republican Pact (P.S.P.R.)”. The 
coalition was based on the principle of “concerted exercise of power”, a power sharing 
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mechanism devised by the ruling party officials. According to Diawara (1994), the Pact 
stipulates : “ They (parties members of the coalition) sign the present Pact to mark their will of 
working together and jointly to the advent of a democratic society on the basis of a concerted and 
democratic management of state institutions to the benefit of all the Malian people”.  
Obviously, the goal ADEMA leaders’ call for other parties to join in the exercise of 
power as a coalition government was to ensure a social basis and legitimacy for the regime. But 
their decision clearly showed the discrepancy between what the people have wanted in the 
constitution and what practice has demonstrated. The winner takes all principle of liberal 
democracy happens not to better reflect the reality and the political and economic needs of the 
people. In Mali, whoever sits alone in power today, tomorrow people will take the street and oust 
him/her. But if a certain number of people are called in to share power, people will say “Oh, 
he/she is not the only one in power; they are many”. In fact, only power sharing is more likely to 
give credibility and meaning to state authority (Sow, 2008).  
To materialise their idea of “concerted exercise of power”, ADEMA leaders appointed a 
coalition cabinet which included nine ministers who were members of the parties which have 
signed the Republican Pact. Unfortunately, the invitation of other political parties, civil society 
and even “people without party affiliation” to participate in the exercise of power was not 
welcomed by all the members of the ruling party’s leadership. ADEMA leaders managed to 
dominate government decision-making process and to push other party representatives aside. In 
sum, Mali had de facto returned to the party-state system of government (Sow, 2008).  
Ministers from other parties felt they were been appointed for the sake of social peace 
and complained that they had no power, that their hands were tied and that they did not even 
have the right to speak at the Council of the Ministers.  Few months later, they resigned, and “the 
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concerted exercise of power” ended (Sow, 2008; Diarrah, cited in Diawara, 1994). After the 
failure of the “concerted exercise of power” ADEMA dominated the political life. The ruling 
party took full control of all state institutions, replaced incumbent cadres of the higher civil 
service with its own members and controlled state resources. 
4.2.1.2 ADEMA, the “Dominant Party” vs. COPPO, the Opposition Coalition   
The first legislature 1992-1997 evolved into a radical power as elections were getting closer. 
Opposition parties banded together to form the “Collectif des Partis Politiques de l’Opposition 
(C.O.P.P.O): Collective of Political Parties of the Opposition”. The failure of April 13, 1997 
elections constituted an important turn in the history of the opposition and the political practice 
in Mali. The radicalization of COPPO’s positions combined with ever increasing social demands 
of all sorts led to confrontations and serious violence, putting thus the young Malian democracy 
in danger for the second time (Sow, 2008; Villalón and Idrissa, 2005).  
This power struggle that had some serious consequences happened because of conflicting 
objectives. For the ruling party, it was about the planning of elections regardless of the obvious 
lack of preparation, to avoid the constitutional vacuum while COPPO required the postponing of 
the whole electoral process until all the planning conditions were met (Sow, 2008; Villalón and 
Idrissa, 2005).  This lack of election preparation will be the reason of the failure of the April 13, 
1997 presidential elections with significant consequences on the parliamentary elections. It was 
characterized by an electoral calendar that amounted in serious deadline problems as well as an 
“electoral forcing” despite essential prescriptions of the electoral law. Both COPPO and 
observers firmly believed that this was the ruling élite’s attempt to cling to power at all costs.   
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This conflict climate worsened with the failure of 1997 elections.  COPPO had a 
showdown with ADEMA about its electoral requirements. Political demonstrations were met 
with violent repression in violation of human rights.   
It was in this context of uncertainty for the normal holding of the 2002 elections that a 
civil society organization called “Cercle de Réflexion et d’Information pour la Consolidation de 
la Démocratie à l’Horizon 2002 (Cri-2002) : Circle of Reflection and Information for the 
Consolidation of Democracy on the Horizon 2002” which played a key role in solving the 
political crisis. The President of Cri-2002 successfully mediated between PARENA and COPPO 
on PARENA president’s request and convinced the two parties to join forces in their actions. The 
two parties held a Round Table to examine the major laws of the Republic. COPPO, other 
political actors and civil society organizations agreed to defuse the political life and to define 
sound rules of the game to save the 2002 elections.  
Cri-2002 was asked to plan the Round Table. The meeting was held and a Declaration on 
the relaxation of the political life in Mali was written at the end called “le Pacte Républicain de 
Bonne Conduite Electorale: a Republican Pact of Good Electoral Conduct”. The Pact was an 
official and public commitment to national reconciliation that set the rules of the democratic 
game. Over 50 political parties signed it before the national and international media (Sow, 2008).  
Then COPPO and other dissidents from the ruling party agreed to participate in the 
planning of the 2002 elections. Thus, the electoral competitions could take place in an appeased 
social context (Sow, 2008).  
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When President Konaré stepped down in 2002 at the end of his second term, he left 
behind a very weak and divided political community. President Konaré’s two terms caused 
division, bitterness and fear in both the political and administrative communities.  
4.2.2 The “Consensus” governance 
4.2.2.1 General Elections 
The presidential election was held in 2002 with a record number of twenty four (24) candidacies 
including M. Amadou Toumani Touré, a former army general and former President of the 
democratic transition, a candidate with no party affiliation. This high number of candidacy was 
first because COPPO failed to choose a single candidate for the opposition and second, the 
internal power struggle within ADEMA made it difficult to deal with the issue of choosing the 
party’s presidential candidate, which later caused the party division. A political organization 
called “Mouvement Citoyen: Citizens’ Movement” and the bulk of political parties including 
ADEMA supported Touré’s candidacy.   
Touré won the presidential election and sought to reconcile the political community. To 
achieve this goal, a new form of governance called “consensus” was devised. This was a power 
sharing system of governance which has gotten the “Mouvement Citoyen” and the parties which 
supported the new President’s candidacy involved in the exercise of power. More parties were 
quick to declare their support for the president’s agenda and joined the presidential coalition. 
Only the “Bloc des Alternatives pour la Renaissance Africaine (BARA): the Block of 
Alternatives for African Renaissance” led by Prof. Yoro Diakité claimed to be in the political 
opposition.  
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4.2.2.2  “Consensus” Politics 
One of M. Touré’s campaign promises was that he will govern with the majority the people will 
provide him with.  When no party could win a comfortable majority in the National assembly, 
the President announced that he will work with a constituted majority while he will stay 
equidistant from the political parties.  Then, a “presidential bloc” was formed from a coalition 
with smaller parties, with much less cohesion.  The coalition survived because of the 
“consensus” politics, which the new rulers said is not a mandatory concept, but a free 
participation of all the actors to a process that encourages political tolerance. Obviously, this 
situation was to the advantage of the newly elected president.  But forming the cabinet was not 
an easy task. After a long negotiation, a balanced distribution of ministerial positions was 
stricken with the major parties (Sow, 2008; Villalón and Idrissa, 2005).  
However, observers of the political scene found that the key to “consensus” power 
sharing ministerial appointments was as follows: 
- Major parties which won seats in the National Assembly; 
- Parties which are symbols of the nationalist movement before independence or whose 
leaders have a specific political background or charisma; 
- Armed forces and other uniform people; 
- Civil society with the connotation of ethnic minority representation; 
- “Mouvement Citoyen: Citizens’ Movement” with the specificity of representing the 
President in Government; 
- Civil society with the connotation of women’s representation; 
- Higher state officials’own friends.    
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 “Consensus” politics was devised to mark a rupture from ADEMA leaders’ exclusion 
politics and violence opposition parties have endured. “Consensus” was possible because parties 
feel no longer comfortable to go in political opposition. It appeared obviously that the electorate 
has imposed a coalition because it was possible to build a majority in the National Assembly by 
combining the 41 RPM seats, ADEMA 36 seats and the URD 13 seat, had these three parties 
agreed to it.  As Sow (2008) says “the President could reign without governing the country” and 
the country would be governed by a coalition still consistently with the Constitution.   
Political party leaders felt that only insane or stupid party leaders will go in political 
opposition because their first experience has shown that the Mali democratic system has rejected 
political opposition. People still have a fresh memory of ADEMA leaders’ exclusion and 
repressive behavior toward opposition parties. Since no single party can live without state 
money, party leaders found it wise to be on the side of the ruling power. At least being on that 
side will give them a chance to stay alive and not to be repressed.  Then, the President slices and 
distributes the national money among his friends, allies and supporters.  Each party’s share 
depends on its political weight.  
At the end of his first term, he decided to run for a second term. Apart from, SADI, 
PARENA and RPM which had announced their intention to go in the opposition in a coalition 
called “Front pour la Démocratie et la République (FDR) before the elections, all the parties 
were reluctant to produce a presidential candidate of their own.  They all said they will support 
the incumbent president’s candidacy.  M. Ibrahima Boubacar Keïta announced his intention to 
run as RPM’s candidate.  Mr. Soumeylou Boubeye Maïga, an ADEMA member decided to run 
against for president and the party dismissed him.   
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In fact, it was mainly those officials who were holding ministerial positions who were 
very active in urging their parties to support the incumbent president’s candidacy for a second 
term. This was unheard of in a democracy; political parties banding together to support an 
independent candidate. But it happened in Mali.  As it could be imagined, parties worked hard to 
secure the incumbent president’s victory. From the 2007 legislative elections, SADI, PARENA 
and RPM declared themselves in opposition.  For how long this opposition would last remains to 
be seen.  
Under “consensus” politics, Mali no longer had a dominant party; rather, it had a 
coalition of powers expressed as “consensus”, the executive branch asserted his dominance over 
both the legislative judicial branches. In such a case, an open opposition will not change much to 
the situation.   
4.3 MALIAN CIVIL SERVICE: A PROFILE 
4.3.1 General Structure 
The Malian bureaucratic system, copied from the French system, bears the basic features of the 
classical bureaucratic model. Article 3 of the law n° 94-009/AN-RM of March 22, 1994 
determining the fundamental principles of the creation, the organization, the management and 
control of public agencies defines  six (6) categories of public agencies: 1) central agencies, 2) 
regional and sub-regional agencies, 3) quasi-autonomous agencies, 4) extra-territorial agencies. 
5) local government agencies, and 6) autonomous agencies.  
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At the top of the administrative hierarchy, there are ministries organized by broad areas 
of activity. Yet this classification doesn't talk about the ministerial organisation which constitutes 
the first level of the administrative architecture. For that reason, we will proceed to the 
examination of the politico-administrative superstructure and ministerial organizations to 
descend to the central agencies level.  
At the national level, ministries have national and general directorates and central 
agencies (directions nationales, directions générales, and services rattachés) under their 
authority. At the regional and sub-regional levels, they are functionally represented by regional 
and sub-regional agencies (directions régionales et services de cercles).   
The territorial administration is structured in eight (8) regions, and 48 districts (cercles). 
Each region is headed by a governor who report to the Minister of Territorial Administration. 
Governors are the chiefs of executive at the regional level as they have hierarchical authority on 
all the regional agencies and district officers in their jurisdiction.  Each district is headed by a 
district officer (préfet). These district officers have hierarchical authority on sub-regional 
agencies.  They also are the interface between local governments and governors. Then there are 
local governments (communes) headed by mayors.  
4.3.2 Ministerial Structure 
The Malian Constitution granted extensive power to the President. He is the head of a strong 
executive branch empowered to monopolize the most important decisions of national policy 
(article 29). He appoints the Prime Minister and ministers and terminates their functions (Article 
38). He presides over the Council of Ministers (Article 39). He has the power to dissolve the 
National Assembly (Article 42). He is the Supreme Chief and the Army Commander in Chief 
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(Article 44). He is the president of the Superior Council of the Magistracy (Article 45). He 
appoints senior civil servants and senior military officers (article 46). He can take emergency 
measures as required by the circumstances, after consulting with the Prime Minister, the 
President of the National Assembly and of the President of the High Council of Local 
Governments as well as the Constitutional Court. He must inform the nation of the situation 
afterward (Article 50). He may delegate certain powers to the Prime Minister (Article 51). 
The prime minister and the ministers constitute the President’s cabinet.  The Prime 
Minister is the head of the cabinet. In this capacity, he directs and coordinates governmental 
action. He assures the execution of the laws. He may delegate certain powers to the ministers 
(Article 55).   
Currently, the President’s cabinet is composed with the Prime minister and 30 ministers. 
The Prime minister’s office has a chief of cabinet, technical advisers, officers in charge of 
political affairs called “chargés de mission” and his handyman called “attaché de cabinet”.  
After their appointment, the Prime minister and Ministers appoint their staff members. 
Every staff team is composed of a General Secretariat and a ministerial cabinet. The law n° 94-
009/AN-RM of March 24, 1994 determining fundamental principles of the creation, the 
organization, the management and the control of public agencies in its articles 22 and 23 
announces the general secretariat and the ministerial cabinet in its article 19.  
The law n° 94-009/AN-RM of March 24, 1994 determining fundamental principles of the 
creation, the organization, the management and the control of public agencies Talks about the 
Secretariat General in its articles 22 and 23. According to articles 22 and 23 of that law, the 
Secretariat general is in charge of defining the ministerial agenda in the areas of its members’ 
Secretariat General 
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expertise, monitoring and assessing various program and project implementation activities and 
coordinating and controlling technical and administrative activities in the department. It includes 
the Secretary General, technical advisers, a mail service, a document and record keeping service 
and a typing service.  
The Secretary General and technical advisers are appointed among career civil servants of 
category A, magistrates, superior military officers and security services and senior officers of the 
police.  The Secretariat General is organized by the decree n° 94-202/P-RM of June 03, 1994.  
The Secretariat General is headed by A Secretary General who manages and provides 
guidance to five (5) technical advisors, subordinate national directorates, directorate of 
administrative and financial affairs, autonomous or quasi-autonomous bodies and agencies. As 
the memory of the department, the Secretary General became a strategic administrative figure in 
the ministerial organization. Because the position of Secretary General is considered to be a 
steady and key position, its holder ought to be protected from frequent cabinet changes and 
political interference. The Secretary General, national directors, the director of administrative 
and financial affairs and technical advisers are all career civil servants.  
  Like the Secretariat general, the law N° 94-009/AN-RM of March 24, 1994 
determining the fundamental principles of the creation, the organization, the management and the 
control of public agencies talks about the ministerial cabinet. Articles 20 and 21 of the above-
cited law provides that the ministerial cabinet is in charge of managing relations with the socio-
political environment, public relations with the press and  preparing and organizing the Minister 
and his envoys’ travels inside and outside the country.  
Ministerial Cabinet  
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The ministerial cabinet is organized by the decree n° 94-201/P-RM of June 03, 1994. It 
includes the chief of the cabinet, the officers in charge of political affairs “chargés de mission”, 
an “attaché de cabinet” and the Minister's personal secretary. Members of the ministerial cabinet 
are appointed by decree of the Council of Ministers. It is worth noting that the profile of 
ministerial cabinet members is not specified in the law. This gives the flexibility to the Minister 
to appoint either civil servants or non civil servants to these positions. The non civil servants 
cabinet members are bound to the civil service by contracts which ends as soon as the minister 
who appointed them cease to be minister, unless they get appointed in another ministerial 
cabinet.  
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Table 2. Ministerial structure 
Prime Minister 
He is the coordinator of ministers’ actions 
Chief of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet 
He assists the prime minister through the coordination of the work of ministers 
Minister 
Guidance of a department 
General Secretary Management and guidance of: 
• subordinate national 
directorates.  
• directorate of 
administrative and 
financial affairs. 
• autonomous, quasi-
autonomous bodies 
and agencies 
• Technical advisers. 
Chief of the 
Cabinet 
Political advice to the minister. 
Management and guidance of: 
• Officers in charge of 
political affairs called 
“Chargés de mission” 
• Minister’s handyman 
called “Attaché de 
cabinet”. 
Undersecretary Assisting the general 
secretary in his management 
and guidance tasks. Interim of 
the general secretary. 
“Chargés de 
mission” 
Relations with the National 
Assembly, political institutions 
and civil society organizations  
Technical advisers In charge of public 
management issues  
“Attaché de 
Cabinet” 
Helping the minister to manage 
his professional and private life 
National directors Management of specific areas 
of the ministry 
  
Director of 
administrative and 
financial affaires 
Management of all ministerial 
human and budgetary 
resources 
  
Council of Ministers 
A collective body which includes the President, the Prime minister and ministers 
Adoption of government decisions 
Committee of General Secretaries 
A collective body which comprises of ministries’ general secretaries 
Preparation of decisions made in the Council of Ministers 
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4.3.3 Size of the Civil Service and Statute of Civil servants 
According to the National Director of the civil service, the current official number of the Malian 
civil servants is 38,074 civil servants, 9,569 of which are women; this represents roughly 
25.13%. This number does not include the police although they are civil servants and State 
contractual employees. Civil servants are hierarchically organized by categories and grades. 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the total number of civil servants into 3 categories. 
 
 Table 3. Civil servants by category and age groups 
Civil servants by category Civil servants by age group 
A 11,121 19-30 2,848 
B 21,727 31-40 8,404 
C 5,226 41-50 11,594 
  51 and above 15,228 
Total 38,074 Total 38,074 
 
The classification by age groups shows that 70% of civil servants are between 19 and 50 
years old and 30% are 51 years old and above. 
  Mali’s Constitution relied upon the law to determine nature of the contract of service 
and the legal status of public servants. The Malian General Statute of Civil Servants, Ordinance 
N° 77-71/CMLN of December 26 1977, amended by Act N° 87-46/AN-RM of July 1987 reflects 
their particular legal status in its sections 9 and 10. Section 9 reads: “the civil servant is in a legal 
and statutory governed relationship with the Administration” while Section 10 reads: “the civil 
servant shall serve the State with devotion, dignity, loyalty and integrity”.  
A close look at the Ordinance clearly shows its striking similarity with the French civil 
service selection and appointment system. It states that recruitment shall be done in accordance 
with official rules and on the basis of personal merit.  It also includes provisions of nationality, 
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age and aptitude.  By doing so, the State sought to give an equal opportunity in employment to 
all citizens. The Ordinance requires that selection be conducted once a year for all ministries and 
government agencies through competitive examinations at the National Directorate of the civil 
service (Direction Nationale de la Fonction Publique et du Personnel). Those who pass the 
examination will fill positions that are budgeted at the National Directorate of Budget (Direction 
Nationale du Budget) to meet ministries staff needs expressed in proposals submitted to the 
National Directorate of the civil service on a yearly basis.  
These recruitments mainly focus on new graduates from universities and vocational 
schools.  Competitive examinations are composed of two types of tests: a general knowledge test 
and a specialized knowledge test.  These two tests are graded according to a grade scale and the 
two grades are compared to identify highly qualified candidates for recruitment.  
The newly recruited enter the civil service on a one year probationary basis.  A year later, 
the new recruits produce a report on their learning experience in the civil service and submit 
them to their supervisors. After an evaluation of these reports on a discretionary basis, 
supervisors send the reports to the National Directorate of the civil service along with their 
proposition to promote the new recruits to a full civil servant status.  
The categories in table 1 match the grade system and professional experience and 
educational requirements determine progress up the hierarchical ladder. Each category has four 
(4) classes in a descendant order: class 3, class 2, class 1 and class Exceptional. Each of the first 
three (3) classes has six (6) echelons and the class Exceptional has three (3). Progress up from 
echelon 1 to echelon 6 is achieved through supervisors’ appraisal. Moving up from category C to 
category B is subject to a competitive professional examination (concours professionnel), while 
moving from category B to category A requires a university degree. 
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The “post” system (cadre organique) introduced in the late 1980s requires that all 
positions in the civil service be filled with career civil servants except the posts of Minister, 
ministerial cabinet member, ambassador and consul. National Directors, Associate directors, 
middle and lower management positions are career civil servant posts. Each government agency 
has an organizational chart with clear job descriptions as well as educational requirements for 
each post. Appointment to these posts is supposed to be done on the basis of work performance 
or other demonstrated skills and abilities.  
In terms of discipline, Ordinance N° 77-71/CMLN of December 26 1977 devotes a whole 
chapter to civil servants discipline.  Section 73 states the general principle: any non-fulfillment 
of duties by civil servants in the framework or outside the exercise of their functions exposes 
them to a disciplinary sanction, notwithstanding any punishments foreseen under the criminal 
law.  Section 74 provides for two types of sanctions: first and second degree sanctions. First 
degree sanctions include: demand for explanation, warning and blame.  
The second degree sanctions are: lowering of a step of grade, temporary exclusion, 
demotion, termination without loss of pension rights and termination with loss of pension rights. 
Section 80 stipulates that the punishment of warning and blame may only be inflicted after a 
demand for explanation within a certain time and when that time limit has expired, the 
disciplinary procedure may go ahead. Sanctions of second degree can be given only after hearing 
before The Disciplinary Committee. Civil servants have the right to appeal administrative 
decisions in the administrative section of the Supreme Court.  They have the right to receive a 
copy of the written charges and defend themselves.  
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
In nineteen years of democratic experiment, the Malian democracy evolved from a dominant 
party system to a single-party system with the destabilization of the political community through 
various maneuvers, to a new system of governance called “consensus”, which seems to function 
well because of political parties fear to engage in an opposition that will yield no return. 
Therefore, all the parties made allegiance to the President of the Republic and claim to be 
members of the “presidential support group”.  
In response to their allegiance, the President grants each of them their fair share in the 
distribution of strategic positions within the State apparatus.  Parties that have seats in the 
National Assembly get ministerial positions in the President’s cabinet while those who have no 
seat in the National Assembly are contented with directorial  positions in public agencies, consul 
or ambassador positions in our diplomatic representations abroad. 2007 witnessed the re-
emergence of a declared political opposition.  But, it could be short lived as it may join the 
“President’s support group” at any time for various reasons.   
The evolution of the Malian democracy shows that the political practice discards 
fundamental democratic principles and gives preference to pragmatism over democratic and 
constitutional orthodoxy.  To determine whether politicization weakens the civil service, we are 
obliged to approach those civil servants who are positioned at the axis of the interplay between 
political and administrative imperatives.  
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5.0  CHAPTER FIVE: POLITICIZATION OF THE MALIAN CIVIL SERVICE: 
PARTICIPANTS’ PERSPECTIVE 
It is argued in this dissertation that politicization perverted the role of the Malian civil service 
system to the benefit of the political establishment.  This distortion has failed civil servants to 
deliver democracy and development. This chapter provides participants’ perspective on the 
politicization of the civil service. It reports data collected through in-depth interviews and 
official document contents analysis. It reflects the views of senior civil servants posted in policy-
making positions in the higher civil service, those who are very much exposed and subject or 
victims of the politicization phenomenon in the Malian civil service. The data reported in this 
chapter was generated from the questions below. The central questions addressed here are as 
follows:  
1) To what extent are the structural and normative features of the Malian civil service 
in the context of democratization consistent with the Weberian model?  
2) Are relationships between politics and administration alike in Mali and in liberal 
democracies? 
3) How well is the Malian civil service grounded in core democratic values and 
principles to support liberal democracy in the making and to foster development?  
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The data revealed that the type of politicization observed in Mali is unique.  It is not 
limited to the distribution of civil service positions to political friends and supporters loyal to the 
ruling power. It also entails the return of favor to the political party for which the appointment 
was done. This reciprocity is visible within the normal course of administrative action in the 
form of civil servants stealing state resources including cash money allocated to their agencies 
for service delivery to the citizens, to finance a host of political parties’ activities and to line their 
own pockets along the way. It is the transformation of the civil service into a gigantic grand 
political corruption and financial delinquency network under the sponsorship of the Presidents of 
the Republic in the democratic era through the civil service. The state leadership knows about it, 
but no action has been taken to stop it. The reason for this silence and inaction is that the practice 
benefits the all of them because the administrative leadership is the same as the political 
leadership.  
Under ADEMA rule, its cadres posted at all the key administrative positions contributed 
to the financing of the party and enriched themselves in an arrogant manner. Opposition parties 
were thrown out of the civil service and the state system and their protests were severely 
repressed. Under President Touré’s regime, the beneficiaries’ base has been expanded to include 
political parties and other political organizations which supported his candidacy and those who 
claimed to support his agenda after the presidential election and to destroy or silence political 
opposition. This gave state high authorities a large margin of maneuver to manipulate  
democratic institutions to their advantage because no leader from the public sector can dare to 
criticize or confront them for fear of being excluded from the network.  
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If ADEMA leaders have secured their strong hold on the civil service to enjoy state 
resources, higher authorities in the “consensus” era distributed key administrative positions 
among members of the “consensus” network in their own words “to help their parties and 
political organizations”. Today the Malian leadership has become the predator of the state. These 
practices have been observed in single party regimes and not expected in the context of 
democratization. “Consensus” politics has not been about power sharing to cater to the Malian 
people’s well-being as suggested by African scholars. It was aimed at pursuing the predatory 
politics of defunct single party regimes in association with the civilian leadership through the 
civil service. This is why Mali has so many political parties. Therefore, it is fair to say that the 
Malian democratization project is doomed and that state higher officials’ sponsored large scale 
corruption and financial delinquency is a unique case in Mali and probably in Africa.   
The core categories which emerged from the data analysis are the followings: 
1) The degree of politicization of the Malian civil service; 
2)  The characterization of civil servants-political party leaders’ relations; 
3) Politicization as a threat to the building of a professional civil service.  
5.1 DEGREE OF POLITICIZATION OF THE MALIAN CIVIL SERVICE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
Data analysis yield four (4) indicators to measure the politicization of the Malian civil service: 1) 
political appointments and promotion, 2) civil servants involvement in partisan politics, 3) civil 
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servants behavior toward political parties and party leaders, and 4) civil servants’ party interests 
versus public interests.  
5.1.1 Political Appointments and Promotions of Civil Servants 
The analysis of the data yield four (4) indicators which characterize appointments and 
promotions of the civil service, namely, 1) the existence of legislation, 2) de facto criteria 
applied, 3) the politics of exclusion with politicization outcome, and 4) the advantages and 
disadvantages of political appointments and promotion.  
5.1.1.1 Existence of Legislation 
The majority of participants in this study said they know about the existence of defined criteria in 
the General Statute of Civil Servants and Act Nº94-09 which has replaced ordinance Nº 79-09  
with regard to appointments, promotion and reappointment of civil servants based on merit. They 
explained that the legislation makes a distinction between politico-administrative positions and 
purely administrative positions. Appointments to politico-administrative positions are left to the 
discretion of the President of the Republic. These are ministerial, Ambassador, Consul General 
and presidential cabinet staff members’ positions. There are no set criteria for appointment in 
these positions in the substantive law of our country. However, it is suitable that people 
appointed at these positions be qualified for the jobs because of the strategic nature of their jobs 
otherwise, appointing mediocre at these positions will depict on State credibility. 
Beside the discretionary positions, there are administrative positions, higher civil service 
positions which do not fall in the categories listed above.  The Council of Ministers appoints 
administrative positions. Informants thought that they are well defined, but insufficient criteria 
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are only defined in relation to the category of the civil servant. What is called a career system 
does not exist in Mali. This means these criteria are not sufficient to allow civil servants to hold 
positions consistent with their level of education and training, their administrative class, their 
seniority in the civil service, their work experience or their qualifications. The civil service is 
about hierarchy, in any case appointments and promotions must be done according to 
administrative hierarchy.  This means the first version of the ordinance Nº 79-09 wanted that 
positions be filled first according to the rank of the civil servant. Thus this does not work because 
the link has simply been maintained between the function and the category.  
Government did not agree with the extension to the rank and the criterion was and still is 
to belong to category of the administrative hierarchy. To be a head of division or a head of a 
section, it is necessary to simply belong to category A; whereas it could have been required that 
to be a head of a section, cadres must be in the third or the second class of the administrative 
hierarchy and to reserve the functions of head of division to people in the first class and the 
exceptional class. This would have improved the criteria of appointments in the civil service. So 
it is acknowledged that these criteria are very insufficient and need to be clearly defined and 
completed. The fact that they are very incomplete makes them very vulnerable as one respondent 
observes:  
“Written rules exist, but they are not very clear, we do not have clear 
guidelines,…the system is incomplete, very insufficient, with very objective limits 
that allow all kinds of appointments”. 
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5.1.1.2  De facto Criteria Applied 
Participants have observed that since the advent of democratization, there has been no 
compliance with the existing criteria. As a result, appointments, promotion and reappointment of 
cadres who hold higher civil service positions are done on the basis of political affinities, 
friendship and family ties. Cadres have to be either a member of a political party or have good 
connections with the highest authorities of the State or be submissive or subordinated to the 
political elite. A frustrated cadre said this: 
“…we notice today that the best criteria for appointment to any civil service 
position are submission, subordination to the political elite…the criteria are 
political or clan membership, political clientelism, I am not afraid to say the 
word”. 
Participants said that under ADEMA rule, priority seemed to be given to the cadres who 
declared members of the ADEMA party.  There was a real ADEMA tendency to control and 
possess the whole State apparatus.  The majority of the higher civil servant positions were 
occupied by ADEMA and allies.  With regard to the choice of the men and women, the partisan 
equation was surely extremely important. Those who were known to be opponents in the 
administration were excluded from holding higher administrative positions, mistreated and 
humiliated. They were victims of injustices, calumnies and plots.  ADEMA wanted to know and 
control everything.  The entire civil service system belonged to the ruling party; and its 
leadership had placed party loyal members at all the important administrative positions. Not only 
that, but party leaders wanted to lay their hands on everything in the civil service. 
 In fact, the civil service appointments in ADEMA era depended on extra professional 
factors because if cadres knew someone in a department, they go there to seek appointment. 
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Because they claimed to be members of the ruling party, they were appointed.  The political 
criterion played a major role. Some participants believed this is normal since all the parties have 
their cadres, when a party comes to power, it appoints them. Participants found it deplorable that 
there were not many appointments and promotions on the basis of professional worth, merit or 
technical expertise. Only very few civil servants with exceptional worth have been appointed and 
promoted on the basis of their professional qualifications, expertise, or their merit only.  
Unfortunately, those other civil servants of average value are frustrated because they 
have difficulties for accessing senior positions; they felt neglected.  Under “consensus”, there 
was no difference between the ruling party and an opposition party; they all played the same 
game.  They lived and operated in a consensual system; there are big parties in the President’s 
cabinet. The Prime Minister informally discusses ministerial appointments with the big political 
parties.  After consulting with the Prime minister, they proposed names for appointment. 
Obviously there was a minimum morality check and the like, but if one person did not qualify 
the party was asked to provide an alternative name.  Therefore, big party officials were 
consulted; this was a situation of dialogue. The regime was not a single party or a dominant party 
system. This was “consensus”, a system of power sharing between the major political parties.  
The logic here was that if the top was openly or discretely politicized, objectively, it is 
normal that the same political logic dominates. Therefore, with the same level of expertise, 
political devotion was an asset.  If two senior civil servants are available to participate in the 
Minister’s cabinet or Secretariat General or a national directorate or any senior position, for the 
same level of expertise, work experience and everything, logically political coloration, political 
devotion would prevail. This was a necessary consequence of being in charge.  People who were 
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said to be in charge must have the maximum of margin of maneuver to have the men and the 
women whom they judged politically and technically able to be loyal to them.   
Within a party, the basic criteria are expertise and the level of education. But to make a 
national selection, it is loyalty; it is the political affiliation which will be taken into account. The 
principle of “the right man/woman at the right position” does not exist in Mali.  Overall, the two 
systems may be different from the way they operate, but they yield the same results. One of the 
participants described the situation in this statement: 
“Under ADEMA rule, there was an opposition. This situation made it 
possible to know and to clearly show that those who were in the majority were 
favored to the detriment of those who were in the opposition.  Now, we are in a 
context where there is no opposition, everybody supports the President, everyone 
supports the government. In such a context, in fact other considerations may be 
taken into account  for the choice of cadres. There are of course political 
considerations, because though we all know that things cannot completely change 
overnight.  Everybody recognizes today that there are certain people who owe 
their position only to their membership to a party. Therefore, on the one hand, 
things have changed and took another form, but on the other hand, things still 
remain the same”. 
5.1.1.3 Politics of Exclusion with a Politicization Outcome  
Participants have noticed that with the advent of democracy, things have changed, but they have 
taken another direction. After the revolution of March 1991, there was a strong tendency of those 
who were called the leaders of the democratic movement to push aside those they regarded as 
collaborators of the defunct regime. Thus there was this strong tendency of exclusion. There 
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were times when at the Council of Ministers, it was extremely difficult to make appointments 
because any person whose name was suggested, was subject to objection from those who thought 
they were there in the name of the democratic movement and they have to make sure cadres who 
collaborated with the defunct regime do not have access to certain positions.  
Thus, there was this tendency to push many civil servants to accept to be affiliated with 
the majority party to have a good blanket. As the majority party also needed to renew the higher 
administration of State, this has given the opportunity to many cadres who became ADEMA 
members not by conviction or anything, who became ADEMA members because it was 
necessary to be an ADEMA members as it was necessary to be UDPM member in the military 
era, to have access to certain positions.  Therefore, the politicization of the civil service 
continued this way too.  
And on this basis there was a kind of exclusion of the senior civil servants who were 
other party members particularly opposition parties.  There were periods when to be CNID or to 
be MIRIA did not really facilitate access to certain positions. But evidently, priority was given 
mainly to people who displayed their membership to ADEMA, the “dominant” party.  Therefore, 
this strongly explains why people have good relations with party leaders, whether people show 
off at various events or contribute to the financing of parties.  Today within parties the problem 
which arises is for a party leader to gain respected from his/her party members, he/she must be 
able to place party militants in the higher civil service. A party leader who had no possibility of 
placing his militants in these positions was not considered to be truly a party leader because 
people will not give him the consideration, the respect and the attention he/she deserves although 
they have chosen him/her to be their leader.  
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5.1.1.4 Advantages and Disadvantages 
According to the participants, the advantage here is the loyalty of the civil servants who have 
been appointed to the party who appointed them. For the person who decides on appointments 
and promotions, the advantage could be the moral satisfaction to have placed a friend, a relative, 
a cousin or a party member at an executive position in the civil service. For the person who has 
been appointed or promoted, the advantages could be that he/she will have premiums and 
allowances and access to the investment and operational budgets which could enable him/her to 
show his/her gratitude to his/her benefactor and his/her party by returning financial favors.  In 
addition, the appointee is always happy and proud of his/her appointment because it is his/her 
family which has gotten the favor.  
It is the political loyalty which is put forward as the most important criterion for 
appointments and promotions. People do not appoint individuals whom they do not know and 
trust. Another advantage is that with regard to the social aspects, these appointments might 
contribute to a more or less peaceful society.  
A major disadvantage is that the system is designed in such a way that now parties, 
whether they admit it openly or not, function on State resources. The civil service draws no 
advantage in this action; instead it weakens. These kinds of situations discourage experienced 
and talented civil servants, destroy the spirit of initiative, the passion for public service and kill 
excellence. In addition, some unfortunate trends have been also observed. Young people from 
class 3 and even trainees without professional experience were being appointed as members of a 
ministerial Secretariat General or promoted at senior position to supervise cadres who have long 
years of professional experience. This is frustrating and de-motivating. Obviously, these 
inexperienced new recruits cannot serve effectively in these capacities. A more serious problem 
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is the fallouts of their appointments because when they leave these advising positions, they will 
not have any motivation to move to lower positions.  
Some participants pointed fingers to ministers who went as far as to impose particular 
agents to their agency directors for appointment.  The consequences are the ruining of 
hierarchical relations; it can be said that there will be no more hierarchy.  First of all, these 
imposed agents knew that the agency director has no power. If the minister sends people to an 
agency and instructs the agency director to appoint them at such or such positions, the agents 
who are being appointed know that in fact, it is the minister who has appointed him. So for these 
individuals the director does not count. That is why when trivial things happen, these cadres 
disrespect and remind their director that they are the minister’s protégés. The incident will be 
reported to the minister and if the director is not lucky, he/she may be replaced as soon as 
possible. That is a very serious issue in a civil service that these types of appointments have 
created.   
Currently, nominations and promotions at senior positions follow partisan line. Party 
leaders grant appointments and promotions to their cadres militant.  People want to work with 
those they know. Since appointments at some higher civil service positions are at the discretion 
of the highest authorities, they choose men and women who claim their party memberships.  
There would be no problem with that if these people had the necessary competence to hold these 
positions.   
There have been Malian ministers who displayed notorious incompetence, who could not 
even read the speeches their advisers have written for them.  Therefore, that disappointed many 
and made people doubt about the quality of the civil service because although a ministerial 
position is a politico-administrative position, it represents the first level of state administration. It 
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should be held by an individual with a strong intellectual background; otherwise, the person’ 
incompetence may surface any time and put the quality of the state in question. 
5.1.2 Civil Servants Involvement in Partisan Politics   
The analysis of data allowed the researcher to identify two (2) indicators which best describe 
civil servants’ involvement in partisan politics. These indicators are 1) the absence of civil 
servants loyalty to the state and 2) loyalty of civil servants to their parties.   
5.1.2.1  Absence of Loyalty to the State 
There is a split with regard to the issue of newly appointed ministers who completely change 
incumbent cadres in their ministries. Most participants preferred that new ministers replace 
incumbent non-career civil servants in ministerial cabinets and keep career incumbent senior 
civil servants in ministerial Secretariat Generals. However, they prefer that those holding director 
position remain because they are the memory of the civil service and ensure its continuity. They 
suggested that directors could be replaced as their incompetence, lack of skills, and lack of 
loyalty to the State or lack of professionalism surface.  
While few participants found it normal that those senior civil servants who hold higher 
positions in their ministry’s hierarchy be replaced on the ground that people feel more 
comfortable working with those they know and trust. They attributed this never ending 
movement situation in the civil service to the absence of clear guidelines and an incomplete, 
insufficient and unclear General Statute of Civil Servants.  
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5.1.2.2 Existence of Loyalty to Parties 
Almost all the participants acknowledged the involvement of civil servants in partisan politics. 
When political ministers come in office, they must have a commitment of loyalty to   
government.  But with respect to their parties, if these political ministers were to follow criteria 
of professionalism and competence, perhaps they would not always please their parties.  
Therefore, there is a tendency for these ministers to place themselves at the service of their 
parties and their partisans and care less about the general interest, the principle of neutrality and 
impersonality which are core public service principles.  
In previous reforms, laws have been passed to establish Secretariat Generals and 
ministerial cabinets to make a distinction between administrative functions which must be based 
on competence, job security, professional experience and ministerial cabinet functions intended 
to serve politics if the minister is a politician.  But, these laws have never been respected because 
ministers knew better, because they were often proposed by political parties and were not always 
the most qualified candidates within their parties. Their selection was done on the basis of their 
importance or their loyalty to the party.  This is reflected not only on the choice of their men and 
civil servants but also on the operation of agencies under their authority. 
Allegiance is prolonged in the ministries in the choice of people and criteria of 
professionalism are not always respected.  Allegiance continues in the department’s financial 
resources management where human and financial resource management lacks transparency 
because of the inadequacy of the rules enacted as well as their non-observance.  
There is also an agreement that senior civil servants are citizens and have the right to join 
political parties. However, participants deplored the fact that civil servants prefer to be loyal to 
political parties rather than to the state. If they work for a minister with whom they share party 
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membership, they deliberately neglect their work assignments to focus more on satisfying the 
minister and their party needs.  In addition, they are said to be likely to sabotage work if they do 
not belong to the same party as their bosses. As a result, they become openly biased in the line of 
duty and care more about matters related to their parties and party members.  One participant  
described how the sabotaging is done: 
“But from the moment people refuse to see the objective things, I say, well, 
this one for example is in the opposition.  I am not a member of his party. The 
obligation of loyalty that I owe the state administration, I will not keep that 
anymore; that is dangerous. For example, instead of working because my minister 
has objectives to achieve, I will say, ‘well, my minister and I do not belong to the 
same party’; I do whatever it takes to practically sabotage the assignment. What 
does sabotage means for an executive officer? You are given an assignment to be 
turned in today at 10 a.m. You wait until tomorrow at 10 a.m. to turn it in…..  You 
have been asked to give statistics; all the statistics you give are not accurate and 
everybody in the ministry knows that the statistics are not accurate…. This is the 
absence of loyalty; this does not have anything to do with, you are not obliged, you 
do not betray your party when you are loyal to the person who has appointed you.  
And this is the danger of partisan politics.”  
5.1.3 Party Interests vs. Public Interest  
The analysis of the data allowed the researcher to identify three (3) indicators which best 
describe civil servants’ parties’ interest versus public interest. These indicators are 1) fundraising 
for parties through state contracts, 2) parties financing parties through cash money, goods and 
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services and 3) securing electoral victory to parties.  In the Malian political context, party 
interests have always been put before public interest.  In the ADEMA era, the party had primacy 
over State institutions to the point that some people have called the system a “party-State”. With 
the “consensus” system of governance, participating parties also enjoyed some privileges.   
5.1.3.1 Fundraising for Parties through State Contracts 
One way was to create a big project in the ministerial department.  Either buildings are torn apart 
and rebuilt or the equipment was declared obsolete and in need of replacement. These public 
works involved State contracts. Only party members or higher officials’ friends or family 
members were awarded these contracts. Whoever got the contracts knew there were non-written 
rules of 10%. That meant contractors must return 10% of the value of their bids to the director of 
administrative and financial affairs who is the supervisor of these contracts. A participant 
narrated state contracting procedure: 
“ADEMA members were the only ones in the game and they have 
developed silly things which went as far as printing ADEMA business partners’ 
cards. For private sector business persons to get State contracts, they had to have 
this card. The majority of tradesmen and private business people bought the card 
and exhibited it in state agencies to be awarded State contracts, and this was 
known to everybody.  The cards were printed and sold at a very high price and 
the funds raised from card sales were used to finance the ADEMA party.” 
Therefore, this was stealing in broad daylight. They did not need to break into the state 
coffers to take money. So these practices seemed more or less legalized. This modus operandi 
looked like a large net which is woven. Everybody knew it but nobody ever complained about it, 
let alone fight to end the practice. Party leaders wanted parties to leave on state money both 
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legally through state subsidies and illegally through civil servants placed at strategic positions 
where they can have access to public money to finance their parties’ activities.  
5.1.3.2 Parties’ Financing through Cash Money, Goods and Services 
With regard to this issue, participants said that the deal between cadres and the ruling party or 
parties which supported the “consensus” is their commitment to contribute to the financing of the 
party. This was and still is a common practice for all the parties involved in the exercise of 
power and is done in a number of ways.  
Contributions are paid on the monthly basis and their levels depended on position levels. 
Hence, the stealing of government money has been institutionalized. That was why each newly 
appointed minister replaced the incumbent director of administrative and financial affairs 
without any allegation of financial mismanagement. Because in most cases both new and 
incumbent directors of administrative and financial affairs were and still are financial 
management specialists. One would expect allegations of financial mismanagement as a good 
reason for the replacement of incumbents or even their indictment.   
The party became so demanding that some financial contributors ended up 
digging big holes in their financial management and became trapped in their parties.  
Worse, they must now blindly obey party officials to secure their protection and to avoid 
public humiliation. If they try to be disobedient of party principle, party officials will 
publicly frame them, accuse them of embezzlement and misconduct and they will end up 
in jail.  Given the entire system is corrupt and politicized from the administrative 
machinery to the judicial system to the political community, the accused agents will be 
the only ones to know about their innocence. Party leaders will engage in defamatory 
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campaigns against them through the media by publishing articles on their alleged 
practices.  
This will be the end of their careers because the party which did this to them 
might remain in power for ten years. They will not be active; they will be put aside 
during these ten years.  Ten years is too long in civil servants’ careers. These demoted 
agents may run the risk of getting psychological problems. Not only they will not be 
comfortable vis-à-vis their family members who have always regarded them as honest 
civil servants and for whom they have done nothing extraordinary in terms of expenses.      
This is still in effect under President Touré “consensus’ regime. In his first term (2002-
2007) he championed consensus politics as his leadership style. There were a number of parties 
involved in this power sharing exercise, parties which claimed to support him.   
The highest authorities apportioned the national cake through the distribution of strategic 
civil service positions to reward each and everyone who supported the regime. Parties which 
gained parliamentary seats are granted ministerial positions according to their political weight. 
Parties which have very limited political weight but have declared their support for the regime 
are also awarded some positions.  Even the less significant parties got at least one or two director 
positions or an ambassador position. The reason for this distribution of strategic positions is to 
provide each allied party with some financial support basis.   
Militants who have been noticed for their active support for the regime, have been hired 
at administrative assistant or handymen positions.  Those who could not be hired were awarded 
Mercedes Benz cars. Some cadres who had embezzled public money and whose management 
was under Interpol police’s investigation fared well in getting involved in the 2007 electoral 
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campaign.  Indeed, Interpol police was instructed to classify their files and to leave them alone.  
A participant reflected on his conversation with a party leader in this statement: 
“I know political parties whose leadership members told me that they 
could not get ministerial positions. But one of the highest authorities told them ‘I 
am going to give you such and such director positions and I even think those 
would be better for you that a ministerial position’.  They accepted the decision 
and these parties and party leaders are happy with those positions.  On official 
whose party benefited from two director positions happily told me about his 
conversation with the one of the state official. And he said that he really 
appreciates what these two directors bring to the party; that he was grateful to 
these two directors because they help the party enormously. “ 
Lastly, participants mentioned the connection politics-private sector as the finest, more 
flexible, and more complex connection never developed in another country. They found the 
necessity for the civil service to rebel against these practices. For them, Mali’s pluralism is a fake 
one; the highest state officials are the ones who finance all the Malian political parties either 
from their pockets or from the state coffer. This is why and how “consensus” politics survived 
and continues to exist.  In the Malian politic, the actors of this practice called it “political 
realism”.  
Participants mentioned another way of financing parties. Public agency directors and 
directors of administrative and financial affairs diverted public money to defray the costs of party 
officials’ trips to countryside for campaign purposes or for visits to touch base with their 
constituency. Ministry cars, fuel, drivers and per diem are made available to party officials for 
their numerous trips to their bases. Ministers have always prepared requests for missions and 
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sent them to the ministry of finance for approval and payment.  Requests for mission are official 
documents which are submitted to the control and verification of the directorates of budget and 
of financial control before payment. They included the budget, the purpose of the trip, the names 
and number of people who are traveling, their destination and the duration of the travel.  At the 
end of the fiscal year, national directors, and directors of administrative and financial affairs 
always managed to produce forged financial documents to prove that money allocated to the 
ministry has been spent to produce goods and to provide services to citizens. A participant 
honestly states it: 
“The party needs reliable civil servants not only to implement its policies 
but also, let us not hide our faces because everybody knows that political parties 
live on public money. So the party needs reliable people who can guarantee the 
resources needed for parties’ functioning. So the party needs a director from 
whom it can ask a favor of  placing 4x4 pickup trucks at the party’s disposal to 
transport party officials on a party mission or a director who can rather give 
State contracts to party militants, than to deal with people who are not willing to 
do any favor to the party….. For example, if the party in power appoints a cadre 
without political coloration, he/she does not have to feel obligated to join the 
party, but he/she must provide the party with the service expected from a civil 
servant.”   
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5.1.3.3 Securing Elections Victory to Political Parties 
Participants said that policy implementation was not the only reason for parties’ clientele 
formation.  The second reason was the search for reliable cadres who can secure election victory 
for the ruling party, parties appointed civil servants who would agree to return favors to the 
party. Thus parties use civil servants to bring back and to build an electorate for them or at least 
to guarantee election victories.  
To achieve this goal the ruling party has often used the services of the ministry in charge 
of public safety to re-conquer the electorate in some places in the country. The minister in charge 
of public safety, who was not member of the ruling party, instructed his staff to conduct a special 
mission aiming at convincing opinion leaders, traditional leaders and elders to vote for the party 
in the upcoming elections. Meanwhile, the ruling party leaders officially declared in a speech, 
that at the next elections, their party will carry that particular place. Their efforts bore fruits 
because the party carried that area in the very next elections. A participant who knew about the 
secret mission revealed the instruction given to the missionaries here in his own words:  
“We have a difficult zone, we have a budget for you; we want you to do 
everything in your power to bring us the electorate of this area for the party’s 
sake”.  
The ruling party leaders could also make a deal with a civil servant whom they appoint to 
a position in which he/she can secure election victory for the party: 
“I want to appoint you as governor of this area, because it is a difficult 
area; thus do your best convince the “Great Electors” to vote for the party.”  
Civil servants have been subject to acerb criticisms from both citizens and political officials. 
Public opinion believes that civil servants are not impartial in the handling of the electoral process.  The 
two administrative agencies which are involved in the electoral process have always been under fire.  The 
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“Direction Générale des Elections” has been criticized for the non transparency in its work especially 
with regard to the establishment and the management of voters’ database and voters’ cards.  At the 2007 
presidential election, this distrust led to a crisis between this agency and the Secretary General of the 
RPM party who demanded either an audit or at least a scrutiny of the agencies electoral activities. The 
distrust also came from the fact that the agency director is a military.  
The Ministry of Territorial Administrative and Local Governments has also been subject to 
criticism.  Both political officials and citizens accused this ministry’s cadres of not being neutral and for 
encouraging fraud. After the 2009 municipal elections, the president of “Union pour le Développement au 
Mali (UDM)” angrily denounced before the media massive electoral fraud perpetrated by some actors of 
the election with the complicity of the electoral administration in charge of the electoral process. He said 
that actors and unhappy recipients reported how piles of ballots with fingerprints have been removed on 
the election eve with the complicity of corrupt polling station presidents and distributed to people to use 
them to vote for specific parties in exchange for very little money. Elsewhere voters’ cards were removed 
and given to unknown voters to vote with these cards. In addition, taking advantage of the ignorance of 
many party representatives in polling stations, forged poll reports and minutes were written.  The 
President of CNID also made the same comments before the media. He has denounced cheating and the 
purchase of consciences with the complicity of the electoral administration.  All these demonstrate the 
people’s distrust in civil servants’ role in the electoral process.     
5.2 NATURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS-POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS’ RELATIONS 
The result of data analysis showed that there are five (5) indicators of the relationships between 
party leaders and civil servants.  They are namely 1) senior civil servants as political party 
leaders, 2) civil servants as “pragmatic” self interest seekers, 3) party leaders as clientele seekers, 
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4) party officials’ alluring behavior, and 5) state clerks’ resistance to political involvement.     In 
Mali, senior civil servants are also party leader. In these dual roles, they have always sought to 
secure and preserve their interests on both fronts. In addition to preserving their interests, they 
have also always attempted to recruit clientele for their parties in the civil service. However, 
many civil servants also engage in courting political parties as their position hunt strategy while 
a relatively small number struggle to resist political involvement.   
5.2.1 Civil Servants as Political Party Leaders 
Participants pointed out that a very important feature of the Malian political system is that the 
political community comprised of more civil servants than people from liberal professions. 
Therefore, there is inevitably an interpenetration of political parties in the civil service today in 
Mali. This is to say that the vast majority of Malian political élite wear two hats: they are the 
political parties’ leading class and senior civil servants at the same time.  As such, they all aspire 
to “good” or “juicy” positions in the civil service.  Obviously, their first whish is that their party 
be able to place them at “juicy” civil service positions.  Therefore it is a shame that participants 
have found the Malian civil servants to be very unfaithful party militants.  
The politicization of the civil service also occurred mainly because in political parties, all 
the executive body members are mostly civil servants. Therefore, civil servants engage in a 
courting game with parties and party leaders while it is also certain that party leaders also have 
tried hard to charm and even sometimes have forced competent and capable civil servants to join 
in. Finally, there are few cadres who have decided not to enter politics and who have a hard time 
keeping their political neutrality. 
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All those who can think, find social agenda, bring ideas and opinions to the parties, 
criticize government action and can access information, are civil servants. These people are party 
leaders, parties decision-makers. All those who can think, find social agendas, bring ideas and 
opinions to the parties are civil servants. The development of the private sector dates back to the 
late1990s in Mali when many state enterprises have been privatized and certain professions were 
liberalized. Those who are in the private sector are more interested in taking care of their 
businesses. But they often forget that in fact the policies and decisions that are made are likely to 
make their businesses prosper or go bankrupt.   
Therefore, parties are very much present in the civil service.  People’s willingness to 
comply with the rules of deontology of the civil service, is what shows how different they are. 
Some take less account of their political affiliation while in the line of duty.  Others are openly 
biased in the line of duty and care more about matter related to their party members. Because 
party leaders are also civil servants, they are caught in the politics-administration dilemma. As 
they aspire as civil servants to gain access to higher civil service positions, as political leaders, 
they have avoided to publicly acknowledge their membership to the opposition in the ADEMA 
era. Under the “consensus” rule, they were forced to either keep quiet or weigh their remarks or 
refrain from clearly expressing their disagreement with state higher officials for fear for their 
careers in the civil service and their parties’ survival.  
5.2.2 Civil Servants as “Pragmatic” Self-Interest Seekers 
Participants felt that more often, senior civil servants adhered to political parties not for political 
conviction, but in the hope that a particular party will help them access a “juicy” position in the 
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civil service. What are called “juicy” positions are those financial management positions were 
the politically backed civil servants have access to and control of state resources.   
Some participants have offered two main explanations for this behavior.  The first 
explanation was historical. They argued that political leaders in the single party system and 
military dictatorship have exercised so much pressure on civil servants in the treatment of 
various cases that it was very difficult for them to keep their impartiality. So the behavior 
became a heritage which has proven difficult to eliminate.  
The second argument was economical. For a long time, Malian civil servants were one of 
the most underpaid in Africa. Thus, the low pay was also believed to have shaped civil servants’ 
behavior. Appointment to “juicy” positions went with the entitlement to allowances and perks 
which supplement the low salary. Others have invoked political opportunism to explain this 
behavior. They said they have noticed that partisan politics has become the rule of the game and 
the survival mechanism for experienced and competent civil servants to maintain themselves in 
their positions.  
Those who are lucky to get appointed to “juicy” positions are been forced to accept the 
rules of the game imposed on them by the political party which has appointed them to remain in 
their positions, respondents added that some highly regarded cadres who hold top positions in the 
civil service have been known for changing their party membership so many times to secure their 
positions as a survival mechanism.  This is a behavior that is commonly referred to in Mali as 
“political nomadism”. Below is a participant’s statement with regard to the practice: 
“I know someone who had three or four party membership cards. Because 
at the beginning in fact CNID was flying high, a young party which preached the 
“Ko ka djè: fight against corruption and promotion of transparency”, he was a 
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CNID member. But when already in the first round it was obvious that the 
ADEMA candidate was likely to win the elections, suddenly he became an 
ADEMA member.” 
Participants have also explained civil servants’ courting behavior as a way of seeking 
party sponsorship for appointment in their dream positions. They showed off and made 
themselves available and useful to parties, particularly the ruling party. When they learned that 
the party was in need of some experienced people to do some specific work, they did everything 
to contact party officials who were in charge of the matter and proposed their services. They 
completed the assignments as quickly as possible and turn them in.  They attended party events, 
made themselves noticed through comments and suggestions about how to make things better in 
the party, made financial contributions or volunteered for parties. This was characteristic of the 
behavior of cadres who have poor or average professional worth in their attempt to emerge. 
When they succeed in joining in, cadres also have displayed a collaborative behavior toward 
parties.  Participants said that unfortunately the Malian civil service is full of these kinds of 
agents.  One participant described these courting maneuvers below: 
“There are gold diggers, people who want to make it at all cost, who think 
that the shortest road as it is very often said is not the straight line, but the ladder. 
 You show off, you make yourself useful to the party.  When someone tells you: 
‘he/she is the secretary general of such party who has such documents for such 
and such assignment’, you do everything, if the assignment requires a week, and 
you do it in two days.  You turn it in yourself at the party headquarters and you 
say things like ‘I would have really wished, I heard about your party, but if you 
made such or such thing it would be better and so on.”   
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Participants clearly expressed their concern about the practice of “political nomadism”.  
They firmly believed that some mechanisms must be developed to either stop the behavior or to 
inflict sanctions to those who engage in “political nomadism”. In addition, they called for a 
regulation of civil servants involvement in partisan politics and one of them out of frustration 
said this:  
“I think that we need to make the difference between commitment, the membership to a 
political organization and the expression of this membership. I believe that we need to organize 
this at the level of our state, the expression of the political engagement of civil servants while 
proceeding to the necessary differentiations according to levels or strata of the civil service.” 
5.2.3 Political Parties as Clientele Seekers 
In this regard, the relations seemed to be simple. The ruling party needs competent civil servants 
to implement its policies. Civil servants need the ruling party to access positions they have 
always wanted. In the ADEMA era, in the party’s search for civil servants’ responsiveness and 
subservience, its officials demoted incumbent cadres and promoted those who were at the bottom 
of the pyramid. Incumbents who are not been replaced would only owe ADEMA leaders the 
chance they have been given to remain in their positions. Agents who have been appointed or 
promoted felt obligated to the ruling party ADEMA. This was a clientele formation exercise; it 
was a way to constitute a group of obligated cadres to the party. A participant had this to say 
about ADEMA leaders’ move when the party gained power:  
“I do not know if you have read “the Prince” of Machiavelli?  When a 
new power comes in, it needs to demote incumbent cadres and promote those who 
were at the bottom so those individuals know it is to the ruling party that they owe 
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everything. An incumbent does not owe you anything except the chance you give 
him to remain in his/her position. Whereas someone you appointed or promoted 
feels obligated to you more that an incumbent.”  
The massive invasion of the civil service with non civil servants party members 
has also been deplored. Public administration is a profession that requires specific 
training. This invasion of the civil service with agents who have no training for public 
service, who have never served in the civil service and who enter as “chargés de mission” 
or “chefs  de cabinet” and others as part of ministers’ staff  members constitute the 
gangrene of the civil service; this is clientelism at play.   
The practice is very wrong because these positions have been neither very well 
defined and described, nor well targeted and it was agreed upon that they will be the 
political components of ministerial cabinets. But they have become positions that allow 
for intrusion of non-civil servants in the civil service, totally disturbing and disrupting 
hierarchy.  The practice has also caused a serious discomfort among career civil servants 
because it means that people have found an alternative door of entry in the civil service. 
These people came in as “chargés de mission” and remained in the civil service without 
meeting the qualification requirements.  
The practice has caused complete hemorrhage, a disaster, one of the reasons why 
civil servants’ ascension in the administrative hierarchy has become problematic.  Indeed 
it is very unfortunate that this has been the entrance for all those who are called "chargés 
de missions” and others. The imbalance caused by non-civil servants has been 
exacerbated by an attraction effect and many people have been trying to go in the 
direction of the attraction initiated, a rush of people to what are called “juicy positions. 
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Some civil servants coming from different horizons have also invaded others “corps” 
while draining the rest of the system.   These two factors combined to worsen the deficits 
that have been caused by structural adjustment programs. 
In any case the hiring of contract agents in the civil service to close the deficit of 
civil servants in certain sectors of the civil service became a necessity provided these 
hiring be under control otherwise, they may be used for political partisan hiring. 
Obviously, there are some ratios which are necessary for the civil service to function 
well. If a palliative is to be found to close the deficit, the contractual hiring can be 
considered particularly in education and healthcare sectors.  
In fact an incident that broke between the Minister of Health and the Minister of 
labor over the hiring of health professionals brought suspicions in this regard. The 
Ministry of health has gotten some budget allowance to hire a fix number of contractual 
health professionals to staff the health facilities throughout the country and the hiring was 
to be done by the Ministry of Labor because as the central hiring authority. After the 
hiring decision was signed and although both ministers are members of the same political 
party, the Minister of Health rejected the decision, accusing the Minister of Labor of not 
only hiring more people than requested but also for hiring a large number a people who 
have no healthcare training.  Neither the identity of the disputed new recruits nor their 
educational background has been revealed.  Then public opinion made inferences of 
partisan hiring.  
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5.2.4  Party Officials’ Alluring Behavior 
Participants also described party officials’ behavior toward some talented and highly qualified 
cadres.  Initially, they have noticed these talented civil servants and parties have appointed them 
to key administrative positions if the party had no qualified members to fill the positions they 
need to fill. In these cases, parties did not openly require these civil servants to join in.  As time 
went by, it became tempting for them to join the parties that have appointed them. In most cases, 
these agents have ended up joining their benefactor parties as a sign of gratefulness. If they do 
not do so, they are likely to lose their positions because of pressure from unhappy party 
members. The deterioration of work relations may lead either on party members’ resignation or 
their replacement with party members like a respondent put it: 
 “Some situations occurred in which civil servants whose worth has been truly recognized 
by everybody have been appointed by parties because in their view, they did not have 
senior executive members of the parties they needed to fill certain positions they had the 
obligation to fill. Parties do not ask these people do join in….. Right there, chances are 
that people move into their minister’s camp; choose the camp of their 
minister….  because there are pressures from party militants who are also waiting…. So, 
this could gradually deteriorate work relations, the work environment which can cause 
the agents to resign or the minister to get rid of them.” 
5.2.5  State Clerks Resistance to Political Involvement  
Participants talked about a scenario which involved civil servants who have decided not to get 
involved in politics. These cadres do not care about political parties; they do their job and do not 
care about the rest. At least they have good conscience. They kept their dignity and did not 
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prostitute themselves for politicians. They regarded themselves as clerks of the state and paid 
allegiance to the State. They may not be numerous, but they exist. These cadres often displayed a 
behavior of indifference to politics.  They do their job faithfully and well, they do not fear 
anything from party leaders. Thus these are people who are detached from political 
considerations. They considered themselves to be servants of the people and their main concern 
was the satisfaction of citizens needs, which is the raison d'être of the civil service. Besides, they 
were ready to oppose their professionalism to parties and party leaders and did not worry about 
political interferences.  
Parties have still tried to court them too. When they resisted, party courting turned into a 
threat of removal of the cadres from their positions and their replacement with party members. In 
many cases, these cadres ended up losing their positions to some of those who accepted to be 
subservient to the political élite or to political friends and “protégés.” Some of them have been 
lucky to be move to lesser important positions while other not so lucky have been left on the 
sidelines without any reappointment or even redeployment for an undetermined length of time.  
Ultimately, this took the form of punishment inflicted to these “disobedient” cadres as the 
lesson of their vulnerability and helplessness with regard to the political power. By doing so, 
political parties sought to send a strong message to career civil servants who were bold enough to 
turn down their membership and loyalty requests. 
Participants also mentioned the social challenge faced by the big clerks. In Mali, each 
civil servant feeds and takes care of an average of ten people, members of their extended 
families. On the one hand, newly appointed ministers would want to force the big clerks to resign 
by making their lives miserable in many ways. When these agents are fed up and decided to 
resign, their family members urged them to stay no matter what for fear of loss of status and 
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resources to take care of them. The truth is when these agents quit their positions their 
communities will suffer from it terribly. This is the social aspect of the matter. A participant who 
has suffered this practice gave his testimony: 
 “It is true that people are not the same.  There are some who would say ‘I 
don’t care, I do my job. If I am not treated properly, I will resign’.  But most of 
the time, your parents and relatives themselves will tell you ‘Hey, you better lean 
on God. Stay there nothing will last forever’.  Indeed they do not want you to 
resign from your position; they depend on you.  So, when you quit your position, 
the whole community will suffer from that.  So in fact, they prefer that you suffer 
there, that you curve your spine while waiting for those people to leave.” 
Finally there are those who do not want to get involved in politics but who fear party 
leaders for eventually causing them trouble. These cadres will try their best to please and 
compromise with party leaders and avoid clashes with them. This behavior may be prejudicial to 
the functioning of the agency. 
5.3 POLITICIZATION AS A THREAT TO THE BUILDING OF A PROFESSIONAL 
CIVIL SERVICE 
Participants felt that a civil service ought to be professional by definition. And they defined a 
professional civil service as a civil service which agents are qualified and comply with the rules 
of deontology of the civil service, namely impartiality, equal treatment for all the users, a civil 
service which is characterized by its moral integrity, a civil service which tries to take into 
account its users the needs, as well as the realities of society which it serves. In other words, if 
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servants are accountable for being fair, just and equitable in their decision and actions in order to 
help citizen enjoy liberty, justice, freedom, equality and equity, this implies that they are 
upholding a significant number of moral and ethical values.   
The result of data analysis suggested seven (7) indicators that showed that politicization 
is a threat to the building of a professional civil service capable of supporting democracy and 
development. They are: 1) civil servants and decision and policy making, 2) degree of openness 
of policy and decision making, 3) public service delivery and users’ satisfaction, 4) transparency 
and accountability in the civil service, 5) independence, autonomy and neutrality in the civil 
service, 6) honesty and integrity in the civil service and 7) civil service values and state officials’ 
moral values.   
5.3.1 Civil Servants, Policy and Decision Making 
Ruling party leaders needed reliable and qualified civil servants to implement their policies. But 
their preference went to those who are willing to pledge allegiance to them. They believed that 
the advantage of such preference was that loyal agents are more likely to support their political 
choices with devotion and loyalty and to facilitate the attainment of their goals and objectives.   
More often, cadres took positions generally favorable to the ruling power with no worry 
for either the rule of law or for citizens’ interests. Their conduct was mainly dictated by political 
motives which have nothing to do with the objectivity that must characterize administrative 
decisions.   
The disadvantage was that obviously a cadre who supported a given party’s political 
choices was not tempted to tell certain truths to party officials for fear of losing their positions. 
They would prefer not to draw party officials’ attention to certain risks of certain actions. 
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Consensus politics has complicated the situation. Since there was no opposition, everybody 
supported the regime.  As a result, anything the highest authorities did was said to be good even 
if it was not.  
In 2007, a few days before the general elections, no party had been able to meet the 
requirements to qualify for public financing. But it was decided to break the law and to grant 
public financing to political parties. This exposed their weaknesses and inconsistencies, the non 
respect of the rule of laws duly enacted and the lack of discipline of state authorities. This action 
appeared like the highest authorities way of linking political parties’ financial dependence to 
their kindness. The action also appeared as a large scale political corruption legalized by the 
ruling power with political actors’ tacit consent.  If political parties’ goal is to defend the people's 
interests, it is morally wrong for them to live on taxpayers’ money without any contribution to 
their well-being.  
This is beginning to change, at least in the National Assembly. Opposition parties have 
challenged state officials’ law breaking habit in the SOTELMA-BIM  privatization case.   The case 
involved 180 billion CFA francs (about $395,604,935.6 at an exchange rate of $1=455 CFA francs) the 
state collected from the privatization of a state bank BIM sa. and a state telephone company SOTELMA. 
In the National Assembly’s October session, SADI-PARENA coalition members realized that the 180 
billion CFA francs has not been included in the 2010 budget document while an expected revenue from 
the upcoming privatization of some other state enterprises was included.  They held a press conference to 
denounce the executive branch’s less orthodox financial management practices and to publicly require 
that the amount be included in the 2010 budget proposal as state revenue. 
On Friday November 6, 2009, the executive branch held a press conference in Koulouba Palais 
Banquet room to inform public opinion and Mali development partners about how the money will be 
spend.  The public believed it was out of embarrassment and upon the insistence of the parliamentary 
opposition coalition SADI-PARENA that the executive branch held such a press conference on the 
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matter. Many officials were invited including the Prime minister, the ministers, members of the National 
Assembly, chairpersons of state institutions, Ambassadors, representatives of development agencies and 
members of civil society organizations.   
In their introductory remarks, the highest authorities of the state chief said: “we owe our nation, 
our institutions and our elected officials this exercise”. Then they argued that: “since this money is an 
‘exceptional revenue’ for the state, it must therefore be used to fund state actions which support economic 
growth” and tried to give a detailed explanation of how they intended to spent the money. Then they tried 
to convince people that there will be transparency in the use of the money to achieve the targeted 
objectives in these terms: “the allocation of the money to various identified actions will be done through 
the budgetary process”.  Then the Prime minister was instructed to appoints and chair an inter-ministerial 
committee to manage the funds. It was obvious that the press conference was improvised. 
After these introductory remarks, the Undersecretary in charge of state budget took over and has 
tried hard to give the details of the announced plan with a table.  However, he was not successful in his 
attempt because of the poor quality of his table. It did not take too long for people to realize that the table 
had many incoherence and omissions; the figures in the table did not match the initial announcements. 
This led the public to believe that the Undersecretary’s table was hastily drawn under intense political 
pressure in his rescue efforts of the announced plan.  This was likely to be the reason why emphasis was 
placed on the upcoming committee needs to give itself ample time to better design and develop the 
financial policy pertaining to the spending of the “exceptional state revenue”.  
Out of dissatisfaction form the executive officials’ press conference and the poor performance of 
the Undersecretary in charge of state budget, Honorable Sidibé, an opposition representative in the 
National Assembly, requested that the Minister of Economy and Finance come to the National Assembly 
and submit to the questioning of members of the National Assembly with regard to the non inclusion of 
the money in question in the 2010 budget proposal. The Minister of Economy and Finance sent his 
undersecretary to the National Assembly to submit to deputies’ questions. In his answers, the 
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Undersecretary insisted that the law allows the executive branch to invest such “exceptional revenues” in 
development initiatives.   
Honorable, Sidibé who is also an expert in public finance said that the process was tainted with 
serious suspicions. He asked about the motives behind the executive branch’s decision to use these funds 
without the National Assembly’s input and added that both the decision and decision making process 
violated the principle of public expenditure orthodoxy. Honorable Sidibé expressed his concerns in these 
terms: “What concerns us is how things should be done”. He denounced the double standards for the 
inclusion of expected revenue from an upcoming privatization of some other state enterprise while 
withholding the money that was readily available.  
He was outraged by the submission of the 2010 budget proposal to the National Assembly with a 
deficit of 94 billion CFA francs to be financed by a heavy debt and by the fact that the interests the180 
billion will generate from its placement in a bank will not even be enough to cover the interest of the debt. 
He called the executive branch’s decision “a deliberate practice of poor financial management and 
accounting” of state resources and said that this decision will adversely affect the economic as well as the 
social and living conditions of the Malian people.  
Obviously, cadres in the Ministry of Economy and Finance knew this way of doing thing was not 
consistent with the laws and regulations pertaining to state resources, the budgetary process and public 
accounting. Rather, it was a deliberate violation of Act Nº 96-061 of June 28 l996 determining the 
fundamental principles of public accounting which requires that public resources, state assets be managed 
in such an orthodox way, that financial and accounting operations be recorded in an accounting consistent 
with general norms and submitted to the control of competent authorities.    
In this endeavor, cadres knew that the executive branch was discarding the law on public 
financial management, public budgeting and public accounting. But nobody dared to denounce it or at 
least to call attention on this as a gross decision, even the Undersecretary who is a well respected 
technocrat. This is to say that civil servants do not weigh heavy in decision and policy making in Mali. 
They have a very limited influence on decision and policy-making.  Only the highest officials in the 
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executive branch decided on everything without even consulting with cadres on the feasibility of their 
decisions. More often, on their trips to the countryside, people take advantage of their populist behavior to 
directly submit various requests to them.  Instead of saying that delegation members will make a note of 
the requests and upon their return, they will be examined for their feasibility, promises are made on the 
spot to satisfy the requests.  This decision-making pattern seriously affects the operation of the civil 
service. It is very important to mention that M. Sidibé is from the private sector.  He runs his own 
auditing firm Koni-Expertise.  No civil servant elected in the National Assembly would dare to challenge 
the executive branch higher officials’ way of doing things even if they break the law.   
5.3.2 Degree of openness of policy and decision making: civil society involvement 
Civil society involvement in policy-making has started with election monitoring but is far more 
extensive and includes regular control of policies, priority setting, implementation, equity, 
budget allocation and the effectiveness of service delivery.  Civil society has a limited record of 
playing a rigorous role of watchdog.  The record that exists is much more noticeable at the 
national level than at the local level.  The main actions at the national level to date have been 
taken by the media.  For example, the “Réseau Malien des Journalistes contre la Corruption et la 
Pauvreté”  has publicly complained about the government slow pace in the investigation and 
prosecution of exposed corrupt activities, inaction against busted public officials in corruption 
cases and private newspapers have made accusations of rudeness of government officials.  The 
Bamako-based press “Les Echos” and “Info-Matin” regularly exposed, reported and complained 
about government inefficiencies, inconsistencies and bad behavior.  But the media related checks 
on government are not always well researched, non partisan or consistent.  
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More often, many civil society organizations are limited in their actions because of their 
economic dependence on international development partners and their partisan political stance. 
This could influence their actions. With regard to the press, newspapers can accept payment in 
exchange for publishing an article.  Members of civil society organization have also the tendency 
to be active in the hope to be noticed and to gain access to government positions. In fact, civil 
society leaders have always struggled to get appointments in government as Ministers or to 
occupy other administrative or political positions in the state apparatus. For example, since the 
Secretariat for Women Affairs has been transformed into a full ministry, most of the ministers 
appointed there have come from the Umbrella organization of “Collectif des Associations et  
ONGs Feminines (CAFO)”.  Also, at each cabinet reshuffling, few members of civil society 
organizations get appointed at Ministerial positions.  Therefore, this ambiguous position of civil 
society organizations seriously weakens their role as watchdogs.       
5.3.3 Public Service Delivery and Users’ Satisfaction 
A reference to the general opinion about the civil service, the public is dissatisfied with the 
service for several reasons. Some people think that civil servants are slow and not qualified for 
their jobs. Others think civil servants lack integrity, meaning they are prone to corruption and 
favoritism. People have a bad image of civil servants. They think that civil servants are people 
who are not competent, who are not impartial and who put their personal interest before the 
interests of the citizens and the state. But it is well known that there are civil servants whose 
behavior is condemnable because they do not care about users.  But there are also civil servants 
who are as conscientious as they can be, who are respectful of the deontology of the profession 
and who carry out correctly their duties and obligations toward users of public service.  
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Civil servants were found to have a bad behavior toward users.  First of all, absenteeism 
is believed to be one of the contributing factors to the poor quality of public services. However, 
among all the problems identified, absenteeism appears to be the easiest problem to solve 
because it is the consequence of the lack of discipline, disorder and the lack of control.  The sad 
spectacle of deserted offices by employees who stepped out to take care of daily businesses 
showed how deep the problem was.  
Citizens complained first and foremost about the fact that civil servants do not 
accommodate them well, that services are not delivered in reasonable times and that users are at 
the mercy of civil servants. They argued that civil servants take too long to deliver services to the 
public. In public agencies such as the police or communal administrations, simple services take 
the form of a journey of a combatant. To get an identity card or a passport from the police 
administration, citizens have to start queuing very early in the morning just to get their personal 
information recorded. It takes the front desk police officers two to three days to deliver the 
signed identity card to the individual who has requested it and paid for it.  For the passport, it 
takes five to seven days. As of the communal administration it takes front desk agents five to ten 
days to liver a marriage or a birth certificate.  
Besides, no one was able to tell citizens exactly when their documents will be ready.  The 
processes for delivery of these official documents were so slow and so complicated, that people 
could never be satisfied because of the time and energy they spend to get them. Unfortunately, 
this was the reality of those who need services from the state administration.  Thus services were 
badly rendered to citizens and civil servants felt so powerful that the idea of serving the citizen 
was the least of their concerns. 
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Public service users felt also that the coming and going they were submitted more often 
appeared like an invitation to bribe for satisfaction.  Sometimes, users will find that the agency 
director has traveled to his/her village to lead a rally or to campaign for a public office position.  
So they will be told to come back the following week because the boss has not had a chance to 
sign the documents submitted to his/her signature before he/she leaves. This caused frustrations 
and discouragement.  
Public service users also complained about the lack of respect and courtesy. Most public 
agencies did not have a system of welcoming and guiding users. When users entered a public 
agency, nobody cared about them.  They had to struggle on their own to find the persons in 
charge of the services they came to seek. This was why people always tried to find out if they 
have friend, relatives or acquaintance in a particular agency or they ask their friends if they know 
someone in that particular agency.  
When users found the right case agents, very often they are being ignored because those 
front line agents were more likely to be on the telephone.  Users have to restrain themselves and 
wait stoically until whoever they are talking with finishes to tell the latest gossips and trivial 
occurrences. When frontline employees hang up the telephone, users are not served on the first 
come first serves basis, meaning that fairness and equity have become problematic in the civil 
service. The most practiced system was the system of affinity.  If they had an affinity in the 
agency, they go straight to that person and ask for help.  If they know nobody in that particular 
agency, it will take them time, energy and temperance to get the service they came to seek.   
Participants portrayed Malian civil servants as not effective in terms of service delivery 
to the public. They found civil servants very effective toward their supervisors, men and 
political authorities. When political authorities instruct them to do something, they do it 
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correctly and promptly. But when it comes to users, they take their time since the law does not 
set time limits for the processing of public demands. Some other participants pointed out that 
ethics and public service mission are no longer the structuring goals of public action. One 
participant gave striking examples to illustrate this situation:      
“From the moment we do not have a clear perception of our role in the State, in the civil 
service; it is difficult to provide quality service, efficient and effective service to the user.  
Let us consider the case of healthcare. You go to the emergency room, you will find that 
the stretcher-bearer is drinking tea. It is the person who has taken the sick person there 
who will be forced to carry him/her on the stretcher. This is not understandable because 
there are people for that job.  You come to the door of a ministerial department you 
realize that the gatekeeper in charge of raising and lowering the barrier is absent. He 
gets his paycheck; nobody can withhold a dime from it. You want to enter an agency, 
chances are you will find the front desk agent on the telephone; he/she does not even 
bother to tell you ‘have a seat’. We frankly cannot fell that we are satisfied”.  
Another perspective that participants brought in was the public’s lacks of objectivity. 
They argued that the public often deplores something from which it would have liked benefit.  A 
user may deplore that another user’s requests has been promptly handled and that the principle of 
first come first served was violated.  But if by chance, this kind of rule-bending promptitude had 
been applied to his/her case, he/she would not see any problem with that.  Criticisms are made 
for cases which do not benefit them.  But once the denounced misconduct is in their favor, there 
is no criticism. This is nevertheless the other side of the issue.  If the public can complain about a 
certain number of things, civil servants also can complain about the public’s behavior of always 
wanting to benefit from advantages, always wanting to be served first to the contempt of the 
principles that often the accused civil servants impose on them.  
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When a user comes in the morning to request a service; if the civil servant tells him/her 
“come back tomorrow” he/she does not take that for an answer; he/she wants to get what he/she 
wants immediately. It really is a muddle; it always should be treated in ambivalence. Perhaps if it 
is good to criticize civil servants, it is also necessary to criticize a little the behavior of the public 
and to develop measures so that this public too can display a good behavior toward public 
service providers.   
5.3.4 Transparency and Accountability in the Civil Service 
Participants strongly believed that one of the Malian civil service’s weaknesses is that 
management and control functions in public agencies are not upheld.  It is very important that 
management and control functions be emphasized. This leads to the accountability issue. Mali 
had a civil service which is not accountable at all because there are no clear rules of 
accountability.  Therefore, when individuals are not accountable, this is the door open to  
arbitrary decisions; the door open to what they want; the door open to all sorts of misconducts.  
One of the key features of the Malian civil service is the absence of a functional system of 
accountability.  
Ministers who are parties members were selected on the basis of their importance or their 
allegiance to the party.  Allegiance was prolonged in ministries, in the choice of people with little 
respect for criteria of professionalism. Allegiance continued in the directorate of administrative 
and financial affairs because of the inadequacy of the rules; and with the non-observance of the 
rules in the way they have been enacted, human and financial resources management lack 
transparency.  
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The massive arrival of politicized executives and politicians in the civil service was not 
likely to improve the quality of public service because authorities of control, be it administrative 
control, legislative control or judicial control, did not play their roles lawfully. Therefore, the 
functioning of the civil service was completely tampered. In fact there was no neutral control on 
the functioning of public agencies.  
With the advent of democracy, the distribution of power between the legislative, the 
executive and the judiciary was intended to allow the power to stop the power. The corollary was 
that the legal system be based on competence and ethics to better serve citizens. Unfortunately, 
the principles of checks and balances found themselves erected in a clientèle system.  The three 
branches of government have the same clientèle. In such a situation, there is a little chance for 
citizens to have their rights protected.   
5.3.5 Independence, Autonomy and Neutrality in the Civil Service 
For some participants, there were only few civil servants who manage to respect the obligation of 
neutrality and impartiality the law imposed on them. The vast majority have abandoned their 
moral and ethical obligations for fear of losing their positions.  They have always taken positions 
generally favorable to the power holders with little or no concern either for the rule of law or for 
public needs and demands.  Their conduct was mainly dictated by political considerations which 
have nothing to do with the objectivity that must characterize administrative decisions.  The civil 
service in its role of association with political parties and supplying them with public money 
cannot be said to be either independent or autonomous. This was the reason why a segment of 
the public generally makes a bad judgment on civil servants given many do not have the conduct 
expected from them.    
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 Malian civil servants were no longer in the position of neutrality, independence or 
autonomy which the statutes and the missions of public service required. To get a promotion and 
to ensure their subsistence, more and more civil servants were tempted to make allegiances to 
political parties and political groups who were likely to appoint and promote them to some 
positions which can allow them to leave their dream life.  As a result, political conviction and 
militancy were being abandoned.  They have been replaced with the conviction about the pursuit 
of personal interests or clientele group interests.  Thus civil servants seemed to have lost any 
claim of personal conviction on political issues. Ministers who were party members were more at 
the service of their parties and their partisans rather than at the service of the general interest.  A 
civil service which has associated itself with the political establishment in the looting of the State 
can be neither independent, nor autonomous, nor neutral.  
5.3.6 Public Service Delivery, Honesty and Integrity 
With regard to integrity and honesty in the civil service, participants deplored the fact that the 
Malian society has given up on ancestral education and people thought that modern teaching 
could replace the traditional manner of acquisition of moral values which encourage the 
individual no to steal not to lie among others. Therefore, people have stopped teaching children 
these values. People know that stealing public money has no consequences.  This is the sign of a 
serious moral education deficit. We hold for truth that dishonestly acquired goods have 
consequences on the individual in his life or on his offspring. This is the cultural teaching which 
was really important in Mali and which has almost disappeared today.  
Embezzling public money, forging financial management documents, using state 
resources for private use and illicit enrichment from public money are practices that many civil 
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servants are proud of. These practices have been transformed in a governance style endorsed by 
the Malian highest authorities. So concepts such as honesty and integrity are disappearing from 
the vocabulary of the Malian political and administrative communities.  
5.3.7 Civil Service Values and State Officials’ Moral Values  
Participants affirmed that State officials engagement in grand corruption was a significant 
contributing factor to the decay of moral values in the civil service. That was why despite 
rhetoric and the establishment of institutions to fight against corruption, Mali has scored no 
significant results so far.  One participant told a very shocking story about state officials’ grand 
political corruption and financial delinquency in the course of his interview. He said that the 
chairman of a very large state company gave large sums to the ruling party ADEMA.  
Unfortunately for the ruling party, this man has made records of all the transactions and has kept 
them in a safe place. The company audit revealed an enormous deficit in the financial 
management. Despite all the attempts to indict him, he said that he acknowledged that what he 
did was wrong. But he did it because he was forced to do it. But he informed ADEMA leaders 
that the documents are kept in a safe place and that he will give them to the judge in court at the 
trial. State officials decided to arrest him, then quickly released him and the case was dismissed 
on the ground that the man has some serious medical issues to take care off at that moment. 
There was never a trial. This case and many more similar cases are known to have happened.  
Thus in Mali as grand corruption became rampant, impunity became the keyword. These 
are not corruption, because people hide to engage in corrupt practices. But these are cases known 
to everybody, including inspectors and auditors in the state financial and control systems. People 
diverted public money without fear of sanction. This was the major challenge the Malian 
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democracy faced. In Western democracies, the systems are based on the fight over ideas, issues 
and militants involvement. Democracy in Mali has turned to a struggle to get a slice of the 
national cake. People entered politics to line their pockets rather than to help the country 
develop. In any case, financial delinquency could not be punished because those who had the 
power to sanction were themselves heavily involved in the practice, were sponsoring the 
practice.  
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Table 4. Core category 1: Degree of politicization of the civil service 
 
Open codes 
 
Axial codes 
 
Selective codes 
 
 Ordinance N° 77-71/CMLN; 
 Ordinance N°79-09; Act N°94-09; 
 Insufficient criteria. 
 
• Existence of legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Political appointments 
and promotions. 
 No defined criteria; 
 Friendship,  family and clientelism 
ties; 
 Subordination to the political élite; 
 Merit not important; 
 Party membership. 
 
 
• De facto criteria applied. 
 Exclusion of UDPM collaborators; 
 Priority given to ADEMA members; 
 Exclusion of opposition party 
members. 
 Affiliation to ADEMA for political 
blanket  
 
 
• Politics of exclusion with 
politicization outcome. 
 Political loyalty; 
 Moral satisfaction for helping the 
family; 
 More peaceful society; 
 Incompetence; 
 Lack of experience; 
 Mediocrity;  
 Frustration and de-motivation of 
competent agents. 
 
 
 
• Advantage and disadvantages. 
 Preference for incumbents 
replacement; 
 Preference for retaining certain 
incumbents;  
 Necessity of loyalty to the state. 
 
 
• Absence of loyalty to the state; 
 
 
 
 
• Civil servants 
involvement in partisan 
politics. 
 Party allegiance as a must; 
 Sabotaging work for loyalty to parties; 
 Non observance of management rules  
 
• Existence of loyalty to theirs 
parties. 
 Buildings tearing and reconstructions; 
 Replacement of the equipment. 
 10% of bid as a bribe. 
 
• Fundraising for parties through 
state contracts. 
 
 
 
 
• Party interests vs. 
public interests. 
 Appointees’ contributions; 
 Rewards for supporters; 
 Forged financial documents; 
 Party officials’ trips paid; 
 Private sector’s contribution 
 
 Parties financing through cash 
money, goods and services. 
 Civil servants securing votes; 
 Civil servants’ complicity of fraud. 
 Securing election victory to 
parties. 
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Table 5. Core category 2: Nature of civil servants-political leaders' relations 
 
Open codes  
 
 
Axial codes 
 
Selective codes 
 Weak  private sector; 
 Civil servants capable of agenda 
setting; 
 Civil servants capable of bringing new 
ideas; 
 Civil servants capable of thinking; 
Possible partisan. 
 Party leaders are also civil 
servants; 
 Few private sector party 
officials; 
 Parties presence in the civil 
service 
 
• Civil servants as 
political party leaders. 
 Imbalance of the Civil service; 
 Contractual hiring; 
 Showing off; 
 Volunteering to help parties; 
 Suggestions for betterment. 
 Political “nomadism”  
 
 “juicy” positions hunters; 
 Courting parties; 
 Seducing party leaders. 
 
• Civil servants as 
“pragmatic” self-
interests seekers.  
 Appointment of cadres obligated to the 
party; 
 Chargé de mission hiring; 
 Chef de cabinet hiring; 
 Partisan hiring. 
 
 Clientele formation exercise; 
 Non civil servants hiring. 
 
 
• Party leaders as 
clientele seekers. 
 Shortage of non militant  qualified 
cadres; 
 Expectations of non militant qualified 
cadre  to join; 
 Pressure from party 
 Work relations deterioration;  
 Release of non militant cadre  
 
 competent cadres; 
 Moral obligation to join the 
minister’s party 
 
• Party officials alluring 
behavior 
 
 Parties attempt to court; 
 Resistance;  
 Use of threat of replacement; 
 Moved to a lesser position; 
 Left on the sidelines 
 Social pressure to force to stay; 
 Fear for politicians. 
 Professionalism opposed to the 
party; 
 Left on the sidelines; 
 Punishment for disobedience; 
 Decision of clerks to leave; 
 
• State clerks resistance 
to political 
involvement. 
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 Table 6. Politicization as a threat to the building of a professional civil service 
 
Open codes 
 
 
Axial codes 
 
Selective codes 
 Support for ruling party’ policy choices; 
 Avoidance to give sound policy 
advices; 
 No worry about the rule of law; 
 Neglect of citizens’ interests. 
 Policy making and 
implementation; 
 Blind support for party policy 
choices; 
• Civil servants and 
policy and decision 
making. 
 Media denunciation of state 
misbehavior and bad policies; 
 Media lack of professionalism; 
 Civil society organizations seeking 
public sector jobs; 
 Civil society organizations’ financial 
dependency. 
 
 Less involvement of civil 
society organizations;  
 Civil society organizations’ 
ambiguous position. 
 
 
• Degree of openness of 
policy and decision-
making. 
 Slow services; 
 Incompetent agents; 
 Lack of impartiality; 
 Corrupt practices; 
 Absenteeism; 
 Lack of respect for and lack of courtesy 
toward  users 
 Few conscious - professionals; 
 Self-interested civil servants; 
 No users complaint for misconduct in 
their favor; 
 Complaints about users’ behavior.  
 
 
 
 Users’ dissatisfaction; 
 Bad image of civil servants; 
 Bad behavior toward users; 
 Few exceptions; 
 Lack of objectivity of users 
 
 
 
• Public service delivery 
and users’ satisfaction 
 No management control; 
 Arbitrary and misconduct;  
 Impunity; 
 Dysfunctional checks and balances 
principles; 
 Failure to protect citizens’ rights. 
 
 Lack of transparency; 
 Absence of accountability; 
 Widespread clientelism.  
 
• Transparency and 
accountability  
 Allegiance to parties and political 
groups; 
 Lack of political conviction; 
 Lack of militancy; 
 Securing jobs. 
 Bad judgment on civil servants; 
 Lack of neutrality; 
 Lack of independence; 
 Lack of autonomy. 
• Independence, 
autonomy and 
neutrality  
 Lack of moral education; 
 forging financial documents; 
 Illicit enrichment; 
 Highest authorities’ involvement 
 
 Lack of honesty; 
 Lack of integrity 
• Honesty and integrity. 
 Failure of the fight against corruption; 
 No sanction for financial delinquency; 
 Impunity assured for misconduct.  
 State officials involvement in 
grand corruption; 
 Struggle to get a slice of the 
national cake 
• Civil service values and 
state officials’ moral 
values. 
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6.0  CHAPTER SIX: POLITICIZATION OF THE MALIAN CIVIL SERVICE: 
EXPLAINING THE PHENOMENON 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The objective in this chapter is to explain the politicization process of the civil service in Mali on 
the basis of the analysis of the empirical data. The researcher argues that Peters and Pierre’s 
(2004) concepts, causes and consequences of politicization of the civil service failed to explain 
the twists and turns of the politicization of the Malian civil service. Three key variables have 
been identified. The first key variable is the degree of politicization of the civil service, 
determined by political appointments and promotion and civil servants involvement in partisan 
politics and parties’ interests versus public interest.  
The second key variable is the characterization of politics-administrative relations to be 
determined by civil servants as party leaders, civil servants as “pragmatic” self-interest seekers, 
political party leaders as clientele seekers, party officials alluring behavior, state clerks’ 
resistance to political involvement. The last key variable is politicization as a threat to the 
building of a professional civil service determined by civil servants and policy and decision-
making, degree of openness of decision and policy making, public service delivery and users’ 
satisfaction, transparency and accountability, independence, autonomy and neutrality, public 
service delivery, honesty and integrity, and civil service values and state officials’ moral values. 
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From the analysis of the data a number of explanations to the politicization of the civil service in 
Mali is offered in this chapter. 
6.2 HISTORICAL EXPLANATIONS 
From independence to March 1991 Mali’s political context has been characterized by the reign 
of a hegemonic party which was de facto or de jure party-state. In Union Soudanaise RDA era 
under President Keïta, the relationship politics-administration was known. It was the 
subordination of administration to politics; the civil service was subordinated to politics. This 
means the principle of neutrality, objectivity and restraint imposed on civil servants was not 
respected.  It means the political system in place and the legal organization of basic assumptions 
on which it rested did not allow for the upholding of basic principles guaranteeing the 
performance of public administration. This situation did not allow for the creation of conditions 
of the efficiency of the civil service although these principles were about issues of neutrality and 
restraint vis-à-vis the people.  
After the coup d’état in November 1968, Mali fell under a military regime. The de facto 
single-party was been replaced by a sort of monocracy which was in fact the extension of 
problems that originated from the defunct system with regard to the civil service. Overall, from 
1968 until the creation of the single party, Union Democratique du Peuple Malien (UDPM), the 
Malian civil service continued to be at the devotion of the military regime like it was the case 
under Union Soudanaise RDA regime.  What has changed was the regime; but the relationship 
between the civil service and the ruling power has not.  
 139 
With the de jure single-party system, it was the same thing and it even worsened to 
become pernicious. Civil servants were devalued in the early years of the second republic. When 
the military came to power, they devalued the civil service because they felt looked down upon 
and persecuted by intellectuals and civil servants. Since they had no idea of the role of the civil 
service, they played the game of nepotism. Army chiefs became governors, national agency 
directors and ministers. These military chiefs did not even graduate from high school; they got 
their promotions through routine. So intellectuals were persecuted and the civil service devalued 
throughout the military regime. It was in this period that civil servants have developed their 
opportunistic behavior because nobody could express or defend any idea; it was a dictatorship.  
Courageous and honest civil servants suffered under the military rule. The beating, mistreatment 
and humiliation of some civil servants have contributed to the softening of the vast majority of 
them.   
People were required to have the party membership card. Therefore Mali has a culture, a 
political history that has at all time created and maintained a relationship of subordination of the 
civil service to politics, subordination that implied that the degree of militancy was a criterion, 
the best guarantee for appointment in senior civil service or ministerial positions. During the 
period of transition, things have somewhat changed.  
Between March 1991 and June 2002, Mali attempted to build a civil service which 
recognized the big clerks of the State, an administrative apparatus which marked the logical 
rupture, between politics and administration through its new principles of appointment to senior 
civil service positions, such as the principle of competition through written examination to name 
a few. Thus, the Malian government attempted to redefine the nature of the relations between the 
civil service and politics. Unfortunately, this attempt was short lived. In the third republic, 
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ADEMA leaders clearly and publicly stated that whoever was not an ADEMA member was 
against ADEMA.   
Once elections were over and ADEMA gained power, a hegemonic, an ultra 
dominant party and its leaders excluded non ADEMA members from both the political and 
administration processes and took the civil service hostage. Indeed, politicians’ behavior led civil 
servants to believe that the state is a cake that is shared once elections are over. So, the majority 
of civil servants, no matter what senior or executive position they held, attempted to find 
protectors, mandarins within big political parties presumed to certainly give them one day, the 
benefits of their allegiance, of their membership.  
Ever since we have been and still are in a situation of rent; we have state rent-seekers. 
The Malian culture works in a way that, civil servants considered the state as a cake that election 
winners share.  Therefore, it is better to associate with the winners, and the winners are those 
involved in politics. Whoever is not among the winners has no chance of getting anything. Thus, 
the civil service ended up being politicized. Since the state is a cake that is shared after elections 
and that politicians are election actors, it will be sliced between politicians, their parties and their 
militants. The civil service as an element of the social body also politicized itself hoping to be 
able to get a slice of the cake, what is calls today “democratic pondering”. The civil service 
appeared like the natural extension, the outgrowth of the ruling party. Therefore, is at the service 
of all the people who come into power, rather than to be at the service of citizens. 
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6.3 CULTURAL EXPLANATION 
The Malian public agencies have developed the basic culture of Malian societies, a basic culture, 
an original culture which is grounded in Malians society’s initial conception of the individual, of 
the man and power. This initial conception is that the holder of power by definition is not the 
servant; he/she is in principle the one who is served. But our civil service in principle should be 
at the service of citizens, at the service of society. But a societal conception, a certain dominant 
conception anyway of the Malian culture requires that it be the opposite, inverts somewhat the 
logic of this vision, the perception is the opposite, the holder of power is the one who is served 
he/she is not the servant.  
Since politicians have been in this role, the secular arm politicians’ armed hand can only 
be in this role and have this status. Therefore there was like a transposition of the political and 
social status of power, the holder of the political authority, toward those who have the 
responsibility to promote the well-being of the people but on the basis of political visions. So, 
there was a transposition of this status in the civil service, in public agencies, who became not 
servants, but also those that must be served because they hold a portion of the power.  
Thus, overall, the Malian civil servants’ behavior which is dictated by this conception of 
their social status, of their role, naturally did not encourage relations of conviviality with 
citizens.  But much beyond that, Malian civil servants’ behavior did not encourage the 
expression, the formulation and the satisfaction of citizens’ desires, opinions, interests because 
the civil service was not designed to listen to citizens. It functions like at its own service rather 
than at the service of citizens. In the Malian society in general, the researcher’s perception of the 
service orders of the civil service in different categories: with regard to men, women, to children 
to name a few is variable.  The higher a person is in the social hierarchy, the better the service 
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the civil service offers this person. The closer to the lower level an individual is in the social 
hierarchy it has been observed that the behavior, the attitude toward this individual is a negative 
attitude of disrespect.  
When considering men and women, the researcher’s perception is not homogeneous. The 
civil service’s relations with men as opposed to its relations with women are quite different. As 
much as civil servants endeavor to have correct relations, relations aiming at a certain 
satisfaction to a certain degree of men’s interests. With regard to the interests of women, they are 
less listening, less availability to integrate women’s desires, preoccupations and interests.  
With regard to children, it is similar to women’s case because this is a society in which 
social roles have been defined for every category of individuals. In the public sphere, there is like 
a transposition of the domestic subordination of women and the civil service integrated that 
because in the public imaginary, the representation society has of women, the image society has 
of women, is that of submission to men. And since the civil service is a civil service which 
culture and organization is strongly masculine, there is a very little chance, there is a very little 
room for giving attention to women's desires and opinions, therefore to an expression, to a 
behavior that would encourage the satisfaction of women’s needs. What is true for women is also 
true for children. Thus, from these details it is fair to say that in general, the Malian civil service 
operates mainly for the benefit of men but even having said that, operates mainly for its own 
benefit and the benefit of politicians, not for the benefit of citizens.  
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6.4 POWER STRUCTURE EXPLANATION  
With regard to ADEMA regime, even though political clientelism determined some 
appointments or most appointments, the choice of men and women was a choice that could rest 
on more serious criteria, credibility and seriousness. There is no doubt that political clientelism 
occurred in the sense that only DEMA militants, only people close to state officials who 
benefited appointment in senior positions in the civil service. But at least during this period, it 
was most often ensured that capable and competent people were chosen to successfully carry out 
their missions. And when the appointees failed to do so, actions were taken to replace them.  
This was not the case under the “consensus” governance. A person’s seriousness and 
credibility were no reference.  The success or failure of a mission in a period of time had no 
relevance.  What mattered was that the person is a close friend or a family member. In the 
researcher’s opinion this was what made the sharp difference between what happened under 
ADEMA rule and what happened under the “consensus” governance.  
It should be noted that in the first five years of ADEMA rule, the leadership style has 
often involved a certain number of political parties in the management of the state apparatus, 
notably cadres from other political parties. Therefore this kind of political emulation was the best 
shared criterion, as far as appointments were concerned. The state highest authorities were very 
autonomous, very independent from ADEMA. They appointed people they wanted. Inside 
ADEMA, they appointed people they chose to appoint. This explained somewhat the rupture 
with the late Mamadou Lamine Traoré. Yes, they did not let themselves to be locked up in the 
party. They put the party forward when party decisions were in agreement with their decisions 
and were satisfying their interests. But it must be said that state highest authorities, as rulers have 
their interests; defining the state apparatus confers them a certain authority.  
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After analyzing the situation, Mali suffered a situation the political class has wanted. No 
one wanted to go in the opposition; everybody wanted to be in power, as if party leaders have 
agreed to make this period a second transition with a president who has no party affiliation, 
independent from political parties, equidistant from political parties with his leadership style. 
Through the concept of “consensus” leadership style could be used to redefine some basic 
principles, some necessary corrections to the democratic system.  
Unfortunately, there were only a resolved will to participate in power, which yield 
benefits, which has defined, has determined political actors’ behavior.  They will put consensus, 
peace and security forward. But this is not true; it was an argument of façade. It was the fear of 
the opposition, the fear to not participate in the exercise of power and the benefits it 
yields because Mali does not have either a culture or a practice of political opposition. But, this 
is understandable.  When senior civil servants who are party militants are waiting to be among 
decision makers, therefore to hold higher civil service positions, it becomes difficult for a 
political party, not to participate in the management of the state apparatus, not to participate in 
government since the context allows it, since this particular party was invited to join in. If its 
leaders take the risk to refuse to join in, its militants cadres will leave to either become 
independents or join the political parties that are in the power sharing agreement with the ruling 
power. Therefore, there is a key issue here: it is the involvement in the exercise of power; it is 
the participation in sharing the benefits of power.  
The fact that there is a collusion between the civil service and politicians, the fact that  
hierarchies exist, because administrative hierarchy makes the civil service look like political 
parties, does not allow political forces themselves to have an attitude based on a strategic 
political analysis. That was why there was no strategies, no tactics. Therefore, the situation can 
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be explained as the consequences of the collusion phenomenon between the civil service in its 
hierarchy and the political class. The fact that most of those persons who hold senior or 
executives positions in the civil service have been appointed in their political leaders capacity or 
as political friends or as members of an importance political family even if they may not be 
political leaders, defines the nature of the relationships between political parties and the ruling 
power, with the person who is in power. We need to keep that in mind because it is extremely 
important.  
In other words, the phenomenon of collusion political power-administrative hierarchy 
determines to a large extent, the nature of relations between political parties and the power in 
place, mainly determines the behavior, the attitude and the political party positioning with regard 
to the power in place. Because most of those who are political parties presidents, general 
secretaries or members of their executive offices, most of them hold these leadership positions in 
their parties not because they adhere to an ideology, or they want to defend a political program, a 
political agenda, but to make a name for themselves, to be visible, holding on to the hope that 
one day they will be among those in power. Therefore people joined political parties waiting to 
be asked to join power holders. When this access becomes possible, they will not accept that 
their parties turn the offer down. 
We are experiencing a situation that has sufficiently proven this behavior of party 
members within political parties. It was party representatives in the President’s cabinet, who 
have tried hard to convince their parties not to produce a candidate rather to support the 
incumbent president’s candidacy. This might be hard to understand. But the goal of their requests 
was to protect their relationships with the ruling power. If they do not support the incumbent 
president, they will be replaced in their positions. Those who have not entered yet in the power 
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system have also been very vocal in requesting their parties’ support for the incumbent 
president’s candidacy. They hope to join in once they were able to secure a victory for the 
incumbent president.  If a party leader who is not interested in doing that, tells his party 
members: “no, we are not going to support any candidacy for such or such scientific, ideological 
or political reasons”, they will think that he/she is out of his/her mind and they will decide to 
leave the party.   
Another typical example was, when the incumbent president announced his first term 
candidacy, ten (10) members of ADEMA’s  executive office decided to support him against their 
party’s candidate. Three prominent leaders among these ten ADEMA officials were awarded 
appointments.  Two were appointed as ministers and the third one as the director of a very 
important public agency.  They have decided to support the candidate with no party affiliation 
against the candidate of their own party ADEMA to be able to access power.  
Despite ADEMA’s refusal to go into political opposition, they were among ADEMA 
ministers who have been chosen among the ten. Therefore, people need to keep in mind this 
important rule that gives insight in the analysis on the issue of Malian political parties’ relations 
with the ruling power. They are not political parties, they are chapels, shops, composed of 
people, of merchandise, ready to be sold, ready to sell themselves. People create political parties 
to wait for the opportunity to place some of their leaders in the President’s cabinet one day and to 
appoint their friends at certain positions in the civil service.  
These hopes and expectations define Malian politicians’ behavior and determine political 
parties’ margin of maneuver with regard to the power in place. Therefore this determines the 
positioning, the behavior and the political party attitude toward the power in place, not toward 
each other, but toward the power in place. The problem is that parties’ political leadership is the 
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administrative elite within the civil service and within state enterprises. There are very few 
business people in the Malian parties, few people from liberal professions. The, bulk of Malian 
party officials are civil servants. But nobody expects a civil servant who is waiting for an  
appointment to a  ministerial or general director position, to decline the offer of appointment as a 
member of the President’s staff or as a minister, to oppose his/her party’s decision to support the 
power in place.  
Moreover, Malian political parties did not have resources because of the nature of their 
membership, because of the high number of civil servants in their membership and within their 
leadership.  Therefore, they could not have an attitude of independence and lack of interest with 
regard to the power and to its influence.  
6.5 STATE WEAKNESS AND POLITICIANS’ CONSPIRACY AS AN 
EXPLANATION   
The Malian people have not yet develop a clear conscience on the necessity of building a strong 
civil service, on the importance of the irreplaceable contribution of a strong civil service in the 
development process of the country. People talk about the problematic of governance, but 
governance is first a context, the context of public action. But it is a context which rests on 
principles, rules that define its functioning. The context of Mali’s public action is a context 
which rules are not known because the minimal rules that exist, which are insufficient, which do 
not make a complete system are not enforced. Because every civil servant who worries about 
getting ahead, who worries about promotion, who has the ambition to rise in the hierarchy of 
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his/her profession is obliged de facto, with the tolerance of the law, to be at the devotion of a 
political force notably the one in power at that particular moment.  
The researcher did not think Mali was doomed to remain this way. But the situation 
appeared like it benefited everybody. Those who must denounce it and work to change it thought 
that tomorrow they will be in power and today change will not help them. There was like a 
consensus, a conspiracy of silence about the issue so that it would not sufficiently, completely 
and seriously be resolved. Of course, there was like a strategic alliance between politicians, to 
appease their ambitions which are not necessarily development ambitions for the country, a 
conspiracy, an alliance to the detriment of citizens who are the majority, who are their militants.  
But, things needed to be put in perspective. There were no militants in Mali; the crisis of 
militancy was evident. There are people who vote, but these voters were not true militants. The 
citizens militant who could have initiated the debate inside strong political parties to solve the 
crisis of the civil service were not interested in doing so because they were not militants, because 
they had no political commitment in the political parties.  
Politicians had the responsibility to reject this way of doing things and to see things, if 
they wanted to put an end to the rupture between the state which they represent and society. This 
was a context of rupture of confidence between citizens and the State. This is why the African 
state, precisely Mali, is undergoing an incredible crisis, including a crisis of authority and a crisis 
of legitimacy. With regard to the crisis of authority, forty years ago people feared and respected 
authority.  Today, People have no consideration for the authority. In both urban and rural areas, 
the crisis of legitimacy of the ruling power was apparent.  
The proof was neither the state nor the political community was able to mobilize. Apart 
from election periods, no power was capable of mobilizing the people, to put people in a 
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situation of commitment to achieve development objectives simply because the people knew that 
it was not about achieving development objectives; rather, the quest for the satisfaction of the 
interests of the ruling class. In this context it was not possible to build a viable public 
administration, a strong civil service. Besides, it is well known that the civil service is a key and 
irreplaceable instrument which can be used to advance the democratization agenda and move the 
state toward development because it is the necessary passage for policy implementation, for the 
sophistication, for the operational realization of politicians’ visions.  
But, if the civil service is subordinated to politicians whose interests are not necessarily 
either democratic or developmental, this subordination might force the institution to align itself, 
to do maneuvers, to offer services that do not integrate citizens needs, but only to cater to the 
satisfaction of the ambitions, to the interests of the ruling élite to the detriment of the 
implementation of policies that satisfy the needs of citizens.  
If Mali is to remain in this situation, this means it will disappear as a state. For this 
situation to change, the civil service itself will need to do its mea culpa. If it wants to continue to 
benefit from the tolerance of citizens, it would be necessary to do its mea culpa. Otherwise the 
state will find itself in a situation in which citizens will consider the civil service, the state 
administration to be the same as politicians. This means the margin of differentiation between 
the civil service and politician will be very small.   
The consequence would be that the state will not have any more instruments capable of 
nurturing its social contract with the people, because policies would have failed, because the civil 
service would have shown the proof of its association with politicians. There will be a vacuum 
which will needs to be filled. The vacuum situation will create the objective conditions of a very 
dangerous revolution because the elite have missed the opportunity of making a new contract 
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with the people through reforms that satisfy everybody. In a nutshell, the extension of the civil 
service actions, its ultra developed association with politicians, will create the conditions of a 
mass movement leading to sweeping changes; and mass movements always involved violence.  
This might give the opportunity for the Malian people to lay the new foundations of a 
state with a clear dissociation between politicians’ missions and civil service’s missions. Then, 
this dissociation will allow for the building of a civil service system with clear criteria for hiring, 
functioning, accountability, and sanctions that will restrain civil servants from any kind of 
mandatory situation of conspiracy or association with the political power.  
6.6 RELIGIOUS EXPLANATION 
Under the military regime, Islam played a negative role in trying to convince people to agree 
with decisions or policy and be subservient to the ruling power. In fact Islamic leaders preached 
that those who opposed military decisions deserved whatever they got and if they die, they are 
considered to have committed suicide and will never go to heaven. This aspect of Islam with 
regard to the ruling power was very reactionary. Hence, civil servants softened.      
Islamic leaders and the people who possessed fetishes, the “féticheurs” of the Republic 
played a key role in the connection ruling power-administration-society because they knew many 
people’s secrets in the three components of the state.  They detain information from state 
officials, civil servants and society. Through their influence, they take care of many issues that 
are not even mystical simply because of the large amount of information at their disposal.  It is 
common to see a religious leader ask a state official including the highest authorities to put an 
individual civil servant under his/her wings.  This official will do exactly what the religious 
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leader has told him to do as if he/she were his student. Therefore, it can be inferred that no 
official is in full control of the decisions to be made because as soon as they received instructions 
from the most important religious leader or from an important “féticheur”, they felt compelled to 
carry it out.   
Thus these are some issues that need not to be neglected with regard to civil servants 
because sometimes, their behavior is also dictated by this power, the religious power. And also a 
chunk of the embezzled resources goes to the religious leaders because they are also seen as the 
protectors. When somebody is threatened and that the religious leader instructs to leave that 
person alone, the case is closed. There are some religious leaders in Bamako whose vehicles 
have no papers, no insurance, no custom clearance, and nobody dares to ask to see the papers of 
their vehicle.  These vehicles are known to everybody as well as their owners.  
The Family code is a case in point. The highest authorities instructed the Minister of 
Women, Family and Children Affairs to draft a bill of Family Code as the implementation of the 
regional and international instruments that Mali has adhered to including the United Nations’ 
Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, ratified in 1985, the 
Protocol of the African Charter on Human, the People’s and Women’s Rights, ratified in 2005 
and the United Nations’ Covenant of the Rights of the Child, ratified in 1990.   
A committee which included representatives from all segments and strata of the Malian 
society was appointed to tackle this difficult and delicate task. All religious faiths were 
represented and a representative of the Muslim faith was voted chairman of the committee.  After 
twelve years of consultations and hard work, the draft was approved by in the Council of 
Ministers. The bill was voted in the National Assembly with 117 YES, 5 NO and 4 abstentions 
on August 3, 2009. Many people applauded the event. Among its detractors were many men 
 152 
including members of the High Islamic Council like its Secretary General Mohamed Kimbiri, 
Director of Radio Dambé who expressed his outrage in this statement: “We are very 
disappointed because of at least two provisions.  The first is that children born out of wedlock are 
recognized in the succession.  The second provision is that girls and boys receive an equal share 
in their fathers’ inheritance.  This contradicts the Islamic law”.  M. Kimbiri also said that “This 
Code is a disgrace, a betrayal [to Muslims] … We are not against the spirit of the Code, but we 
want a proper Code for Mali, which is adapted to its social values.  We will do everything in our 
power to stop this Code from being signed into law”. 
The key feature of the new Code was that it addressed the issue of inheritance previously 
governed by the customary or Islamic law. But the Code had offered options people will have to 
choose from. Whatever law a person chooses to apply in his will or before witnesses to resolve 
his/her inheritance matter should apply.  Also gender equality is asserted several times although 
the superiority of men remains. The man remains the “head of the family” and has the choice of 
the family residence.  The concept of “paternal authority” has been replaced with “parental 
authority”. The “due obedience” of women has been deleted.  The minimum age for marriage 
was set to 18.    
Since the adoption of the Code, protests have become more serious. Over fifty thousand 
Malians had “cursed” the Act in a meeting called by the High Islamic Council on August 22 at 
the March 26 Stadium in Bamako. Islamic leaders then engaged in blackmailing high authorities 
and elected officials. They threatened to “boycott weddings, child naming and funeral 
ceremonies of members of the National Assembly who voted the Code”. Hundreds of religious 
leaders and village leaders spoke “against the enactment of a law deemed wicked and satanic”.  
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Under pressure and after consultations initiated with the parties represented in the 
National Assembly, the highest authorities announced that the new Family Code will not be 
promulgated.  It was resubmitted to the National Assembly for re-examination. In a speech 
broadcasted on national radio in the evening of August 26, 2009, state officials explained that a 
re-examination of the Code was intended to ensure “the peace and social cohesion” and that 
further considerations should allow to obtain Malians’ “support and understanding” .  
To express his concern, the International Federation of Human Rights wrote a letter to the 
Malian authorities on September 24, 2009, about their decision to return the Code to the National 
Assembly for a second examination.  This example clearly shows the impact of Islamic leaders 
on decision and public policy-making in Mali.  
6.7 CONCLUSION 
A number of explanations of the politicization of the Malian civil service have been offered in 
this chapter.  Under the de facto single party regime of the first republic and de jure single party 
regime of the second republic, the civil service was completely subordinated to the party. With 
the primacy of the single party in the context of the command economic planning, the state was 
believed to be the engine of economic and social development. So the post-independent State’s 
civil servants were considered to be the servants of the people.  They were expecting to help 
political officials develop and implement policies, programs and projects aiming at improving 
people’s well-being.  
Under the first republic, the subordination of the civil service to the single party “Union 
Soudanaise – Rassemblement du Démocratique Africain: US-RDA” made civil servants appear 
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like power holders, an outgrowth of the political power. So a Malian cultural value that holds 
that a power holder does not serve; rather, it is the one who is served caused the civil service to 
associate itself with the political power and fail to play its role of delivering development. 
Instead of using their skills and expertise to bring citizens in the state development process, the 
civil service operated solely on the single party rules and principles given the party was seen as 
expressing people’s needs and aspirations.  
Under the second republic, the single party effect was exacerbated by the military 
devaluation of the civil service. Military officers with no academic training and no idea about 
politics were placed at senior and executive positions of the civil service to instruct career civil 
servants how to run the business of government. Those civil servants who tried to resist them 
were severely repressed, jailed and even tortured to death. Faced with their helplessness, civil 
servants softened and gradually lost their professional and ethical values to the detriment of the 
less orthodox values of the military. When military bosses sought to enrich themselves they used 
civil servants to supply them with public money with little concern for the people’s well-being. 
In the course of this action, Malian civil servants who were among the less paid in the African 
continent, thought to serve themselves while serving their military bosses.  
The military has also called upon civil service to craft all the antidemocratic changes 
sometimes to the detriment of citizens. Finally, they have turned the civil service into a machine 
of humiliation and repression. Thus, the military regime is believed to have caused civil servants 
to lose their moral and civic values and a starting point of their opportunistic and corrupt 
behavior.  Civil servants curved their spines and endured the military arbitrary until March 26 
1991 when the military rule came to an end with a coup d’état following a mass protest.    
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In the transition period, Mali has attempted to build a civil service which marked the 
logical rupture, between politics and administration through its new principles of appointment to 
senior civil service positions, principle of competition through written examination for hiring and 
other sound personnel policies. This was the Malian government’s attempt to redefine the nature 
of the relations between the civil service and politics. Unfortunately, this attempt was short lived. 
Once elections were over and ADEMA gained power, it moved quickly to dominate the political 
and administrative life, took the civil service hostage and turned it into the instrument of its 
domination. As non ADEMA members were being removed and replaced with ADEMA 
members to secure the party’s control over the state and its resources, politicians’ behavior led 
civil servants to believe that the State was a cake that is shared once elections are over. So, civil 
servants, no matter what senior or executive position they held, the majority attempted to find 
protectors, within the big political parties presumed to reward them one day, for their allegiance.  
 The third republic, with ADEMA leaders’ hegemonic behavior, became a “single party 
regime” with all the features hidden under the cover of democracy. The politicization of the civil 
service in the sense of placing both civil servants and non civil servant party members at 
strategic administrative positions to monopolize state resources to benefit only ADEMA and its 
members while excluding the rest of political parties from state process occurred. So the 
politicization of the civil service took the form of the sharing of the cake between ADEMA, its 
leaders and its members within the civil service. Other parties leaders’ reactions to this selfish 
behavior were met with repression, humiliation and jailing.  
What made the presence of politics much felt in the civil service was and continues to be 
the fact that the Malian political leaders are also senior civil servants who operate in both arenas. 
They are parties’ executive officers and senior civil servants at the same time. In addition, they 
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recruit most of their memberships in the civil service to form their cadre bases and wait for their 
turn to access power.  
Under the “consensus” governance, the politicization of the civil service ADEMA style 
remained but the base of sharing the cake was expanded. Parties and political associations which 
claimed to support government agenda were awarded a piece of the national cake, stretching 
state resources very thin. Both politico-administrative and strictly administrative positions were 
distributed among these parties and political organizations according to their political weight. 
Each of these organizations deployed their cadres into their awarded positions to extract as much 
state resources as they can to serve the organizations and their leaders while keeping some to 
themselves.  
This practice was used to manipulate the political community in a number of ways.  With 
regard to those who are members of the conspiracy network, it was aimed at keeping them 
hostage of their greed and to subject them to blackmailing and threats of being cut off their 
means of survival both politically by removing and replacing themselves and their cadres in their 
administrative position and cutting their parties off state resources. The consequence was 
obviously their silence and tacit acceptance of any decisions he makes. It was also intended to 
destroy the political opposition in a pacific way by alluring its leaders in the network. 
Islam has played and will continue to play a key role in the definition of the relations 
between politics and administration. Under the military rule, whether for fear or complicity, the 
Islamic leadership took the military’s agenda and behavior to the level of religious teachings. 
They preached that power has a divine source and that the Holy Koran prescribes that every 
human being respect and submit to it.  Whoever challenges power will be responsible for 
whatever will happen to him/her and in case of resistance resulting in death, this death is 
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consider as suicide and the deceased person will go straight to hell. These teachings forced civil 
servants to submit and endure the military arbitrary.  
With the advent of democratization, they became an important part of the state power 
especially the decision and policy-making power. They have also contributed to a large extent to 
the failure of the fight against corruption and encouraged impunity in Mali.  Both the 
administrative and the political community seek Muslim leaders’ advice and mystical protection 
to secure their positions in the power system and to escape sanctions for their misconducts.  
Because Muslim leaders detain secrets from both political officials and civil servants and receive 
their fair share of the public money embezzled from the state. In this position, they were able to 
take advantage of the vulnerability of both groups to influence decision and policy-making 
directly. No matter the misconduct might be, if they request that charges or sanctions be dropped 
against their protégés, nobody including the highest political authorities will challenge or discard 
their requests. Hence, the politicization of the civil service in Mali goes beyond definitions and 
explanations developed in Western societies. It has become the new name for the predatory 
behavior of the Malian élite against the state, a state looting conspiracy of state officials. 
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7.0  CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE PHENOMENON 
7.1 ARGUMENT REVIEWED 
This study has argued that the phenomenon of the politicization of the civil service in the context 
of democratization has been a hindrance for the civil service development into the institution 
needed to support and deliver democracy to citizens, has destroyed all state institutions and has 
endangered the democratization and development processes. The analysis of participants’ 
perspective along with the explanations of the phenomenon have revealed how and why state 
officials have capture the civil service and turned it into an instrument of widespread corruption, 
embezzlement, manipulations, blackmailing to secure their strong hold on power.  
Civil service is an apparatus whose role is to help shape public policies and implement 
them. Civil servants in a democratic society are accountable for their actions to both 
democratically elected politicians and citizens. Unfortunately in Mali accountability does not 
allow for scrutiny, given its vague, unclear and minimalistic nature.  
The Malian civil service is undergoing a serious crisis which showed itself in the form of 
crisis in both state authority and state legitimacy.  The association between civil servants and 
politicians has translated into the capture of the civil service by politicians causing a distortion of 
its functioning leading to its rupture with society. Politics has taken a centre stage in the Malian 
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civil service. Party members are placed at positions where they can access public money and 
divert it to finance parties and serve themselves in absolute impunity. Professional competence 
has been replaced with political loyalty. Party interests have been given primacy over public 
interest. Policy and decision-making have been biased because of political and religious 
interference.  
Moreover, state leadership has engaged in grand corruption and clientelist practices to 
reinforce their power. Individuals who have no administrative training have invaded the civil 
service. Political opportunism became the rule of the game and the survival mechanism for 
experienced and competent civil servants to maintain themselves in their positions. Individuals 
who do not work in the civil service enjoy budgets allocated to public agencies to cover their 
operating costs. Forged financial documents are established to justify the spending of public 
money. Inspectors who have the responsibility of reporting these practices are heavily bribed to 
buy their silence.  
The politicization of the civil service has contributed to the trivialization of the technical 
expertise aspect of the civil service to the detriment of its political aspects. Distribution of 
positions to political friends or to members of an ethnic group became more important than the 
“raison d’être” of public administration. Political and cultural logics have taken prominence 
over the ideals of public service and democracy to satisfy individual interests. This situation has 
left civil servants very little time and very little room to care about the management of public 
affairs, the promotion of citizens’ participation to government and to help them enjoy their rights 
and freedoms. As a result, partisan politics complicated by moral and ethical decay have 
translated into an inability to assist in sound decision and policies making as well as the neglect 
of quality service delivery to citizens.  
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Politicization has fueled a conflict between these values and the interest of civil servants, 
causing an ethical deficit. And above all, the politicization of the civil service has turned the 
democratization impetus into a dangerous confusion of roles which consequences are hard to 
imagine. This poses a tremendous challenge to the democratization process while threatening the 
building of a professional civil service as well as other democratic institutions in Mali.  
Everybody knows about it but nobody either complains or worries about it.  What is more 
troubling is that the civil service itself is yet unaware of the danger simply because the senior 
cadres wear both the hat of politics and the hat of administration. As they navigate between the 
political and the administrative worlds, they chose to ignore the situation and remain cynical 
about it. This crisis is a big challenge to the credibility of the civil service and the state.    
7.2 CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PHENOMENON 
This dissertation contributes to the African democratization literature on the interplay between 
politics and administration in African countries by showing the role of the African leadership in 
destabilizing Malian democratic institutions and disrupting the democratization process and 
purposefully weakening democratic institutions (Sartori, 1976; Lipset, Linz and Diamond, 1995; 
Diamond, 1999).  It also contributed to the civil service politicization theory by shedding a light 
on the administrative élite and the political leadership’s greed and conspiracy against the people 
with regard to the distribution of state resources as another type of politicization (Peters and 
Pierre, 2004).   
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7.2.1 Role of the African Leadership in Purposefully Weakening Democratic Institutions 
A key theme in the democratization literature is the destabilization of democratic institutions and 
disruption of the democratization process which has been pushing Mali toward the democratic 
category of pseudo-democracies (Sartori, 1976; Lipset, Linz and Diamond, 1995; Diamond, 
1999).  A “dominant” party system instituted in the first decade of the democratization 
experiment transformed the Malian democratizing regime into a party-state. In fact the most 
influential segment of the ruling party leadership was very reluctant to share power with other 
political organizations. 
 Because of  the confusion between the role of the “dominant” party and the role of state 
institutions, the élite managed to extend the party’s grip on the institutions of the state making 
them function like in the single-party regime by exercising a domineering influence on both the 
legislative and the judicial branches (Balogun, 2002).   The system went as far as to refuse the 
existence of the opposition in the party system in the form of severe humiliation, repression and 
exclusion. The consequences have been perverted institutions and highly fragmented and deeply 
divided political community. 
In the second decade the rules of the games were changed while the goal and outcome 
remained the same.  “Dominant” party rule has been replaced with a diffused party system under 
the name of “consensus” politics. A president with no party affiliation took advantage of the 
weak party system and a deeply divided political community to secure victory with the support 
of a segment of civil society and a party coalition including the main political parties which 
could not agree on the choice of their presidential candidates.  
As this political fragmentation reflected in the configuration of the National Assembly, 
state officials seized this opportunity to engage in grand political corruption with parties and civil 
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society organizations. Since no political party can raise sufficient funds to finance its activities, 
state resources were made available to those which claimed to support the executive agenda, 
through both formal and informal channels, making each and every political leadership who also 
constitute the administrative élite, dependent on the “generosity” of state higher authorities and 
feeling obligated to him without returning anything to citizens. The executive branch has 
succeeded in turning itself into both the “lord and the master” of both the legislative and judicial 
branches of Government. This showed without a doubt that the high authorities and party leaders 
have neither a democratic nor a development agenda for Mali.  
The current governance style also discouraged and destroyed the opposition. In the first 
five year, no party was in the opposition; all of them supported the regime. In the second five 
years, three parties declared themselves to be opposition parties and few individuals from the 
private sector have begun to challenge both the executive branch’s authority and to try to restore 
the legislative branch’s control function over the executive branch.   
All these actions were taken by the executive branch, tacitly approved be political leaders 
but without consulting the people.  There was a tendency to destroy the opposition through a 
tacit invitation to join in and the opposition seemed to be hoping for such an invitation to 
materialize.   
7.2.2 Civil Service Politicization Theory and élite’s Greed and Conspiracy against  the 
People 
The definition of the concept of politicization as a personnel management and administration 
practice (Peters and Pierre, 2004), the normative definition of politicization as the degree of the 
public sector autonomy from the political power and an inappropriate political interference 
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within bureaucracy (Rylander,1969),  the regulatory definition as it happens  when  the public 
sector grows along with an increase of it regulation of private matters (Derlin, 1985), the 
functionalistic definition which implies that politicization occurs when the public sector reacts 
positively to political signals (Koch, 1985), the relational definition which deals more with the 
relationship between the political and administrative power, the third type of definition considers 
the relationship between bureaucracy and its environment outside government, the representative 
definition which argues that politicization refers to the extent that civil servants reflect the 
composition of population they are hired to serve (Kingsley,1944; Krislov and Rosenbloom, 
1983), the behavioral definition which has to do with the attitudes and behavior of bureaucrats 
favoring pluralism and regard competition between parties as natural (Aberbach et al., 1981; 
Moulin 1975), and the last definition which sees politicization as being recruitment-related and 
regarded as patronage, all of these definitions have failed to captured the Malian phenomenon.   
In the first decade of democratization, the “dominant” party permeated and used the civil 
service to control and take advantage of state resources. In addition, the civil service has been 
also transformed into a private property, funding agency for the “dominant” party as well as 
coercion and exclusion machinery.  Party cadres were appointed at strategic positions in the civil 
service because of their loyalty to the party to contribute to the financing of the party.  Those 
cadres who are known to be also political leaders were removed and replaced with party cadres, 
mistreated, humiliated and demonized. It has also tried to exclude cadres who served the defunct 
military regime. In response to this attempt, cadres decided to adhere to the “dominant” party to 
secure their positions and avoid violence against them.  
Since the advent of “consensus” politics, at first, parties’ who declared their support to 
the highest authorities got the chance to have their cadres access higher civil service positions.  
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They have been appointed to these positions to “help” their parties, meaning to divert public 
money to contribute to the financing of theirs parties. Learning from past experiences, the 
opposition disappeared and all the parties declared that they support the ruling power and they 
were also included in the distribution of higher civil service positions. So the looting of the State 
continued under a collective form and according to parties’ political weight.  In the second five 
years, three parties identified themselves as opposition parties. However, their cadres remained 
in their positions and kept “helping” their parties.  
Yet the looting of state coffers continued.  As civil servants became opportunistic, their 
survival techniques became “nomadism” meaning moving from one party to the other in search 
for appointment opportunities to some of the higher civil service positions.  When they gain 
access to these positions, they “help” both their parties and “help” themselves without fear of 
sanctions. It also revealed that the leadership has not yet been able to abandon the single-party 
regime practices and that the negative concept of community concept of power is a very feature 
of the Malian democratic life. It finally showed that the “élite” is the true predator of democracy.    
By conducting the ethnographic approach, the researcher interrogated participants about 
the meaning of politicization and the relation politics-administration in the context of 
democratization. When participants started talking about these issues, the researcher realized that 
they all knew about what has been going on which nobody dared to denounce. Studying the 
politicization of the Malian civil service in the context of democratization revealed that Mali is 
far behind in its search for democratic direction.  The Malian case confirmed and reinforced the 
argument that impoverished nations of Africa have little chance to succeed in building a 
democratic society. Above all, this type of politicization has been discussed nowhere in the 
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theories that are out there. This research finds it important that this type of politicization of the 
civil be known in both democratic and politicization research communities. 
The ethnographic method of studying the concept of politicization of the civil service in 
the context of democratization, has uncovered a new type of politicization, the administrative 
and political “élite’s ” association to distribute public money among themselves and disrupt the 
democratization process in the name of “consensus’ politics through the weakening of state 
institutions without asking for the consent of the people. In short, it has exposed the predatory 
behavior of the Malian “élite”.  
7.3 CONCLUSION 
This is the true face of democratization in Mali republic, one of the poorest nations in the World 
suffering from its élite’s lack of  vision for their country, the  breaking of the promise they  has 
made to the Malian people at the National Conference to democratize Mali and bring social and 
economic well-being to the people. This has shown the élite’s betrayal of the Malian people who 
had placed very high expectations and a great faith and pledged to mobilize around its élite’s in 
the endeavor of building a democratic society believed to ease social and economic problems the 
nation faces.   
Today, the masses’ hope has turned into a big disappointment and the alienation between 
the state and its citizens is apparent. The Malian democratization experiment is producing the 
weapons of its own destruction.  Despite poverty alleviation programs, poverty has not receded 
in Mali. Hunger, malnutrition and maladies are enduring phenomena in Mali. The late musician 
Bob Marley said it in one of his songs that a hungry man is an angry man. In addition to these 
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debilitating issues, the powerful have begun to be vocal about the élite’s arrogant and predatory 
behavior.  In Mali the recent crises and clashes between the state and citizens are forerunning 
signs of a building social malaise which may erupt some day in a form of a violent revolution.  
The rupture of the state along with its civil service from society, the deteriorating 
economic and social conditions of the Malian people, the joint conspiracy of the administrative 
and political leaders against the people, and the insidious and organized grand corruption under 
implementation are likely to trigger another violent confrontation between the state and its 
citizens in Mali. Malians have become suspicious of democracy, the institutions and their 
leaders. From the way the Malian élite’s has been abusing the states and its citizens, nobody 
knows what the future hold for Mali Republic. In the meantime, this is the true face of 
democratization experiment in Mali.  Democracy has yet to take hold in Mali; as of now, it is a 
mirage, it is a fake one. But there is poverty, hypocrisy, extortion, arrogance, immorality and 
manipulation to name a few.  All these maladies constitute the challenges of democracy in Mali.  
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